Disclosing a Criminal Conviction on a Licensure Application — Part 2

In my last blog I wrote about real estate applicant who failed to disclose on his Real Estate Commission application a criminal conviction. Upon discovery the Commission revoked his license and the Commonwealth Court approved of the action. Today’s blog involves the exact opposite result for one of my physician clients.

On October 14, 2014 Dr. Christopher Elder, a Texas licensed physician, submitted an application to Pennsylvania’s Medical Board for a license to practice medicine and surgery. Unlike Hawes, Elder disclosed a 2010 federal conviction for aiding in abetting and conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. On April 2, 2015 the Pennsylvania Medical Board provisionally denied Elder’s application. The Board maintained the Criminal History Record Information Act, 18 Pa. C.S. § 9124(c)(1) (CHIRA), authorized licensure denial because of Elder’s felony conviction. The Board also denied licensure, maintaining Elder lacked good moral character and did not possess the requisite training and experience.

Elder appealed the conditional denial of licensure. At the hearing before a the Hearing Officer Elder presented his credentials, training and experience, the facts of the criminal case, and character evidence. Consistent with prior Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent, Elder maintained the criminal conviction was too remote for the Board to determine such affected his current ability to do his job lawfully. Elder’s mitigating evidence established his minor role in the criminal case and his rehabilitation since release from prison.

The Hearing Officer weighed Elder’s witness’ credibility and Elder’s mitigating evidence. He ruled in Elder’s favor, stating that while Elder’s criminal conduct demonstrated moral turpitude at the time of its commission, Elder presented persuasive evidence of his rehabilitation and present moral fitness to practice medicine. A period of probation was required to allow Elder the ability to secure appropriate supplemental educational classes for competency.

The Medical Board rejected the Hearing Officer’s proposed adjudication. The Board determined Elder’s explanation of his crime displayed a lack of remorse and acceptance of responsibility, that Elder still lacked the moral turpitude to be a doctor in Pennsylvania, and lacked the educational qualifications. Elder appealed, maintaining the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious in light of the competent, uncontested character evidence and age of the criminal act.

Commonwealth Court agreed with Elder. For the second time in as many months, the Court took a Pennsylvania licensing board out to the wood shed and gave it a stern whipping. The Court emphasized that Boards must look at the age of the crime as it related to current fitness. Remote, past dereliction, must be considered where an agency seeks to revoke a professional license on the basis of a criminal conviction. Secretary of Revenue v. John’s Vending Corporation, 453 Pa. 488, 309 A.2d 358 (1973).

The Court explained that “where the prior convictions do not in anyway reflect upon the [applicant’s] present ability to properly discharge the responsibilities required by the position, we hold that the convictions cannot provide a basis for the revocation of a … license.”

For Elder I determined he must present a clear explanation of the criminal enterprise accompanied by extensive mitigating evidence. The Board was dismissive of Elder’s mitigating evidence, stating that “[r]ather than to take responsibility and express remorse for his criminal misconduct during his testimony, [Elder] attempted to minimize his role.” Elder responded that such did not minimize his criminal conduct but explained his role in the underlying conspiracy, which the Board misconstrued as a collateral attack on his conviction. Elder directs the Court to Nguyen v. Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, State Board of Cosmetology, 53 A.3d 100 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).

The Commonwealth Court reviewed the entire record, the Federal Court sentencing transcript, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals decision, and each witness’ testimony of Elder’s character and rehabilitation. The Court emphatically states:

The record does not support the Board’s assertion that Elder failed to express remorse or to take responsibility for his criminal conduct. At the hearing, Elder stated that he was “really” and “deeply” remorseful and he “absolutely accept[s]” responsibility.” He presented witnesses to attest to his remorse. The Board did not explain how this testimony was inadequate or what else Elder could have said. Elder’s attempt to place his criminal conduct into context and explain his role in the conspiracy does not demonstrate a lack of remorse or rehabilitation, as the Board presumed. The Board simply made a subjective determination that was contrary to that of the Hearing Examiner, who directly observed Elder and his witnesses, and accepted his evidence on remorse.

We hold that the Board erred and abused its discretion in reaching the conclusion that Elder does not have the present moral character required for a license. Elder’s crimes were committed over 14 years ago and were isolated to a single episode in his life. He has served his sentence. The Board erred by categorizing Elder’s evidence as not accepting responsibility when he was simply explaining his role in the conspiracy. The Board’s conclusion on Elder’s moral character cannot be reconciled with John’s Vending, 453 Pa. 488, 309 A.2d 358, or Nguyen, 53 A.3d 100. It did not take into account its own findings that Elder’s conduct since 2004 has been not only free of criminal conduct but dedicated to significant volunteer and public service activities.

In reversing the Board and instructing it to grant licensure, the Commonwealth Court determined the Medical Board sanction was a “manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion and purely an arbitrary execution of the agency’s duties or functions.” This is an amazing Commonwealth Court conclusion. Elder disclosed his federal criminal conviction for conspiracy to illegally distribute drugs. Elder set forth his long road to redemption, of rehabilitation, and his true character. The Court, a court of law, not the quasi-legal self-protecting Medical Board, looked at the facts – which mattered — and granted licensure.

Long hard preparation of this case won the day. My methodical approach to making a clear record of personal character recovery, redemption, and rehabilitation, could not be ignored. This cases reveals that proper presentation, preservation of the record, and coordination of witness is paramount to success. Call me to discuss your case.

Act 6 of 2018 — All Licensees Must Report Criminal or Disciplinary Charges with in 30 Days

Act 6 of 2018 is a new law in 2018. It represents a fundamental shift in Pennsylvania licensees’ duty to report criminal charges and disciplinary actions filed against them in any jurisdiction in the entire country. The General Assembly passed the new law in anticipation of medical marijuana. The enforcement environment is getting much stricter in Pennsylvania. Every Pennsylvania professional licensee must report the misdemeanor and felony criminal charges to their respective board within 30 days receipt of criminal charges. It is a disciplinary offense for any licensee to not report within 30 days of receipt of criminal charges.

Act 6 of 2018 specifically authorizes the The Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs (“BPOA”) to subscribe to JNET. My prior blogs discuss JNET, the criminal reporting database network to which the Nursing Board began subscribing.   JNET now levels the reporting responsibility and Boards learning of its licensees’ criminal conduct.  There was a significant difference between nurses and doctors, pharmacist, realtors, cosmetologists, and funeral directors (and all others) in their criminal charge reporting responsibilities. All licensees are now treated equal. Licensees can not wait to report — thinking at a preliminary hearing charges will be reduced to a summary offense, for which there is a guilty plea. The charging is the reportable event, not the end result.

This all began in 2014.  In late 2014 the General Assembly modified Pennsylvania professional licensing regulations to require nurses to report criminal charges, not conviction, within 30 day days of charges being filing. The BPOA utilized the last several years to create a new enforcement infrastructure and mechanisms to insure disciplinary action is initiated against all nurses who either reported or they learned of criminal conduct or did not report at all.  The reporting responsibility is in addition to reporting criminal charges upon licensee renewal.

Through JNET the Nursing Board became familiar with the criminal reporting subscription service and its information power. Obviously the Board created a flow chart starting at receipt of criminal information through to disciplinary charge initiation for failure to report. The Nursing Board worked out the differences between JNET and nurse reporting of charges. Steps between failure to report, Board investigation, document review, and charges have also been ironed out.

Apparently BPOA had a significantly positive experience with JNET’s notification process, allowing it to better enforce nurses’ reporting responsibility. Expanding 30-day reporting of criminal activity to all other 25 licensing boards will inundate the BPOA with information regarding licensees’ criminal behavior.  This will produce some delays in failure to report and initiation of criminal charges.

The Act also gives the BPOA prosecutor not just the authority but the command to initiate within 30 days an emergent suspension if a licensee’s criminal acts reveal a clear and present danger to the public. The licensee is afforded a preliminary hearing to contest the automatic license suspension. This “automatic suspension process” is not new.

All licensees were spared the obligation to report summary Drug Act violations. By this I mean summary charges for disorderly conduct written by cops giving a break to licensees caught with illegal marijuana. This reporting requirement was in the original versions of the bill but stricken from the final version. The Act includes authority for every Board to institute a schedule of fines for escalating number of failure to report charges.

Act 6 includes a very limited right of expungement. This is only for disciplinary action for failure to comply with continued education requirements. The law explicitly precludes any expungement of any disciplinary order by any board for any other offense. Aside from capping Board fines to $10,000, BPOA can enter a judgment against the licensee if the fine is not paid in 5 years.

Call me to discuss your case.

Road Riding in the Counties

My personal and business travel is taking me to more counties throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania than ever before. The local courthouse houses in the county seats are really interesting for me. The court houses — arenas of legal combat — are throw backs to more glorious days when the local big trial was the event of the year.

In the past I took for granted these architectural gems that are spread throughout the various townships and boroughs within which I practice.   Now, I seek out and explore the courthouses. Whether by car or bike, I am having fun.

This spring I bought myself a road bike. I ride ferociously around the eastern part of Pennsylvania. I have the pleasure of routinely riding through Philadelphia,  Conshohocken, Norristown, and Valley Forge Park. All are within 5-15 miles of my house.  Sometimes I ride from my house to Philadelphia and back.

A recent Saturday took me on a further ride — from West Chester to the City of Lancaster. The road ride began in West Chester and ended in Lancaster County, behind the Court House. We departed West Chester through its southern rolling-hills of Brandywine Township. We followed Brandywine Creek through East Bradford Township, Downingtown  to West Fallowfield Township. One word — marvelous.

After 90 minutes the group ride, with me at the back of the pack, entered Lancaster County. I was greeted by signs for farm fresh brown eggs, personally constructed homes, garages, sheds, and wonderful antique tractors.

Tractors, tractors, tractors. But not your ordinary tractors.  These were green, yellow and red tractors, pulled by horses. The drawn mowing tractors were hard at work, gas free, mowing lawns and fields. Some tractors were too tired to work, gathering rust. There was no worry about rubber tires rotting. Metal wheels needed no repairs.

The morning aromas changed with each turn in the road. Pungent cow, horse, pig dung awoke my sinuses.  Crushed wild blackberries and dripping vines of honeysuckles permeated homesteads. The morning dew clung to grass blades and tree branches through the Brandywine Creek bike route. Entering Lancaster and riding down Duke Street brought with it fresh bakery smells and the Lancaster County brewing Company.

In each county seat, I look for a small coffee shop. Lancaster’s Prince Street Café did not disappoint. The fresh cappuccino after a 50 mile ride awakened all of my exhausted senses. Orange juice and fresh eggs on a croissant made me even happier. The pictures below reflects the quaintness of the café and the wonderful effort the bakers and barista’s gave the Saturday morning breakfast crowd.

An unexpected joy came as I began to get ready for my drive home. Just to the west of the Prince Street Café is the Lancaster County Donuts Shop. Homemade donuts and holes are sold with every conceivable topping — as if I was in an ice cream shop — tantalized my taste buds. The sublime chocolate with vanilla cream cheese frosting carried me through the rest of my day.

I could not have been happier. Content and satisfied by a hard work out, great ride with new friends and a bulging stomach.  Blair and Clearfield counties also did not disappoint. I’ll keep you posted.

What is and is not Psychology?

In preparation for recent hearing, I came across an extremely complex legal topic. The issue is to what extent of can licensees under the Pennsylvania State Board of Social Workers, Marriage and Family Therapists and Professional Counselors  practice their profession short of practicing psychology.

What are these practices?

• “PRACTICE OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY THERAPY.” The professional application of psychotherapeutic and family systems theories and techniques to the evaluation, assessment and treatment of mental and emotional disorders, whether cognitive, affective or behavioral. The term includes the evaluation and assessment of mental and emotional disorders in the context of significant interpersonal relationships and the delivery of psychotherapeutic services to individuals, couples, families and groups for the purpose of treating such disorders.

• “PRACTICE OF PROFESSIONAL COUNSELING.” Includes, to the extent compatible with a practitioner’s education and professional competence, all of the following:
  • (1)  The application of principles and practices of counseling, mental health and human development to evaluate and facilitate human growth and adjustment throughout the life span and to prevent and treat mental, emotional or behavioral disorders and associated stresses which interfere with mental health and normal human growth and development.
  • (2)  The evaluation and assessment of normal and abnormal mental, emotional, social, educational, vocational, family and behavioral functioning throughout the life span; individual, group, family counseling and psychotherapy; crisis intervention, career counseling and educational and vocational counseling; functional assessment of persons with disabilities; and professional consulting.
  • (3)  Professional counselors’ utilization of verbal and nonverbal approaches and specialization in the use of arts-based therapeutic approaches, such as art, dance, music or drama, to accomplish treatment objectives.

• “PRACTICE OF SOCIAL WORK.” Offering to render or rendering a service in which a special knowledge of social resources, human personality and capabilities and therapeutic techniques is directed at helping people to achieve adequate and productive personal, interpersonal and social adjustments in their individual lives, in their families and in their community or holding oneself out to the public by any title or description of services incorporating the term “social worker” or using any words or symbols indicating or tending to indicate that one is a social worker, except as otherwise provided by this act.

Conversely, the Professional Psychologists Practice Act, 63 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1203(3) also provides significant guidance.  The Psychologist Act creates a separate exemption for qualified members of other recognized professions including, but not limited to Social Workers, Marriage and Family Therapists and Professional Counselors. This section  1203(3) of the Psychologists Act states:

Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent qualified members of other recognized professions, including, but not limited to, clergy, drug and alcohol abuse counselors, mental health counselors, social workers, crisis intervention counselors, marriage and family therapists, pastoral counselors, rehabilitation counselors and psychoanalysts, from doing work of a psychological nature consistent with the training and the code of ethics of their respective professions or to prevent volunteers from providing services in crisis or emergency situations. This exemption applies only to the practice of the respective listed profession.

So, what is practicing Psychology?  “Practice of psychology” means offering to render or rendering to individuals, corporations, institutions, governmental agencies, or the public for remuneration any service involving the following:

(i) The application of established principles of learning, motivation, perception, thinking, and emotional relationships to problems of personality evaluation, group relations, and behavior adjustment. The application of said principles includes, but is not restricted to, counseling and the use of psychological methods with persons or groups with adjustment problems in the areas of work, family, school, and person?-1 relationships; . measuring and testing· of personality, intelligence, aptitudes, and emotions, and offering services as a psychological consultant.

(ii)(a) “Measuring and testing,” consisting of the psychological assessment and evaluation of abilities, attitudes, aptitudes, achievements, adjustments, motives, personality dynamics and/or other psychological attributes of individuals, or groups of individuals by means of standardized measurements or other methods, techniques or procedures recognized by the science and profession of psychology, (b) “psychological methods,” consisting of the application of principles of learning and motivation in an interpersonal situation with the objectives of modification of perception and adjustment, and requiring highly developed skills in the disciplines, techniques, and methods of altering through learning processes, attitudes, feelings, values, self-concept, personal goals· and adaptive patterns, ( c) “psychological consulting,” consisting of interpreting or reporting upon scientific fact or theory in psychology, rendering expert psychological opinion, psychological evaluation, or engaging in applied psychological research.

This definition contains numerous elements, which can be broken down as follows: (1) the practitioner offers to render or renders (2) to individuals, corporations, institutions, governmental agencies, or the public (3) for remuneration ( 4) any service involving one or more of the following:

(a) the application of established principles of learning, motivation, perception, thinking, and emotional relationships to problems of personality evaluation, group relations,, and behavior adjustment, which established principles include measuring and testing of personality, intelligence, aptitudes, and ’emotions, and offering services as a psychological consultant; or (b) psychological assessment and evaluation of abilities, attitudes, aptitudes, achievements, adjustments, motives, personality dynamics and/or other psychological attributes of individuals by means of standardized measurements or other methods, techniques or procedures recognized by the science and profession of psychology; or (c) “psychological consulting,” consisting of interpreting or reporting upon scientific fact or theory in psychology, rendering expert psychological opinion, psychological evaluation, or engaging in applied psychological research.

In applying these definitions to the exemptions, 49 Pa. Code § 41.7 incorporates a statement of policy that provides guidelines for determining whether a given group qualifies as a “recognized profession” for the purposes of section 63 P .S. § 1203(3). Those guidelines read as follows:

(1) The group’s activity and focus must be based on an identifiable body of theoretical knowledge which, although it may include areas of coII1I11on knowledge shared with psychology, is demonstrably different, in the aggregate, from the body of theoretical knowledge underlying psychology.
(2) The group must regulate entrance into professional membership by means of standards of knowledge, training and proficiency generally accepted by the profession with which it identifies.
(3) ) . The group’s activity must be guided by generally accepted quality standards, ethical principles and requirements for an independent profession.
(4) The group must exhibit the ordinary accoutrements of a profession, which may include, but are not limited· to, professional journals, regional and national conferences, specific academic curricula and degrees, continuing education opportunities, regional and national certification and awards for outstanding practice within the profession.

More importantly, Section 1203(3) does not absolving these other licensed professionals from the prohibition against holding themselves out to the public by any title incorporating the words “psychological,” “psychologist” or “psychology” without first obtaining a license to practice psychology pursuant to the act.  The blanket advertising limitation set forth in section 1203 states:

It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the practice of psychology or to offer or attempt to do so or to hold himself out to the public by any title or description of services incorporating the words “psychological,” psychologist” or “psychology” unless he shall first have obtained a license pursuant to this act, except as hereinafter provided:

Pursuant to the Ethical Principal 4(b) of the board’s regulations, “only psychologists licensed by a state board of psychologists examiners may be listed under the heading of psychologists in the yellow pages of the telephone directory.” 49 Pa. Code § 41.61.

Dezen v. Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational Affairs, 722 A.2d 1135 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) discussed this issue. Dezen, a licensed social worker advertised in the Yellow Pages his ability to provide psychological counseling and similar services. The board found that he was not licensed as a psychologist and could not advertise his testing services as such.  The case law clearly precludes any other licensed professionals from holding themselves out to the public by any title or description of services incorporating the term using any words or symbols indicating portending to indicate that he or she his license or authorized to practice in any other capacity send their specific licensed professional.

Call me to discuss your case.

 

A Great Commonwealth Court Appellate Review

April has been a busy month for appellate decisions.  A recent case of my was decided in my client’s favor.  Important lessons are learned from this case.

On March 27, 2015, the Board issued an order to show cause why Freeman’s license should not be suspended, revoked, restricted, or a civil penalty imposed, for violating the Practical Nurse Law, 63 P.S. §§651-667.8, and the Criminal History Record Information Act (CHRIA), 18 Pa. C.S. §§9101-9183. The six counts set forth by the Board as follows:

(1) under Section 16(a)(5) of the Practical Nurse Law, 63 P.S. §666(a)(5),3 because Freeman was convicted of a crime of moral turpitude (criminal conspiracy to commit theft by deception from Home Depot);

(2) under Section 16(a)(5) of the Practical Nurse Law, because Freeman was convicted of a crime of moral turpitude (theft by deception from a Majestic Oaks resident);

(3) under Section 9124(c)(2) of CHRIA,4 because Freeman was convicted of a misdemeanor related to the profession (theft by deception from a Majestic Oaks resident);

(4) under Section 16(a)(4) of the Practical Nurse Law, 63 P.S. §666(a)(4),5 in that Freeman [*4]  committed fraud or deceit in securing her admission to practice (by failing to truthfully answer the question about having pending criminal charges on her biennial renewal application);

(5) under Section 16(a)(8) of the Practical Nurse Law, 63 P.S. §666(a)(8),6 in that Freeman was guilty of unprofessional conduct (by committing theft by deception from a Majestic Oaks resident); and

(6) under Section 16(a)(3) of the Practical Nurse Law, 63 P.S. §666(a)(3),7 for violating the Board’s regulation at 49 Pa. Code §21.148(b)(4),8 which prohibits nurses from misappropriating property or money from patients (by committing theft by deception from a Majestic Oaks resident).

When the board entered a penalty of license suspension rather than probation. Factually, my presentation of the evidence at the hearing was given great weight on appeal.

Freeman testified on her own behalf. Regarding the criminal charges that led to ARD, Freeman explained that a friend had asked her to drive her to Home Depot to make a return. Her friend did not have a receipt or her driver’s license, which the store required to process a return. Accordingly, Freeman gave her driver’s license to the store clerk. While Freeman was waiting for the return to be processed, her friend borrowed her car keys and placed shoplifted merchandise in Freeman’s car.

Regarding the conviction for theft, Freeman acknowledged that she used a patient’s personal financial information to pay her utility bills. She explained:

Well, at the time, I was raising my son on my own as a single mother. Everything was on the verge of being cut off. You know, I didn’t want to have to go back to the shelter. I made a stupid decision to do that.

Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 7/2/2015, at 33; R.R. 56. Freeman expressed remorse for her actions, stating:

I mean, I’m just nervous because — you know, I worked so hard to get where I am today. I do regret the — some of the decision[s] that I’ve made, because I love my career. I love helping people. I love what I do, and based on the decisions that I’ve made, it’s just jeopardizing my whole career. I had to spend lots of money, you know, for lawyers and court costs, fees and everything. But yes, I do regret being here today, in the situation that I’m in today, I mean.

Id. at 43-44; R.R. 66-67.

Freeman recounted the difficult circumstances she overcame in her personal life. Freeman explained that, after graduating from high school, she became involved in an abusive relationship for approximately one year. She moved to a shelter, where she lived for two years. Id. at 46; R.R. 69. While living at the shelter, Freeman enrolled in a certified nursing assistant (CNA) training program and obtained her CNA license. She found employment and, after saving some money, moved out of the shelter and into a one-bedroom apartment. Shortly thereafter, Claimant gave birth to a son, for whom she was solely responsible because the father was incarcerated. Freeman worked several jobs while continuing her nursing education and, in April 2013, earned her certificate in practical nursing.

As I have said many times, mitigation evidence is huge.  Handling these cases at a hearing requires trained counsel to properly distill the facts for the court.  On appeal, finding the winning argument also takes experience.  In this case, the multitude of criminal allegations confused the Board.  It disciplined her for a conviction she did not suffer.

Freeman challenges the Board’s sanction because it cited crimes for which she was not convicted and facts not in the record. The record showed that Freeman pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit theft at Home Depot and one count of theft for stealing financial information from a nursing home resident. She was not convicted of stealing the resident’s jewelry; that criminal charge was nolle prossed. The Commonwealth responds that it matters only that Freeman was convicted of theft. Whether it was theft of jewelry and banking account information, or just banking account information, is irrelevant. The Board argues that its reference to a conviction of theft of jewelry was harmless error. We disagree.

In making its decision to increase the penalty, the Board stated that “[Freeman] was convicted of theft for stealing jewelry and using the bank account of an elderly patient to pay her personal bills.” Board Adjudication, 7/26/2016, at 1; Freeman Brief at P29 (emphasis added). This fact is not supported by the record. The charge related to theft of jewelry was nolle prossed, and there is a difference between a criminal charge and a criminal conviction. Freeman asserts this requires a reversal of the Board’s sanction. The Board responds that the record supports this disputed statement and directs this Court to the Hearing Examiner’s finding of fact that “[t]he charge of Theft by False Impression was the result of [Freeman’s] theft of property including jewelry and checking account information….” Proposed Adjudication, 11/19/2015, at 5; Freeman Brief at P39.

A charge is an accusation or allegation that a person committed an offense. By contrast, a conviction is a finding by a court that a person is guilty of a criminal offense. In short, the finding of fact cited by the Board does not support its assertion that Freeman was “convicted” of “stealing jewelry.”

We won this case.  The license suspension was reversed.  The case has been sent back down to the Board.

 

 

Pennsylvania’s New DUI Case Law

Since Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016), Pennsylvania’s DUI statute as applied to blood draws and refusals to submit to blood draws has because unenforceable.  The illegal escalation of criminal penalties for refusing to submit to a blood draw, or even being told of the enhanced penalties, has created an untenable situation for every police department in the Commonwealth.  They are still doing it wrong. Do not plead guilty.  Fight these cases.

Some departments are still reading the old refusal warnings.  Some are still taking people to the hospital when a simple breath test will work.  Some are making up new refusal warnings.  Some are trying to get people to freely consent to a blood draw without telling them of the consequences.  These, I think are all illegal procedures.  The cases are coming down every week limiting how the Commonwealth can gather evidence and what evidence can be used to prosecute the cases under the post-Birchfield paradigm.

It is the Commonwealth’s burden of proof to establish a DUI suspect’s consent to give blood is the product of essentially free and unconstrained choice—not the result of duress, coercion, expressed or applied. Commonwealth v. Gaetano, 2017 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1241 (April 4, 2017); Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323, 2016 PA Super 293 (Pa. Super. filed December 20, 2016). The standard for measuring the scope of a person’s consent is based upon an objective evaluation of what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the person who gave such consent.

Gaetano and Evans  in applying Birchfield hold that the Commonwealth may not impose criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test.  Reading a person the now illegal O’Connell warning’s, or any other fabricated, constructed, newly designed version thereof, threat of enhanced criminal prosecution and incarceration vitiate consensual submission to a blood draw absent a warrant. Gaetano and Evans state it is the Commonwealth’s burden of proof to establish that a defendant’s consent is freely given and not the product of coercion.

It is not the a defendant’s burden of proof to establish or place in the record his subjective feelings of coercion. Commonwealth v. Fink, 2016 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 4704, *13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).  The mere language of the O’Connell warning, or any other fabricated, constructed, newly designed version thereof, include a threat of enhanced criminal prosecution are coercive and the Commonwealth cannot establish coercive free consent.   Objective evidence of duress that is the basis for Gaetano and Evans will be present in almost every defendant’s arrest record, thus vitiating alleged voluntary consent to give blood draw.

Upon deciding a Motion to Suppress the blood evidence, trial courts cannot, and it is irrelevant to the constitutional evaluation under the Supreme Court precedent, put the burden on the defendant, as to what their objective state of mind was upon giving consent for a blood draw.

As for the specific refusal statute, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547, Superior Court has concluded that it or police departments newly fabricated, constructed threat of enhanced criminal prosecution vitiates any consent given to a warrantless blood draw.  Gaetano and Evans maintain that subjecting defendants to warrantless blood draws based upon the illegal O’Connell warning consent provisions (or any other fabricated, constructed, newly designed but improper version thereof, threat of enhanced criminal prosecution) is illegal and unconstitutional under US Supreme Court and Pennsylvania appellate court jurisprudence.

In looking at the totality of the circumstances the court must determine that any consent is not voluntary and coerced. Birchfield’s review of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on blood testing compels a review of Missouri v. McNeely, 566 U.S ___ (2012),  where the Court refused to adopt a per se rule that “whenever an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol, circumstances will necessary exist because blood alcohol content evidence is inheritably evanescent.”  Id. at ____, (slip op., at 8).

McNeely is applicable in Pennsylvania DUI cases because officers in drunk-driving investigations can reasonably obtain a warrant before having a blood sample drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search.  The Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.  They are no doing so.  The court has held that it is not enough to claim that “circumstances may make obtaining a warrant impractical such that the alcohol’s dissipation will support an exigency.” This is to be decided in each case on its facts.  The Court did not create a general rule based upon “considerable over generalization” that a per se rule would reflect.

Pennsylvania has said the same thing.  “The Fourth Amendment to the [United States] Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of [the Pennsylvania] Constitution protects Pennsylvania’s citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 2012 PA Super 118, 46 A.3d 781, 784 (Pa. Super. 2012). “A search conducted without a warrant is deemed to be unreasonable and therefore constitutionally impermissible, unless an established exception applies.” Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (Pa. 2000).  “Exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception . . . , the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. Dunnavant, 2013 PA Super 38, 63 A.3d 1252, 1257 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013).

As for blood, the “administration of a blood test . . . performed by an agent of, or at the direction of the government” constitutes a search under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152, 615 A.2d 308, 315 (Pa. 1992); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966).  Since the DUI blood tests are typically performed without a warrant, the search is preemptively unreasonable “and therefore constitutionally impermissible, unless an established exception applies.”

In determining the validity of a given consent, the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a consent is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice — not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne — under the totality of the circumstances.  The standard for measuring the scope of a person’s consent is based on an objective evaluation of what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the person who gave the consent.  Such evaluation includes an objective examination of the maturity, sophistication and mental or emotional state of the defendant. Gauging the scope of a defendant’s consent is an inherent and necessary part of the process of determining, on the totality of the circumstances presented, whether the consent is objectively valid, or instead the product of coercion, deceit, or misrepresentation.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 621 Pa. 218, 77 A.3d 562, 573 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations, quotations, and corrections omitted).

I think the DUI case law requires that the police tell the arrestee of the consequences of a refusal to take the test so that he can make a knowing and conscious choice.  When requested to take a breathalyzer or blood test, the court insists that in addition to telling an arrestee that his license will be suspended for one year if he refuses to take a breathalyzer test, the police instruct the arrestee that such rights are inapplicable to the breathalyzer test and that the arrestee does not have the right to consult with an attorney or anyone else prior to taking the test. An arrestee is entitled to this information so that his choice to take a breathalyzer test can be knowing and conscious and we believe that requiring the police to qualify the extent of the right to counsel is neither onerous nor will it unnecessarily delay the taking of the test.  Commonwealth v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873 (1989).

In many cases, the police claim a defendant allegedly consents to the warrantless blood draw during a custodial interrogation after the police inform him of some fabricated, constructed, newly designed informed consent language not court or legislatively approved. This is not proper.  Currently, the only available law requires the police to advise a defendant that: “if you refuse to submit to chemical test and you are convicted or plead to violating § 3802(a)(1) related to impaired driving under the vehicle code, because of your refusal, you will be subject to more severe penalties set forth in § 3804(c)[,] relating to penalties, the same as if you were — if you would be convicted at the highest rate of alcohol.”

This makes the verbal consent to a warrantless blood draw  during a non-mirandized, custodial interrogation in illegal statement subject to suppression.  Absent verbal consent, there is none.  Further, since Birchfield held that  a state may not “impose criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to [a warrantless blood] test,” the police officer’s advisory to any defendant on the non-legislatively permitted language illegal. Birchfield, 136 S.Ct. at 2186. This then requires a court to conclude that the search incident to arrest doctrine does not justify  warrantless blood testing compelled through enhanced criminal sentencing provisions for refusing to take that blood test.  This in turn means that the enhanced criminal offense, both in charges filed and potential sentencing scheme set forth in 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(b)(1)(2), compels this County Courts of Common Pleas to hold that “motorists cannot be deemed to of consent to submit to a blood test on fate of committing a criminal offense.”

Call me to discuss you DUI and blood draw evidence.

Pennsylvania’s DUI Statute and Warrantless Blood Draws On An Unconscious Person

Since Birchfield v. N. Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2173, 2185, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016), the Pennsylvania Supreme court has swiftly moved to invigorate and buttress Pennsylvania civil liberties and motor vehicle drivers’ privacy rights.  On July 19, 2017, in Commonwealth v. Myers, 2017 Pa. LEXIS 1689, 2017 WL 3045867, the Court upheld lower court rulings granting suppression of blood evidence seized from a drunk, unconscious motorist.

The facts are simple. Myers was visibly drunk, operated the motor vehicle, was arrested by one police officer, and taken to the hospital for a blood draw. A second officer arrived at the hospital, did not observe Myers or ask his consent to take his blood before hospital staff administered medication rendering Myers unconscious.  Unable to respond to his commands, the 2nd police officer instructed the nurse to draw Myers’ blood for testing.  The police did not secure a warrant to draw or search drunk, unconscious Myers’ blood.

The Court granted the appeal to consider the lawfulness of a warrantless blood draw conducted upon a motorist who, having been arrested for DUI, had then been rendered unconscious by medical personnel before a police officer provided O’Connell warnings and before the officer requested the motorist’s submission to a chemical test. The Philadelphia Municipal Court, the Court of Common Pleas, and Superior Court all held that a blood draw conducted under these circumstances is impermissible, and that the results of the derivative blood test are accordingly inadmissible at trial. Because the seizure of Myers‘ blood violated Pennsylvania’s implied consent statute, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, and because no other circumstances justified the failure to obtain a search warrant, the Court affirmed all of the lower courts’ decisions suppressing the blood evidence.

At the intermediate appellate level, in Commonwealth v. Myers, 2015 PA Super 140, 118 A.3d 1122 (Pa. Super. 2015), the court stated that Subsection 1547(b)(1) “provides a driver under arrest with [a] statutory right of refusal to blood testing.” (quoting 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1)).  Because Myers was unconscious at the time that Officer Domenic requested the blood draw, the court observed that Myers “could not claim the statutory protection” of Subsection 1547(b)(1). 

Superior Court also relies upon Missouri v. McNeely,     U.S.    , 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), holding that, “because police did not act pursuant to the implied consent law until 4:45 p.m., after Myers had been rendered unconscious by an intervening cause that occurred subsequent to his DUI arrest and transport to the hospital, … McNeely controls here.”  Like the trial court, Superior Court determines the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate the impracticability of obtaining a warrant prior to the blood draw. Therefore, the panel held that the trial court correctly affirmed the Municipal Court’s order granting Myers‘ motion to suppress.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Commonwealth argues that the implied consent statute establishes a valid exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and that the statutory right to refuse chemical testing does not apply to unconscious arrestees. The Commonwealth’s central premise is that, under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a), “any individual who exercises the privilege of driving in Pennsylvania has consented to a blood draw.” 

Although a conscious individual may refuse to submit to a chemical test, the Commonwealth asserts that “[t]here is no law in Pennsylvania that treats an unconscious defendant as having revoked his already-provided consent.”  The Commonwealth faults the Superior Court for “distinguish[ing] between conscious and unconscious drivers without any analysis.” (emphasis omitted). In the Commonwealth’s view, an arrestee’s state of consciousness matters only to the extent that “[u]nconsciousness . . . prevents the suspect from refusing the blood draw,” but it “does not somehow negate his existing consent.”  The Supreme Court categorically rejects this argument.

 

A review of the DUI informed consent issue is a good place to start.  Consistent with 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1547(c) the Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle code imposes evidentiary admissibility standards for blood tests consensually drawn without a warrant. Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle code addressing driving under the influence (“DUI”) of alcohol or controlled substances, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802 (b)(c) & (d) each contain as an essential element of the criminal offense a defendant’s blood alcohol concentration level.

The grading provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle code, 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3803(d), as they relate to DUI charges, identify in subsections 1 through 4 that any individual who is under investigation for violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802, et seq., (accusing an individual of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol such that they are incapable of safely driving) and refuses to voluntary submit to a warrant-less blood test, is to receive enhanced criminal sentencing terms of incarceration solely as a result of the refusal to voluntarily submit to the blood draw.

Pennsylvania’s implied consent law requires motorist who drive on our roads to automatically consent to a blood draw if under police investigation for alleged DUI.  75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(2) (prescribing the “duty of the police officer” to inform a DUI arrestee of the consequences of refusal); Pa. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873, 877 (Pa. 1989) (“The law has always required that the police must tell the arrestee of the consequences of a refusal to take [a chemical] test so that he can make a knowing and conscious choice.”)  If the operator refuses, no blood draw can take place.  Now after, Birchfield, the motorist can not be criminally penalized for refusing the blood draw.

By operation of the implied consent statute, once a police officer establishes reasonable grounds to suspect that a motorist has committed a DUI offense, that motorist “shall be deemed to have given consent to one or more chemical tests of breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of a controlled substance.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a). Notwithstanding this provision, Subsection 1547(b)(1) confers upon all individuals under arrest for DUI an explicit statutory right to refuse chemical testing, the invocation of which triggers specified consequences. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1) (“If any person placed under arrest for [DUI] is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted”); Eisenhart, 611 A.2d at 683 (“The statute grants an explicit right to a driver who is under arrest for [DUI] to refuse to consent to chemical testing.”).

The Court rules that under this statutory scheme, a motorist placed under arrest for DUI has a critical decision to make. The arrestee may submit to a chemical test and provide the police with evidence that may be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution, or the arrestee may invoke the statutory right to refuse testing, which: (i) results in a mandatory driver’s license suspension under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1); (ii) renders the fact of refusal admissible as evidence in a subsequent DUI prosecution pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(e); and (iii) authorizes heightened criminal penalties under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(c) if the arrestee later is convicted of DUI.

Previously, in very certain terms, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court has held that, in requesting a chemical test, the police officer must inform the arrestee of the consequences of refusal and notify the arrestee that there is no right to consult with an attorney before making a decision. See O’Connell, 555 A.2d at 877-78.12 “An arrestee is entitled to this information so that his choice to take a [chemical] test can be knowing and conscious.” Id. at 878. The choice belongs to the arrestee, not the police officer.

In determining the validity of a given consent, the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a consent is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice — not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne — under the totality of the circumstances. The standard for measuring the scope of a person’s consent is based on an objective evaluation of what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the person who gave the consent. Such evaluation includes an objective examination of the maturity, sophistication and mental or emotional state of the defendant. Gauging the scope of a defendant’s consent is an inherent and necessary part of the process of determining, on the totality of the circumstances presented, whether the consent is objectively valid, or instead the product of coercion, deceit, or misrepresentation.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 621 Pa. 218, 77 A.3d 562, 573 (Pa. 2013).

The case of Commonwealth v. Evans, 2016 PA Super 293  (December 20, 2016), is the first major Pennsylvania Appellate Court decision discussing Pennsylvania’s DUI statute, the Implied Consent Law (“O’Connell Warnings”), and the prosecutor’s burden of proof at the suppression hearing.  Evans holds that a defendant does not have to prove they gave consent only based upon the threat of a more severe criminal penalty (jail and further license suspension).  Rather, the statute itself establishes this burden and the Prosecutor must rebut that legal presumption.  Because there is no ability to rebut a presumption of illegitimate consent when threatened with enhanced jail penalties, all motions to suppress must be granted.

Myers takes Evans one step further, finding that “Subsection 1547(b)(1) does not distinguish in any way between conscious and unconscious individuals, but, rather, provides the statutory right of refusal to “any person placed under arrest” for DUI. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1) (emphasis added). By its plain meaning, “any person” necessarily includes an unconscious person. Accordingly, we hold that Myers had an absolute right to refuse chemical testing pursuant to the implied consent statute, that his unconscious state prevented him from making a knowing and conscious choice as to whether to exercise that right, and that the implied consent statute does not authorize a blood test conducted under such circumstances.”

A Refresher on Unprofessional Conduct in Pennsylvania as it Relates to Convictions for Assault

In preparation for every hearing, I review case law discussing the relevant legal issues.  One such recurrent topic is unprofessional or immoral conduct.  This is the vague Pandora’s box of behavior upon with both license revocation and denial may be based.  What is immoral conduct as it relates to physical fighting and the crime of assault.

One clear case involves a licensed social worker who pleaded guilty to two counts of simple assault, which is a 2nd degree misdemeanor.  The criminal charges arose from the licensee assaulting a former client and the client’s husband. The criminal complaint alleged that counselor had engaged in an affair with the former client and that upon traveling to the former client’s home, she attacked K and T.  The conduct resulted in convictions, for which the Board issued an Immediate Temporary Suspension order (ITS).  This is immoral conduct.  Do not go and assault a former client for anything, let alone braking of a relationship and returning to their spouse.

Another case is Foose v. State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons, 135 Pa. Commw. 62, 578 A.2d 1355 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990), where the Court defines crimes of moral turpitude as “anything done knowingly contrary to justice or good morals.” Foose, 578 A.2d at 1357.  Assault convictions fall within this definition because assaults “are inconsistent with the definition of good moral character [and they] involve a reprehensible state of mind.” “The reprehensible state of mind” at issue with the misdemeanors of which any licensee is convicted “is the knowing or reckless attempt to cause or causing bodily injury to another, or engaging in conduct which constitutes a physical menace intended to put another in fear of serious bodily injury.” A conviction for 1st or 2nd degree assault means you intentionally inflicted bodily injury upon that person.  Your license could be assaulted by the board for such conduct…..don’t let them do it so don’t you do it.

Sometimes a Board will distinguish third-degree misdemeanor simple assault, which involves conduct that may be lacking in a “reprehensible state of mind” that could arise in a situation such as “a fight or flight scuffle by mutual consent.” However, other Boards have been persuaded that intentional appearance at a victim’s home to conduct an assault constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. It is a reasonable interpretation and the appellate courts have concluded such.

In another case involving a teacher and his wife, the governing regulations provided that the only relevant inquiry when questioning whether a crime is one of moral turpitude relates to the particular elements of the crime committed, not to the facts underlying the particular commission of the crime. The regulatory provision at issue, 22 Pa. Code § 237.9(a), provided guidance, defining “moral turpitude” as including “reckless conduct causing bodily injury to another.” Importantly, many professional licensing regulations do not include this specific inclusive language.

Although the definition in the teacher regulations also included “conduct done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty or good morals,” some courts have opined that the term “moral turpitude” as defined in the regulation, as well as the definitions arising in other statutory contexts requires a reprehensible state of mind or mens rea. Thus, it may be an “act of baseness, vileness, or depravity, contrary to the accepted customary rule of right and duty between two human beings.” Such an act requires at least knowledge of private impropriety or the potential for social disruption. Also an act of moral turpitude may consist of intentional, knowing or reckless conduct.  A teacher, hitting his spouse, has been interpreted as depraved conduct warranting licensing revocation or discipline.

In sum, do not assault your partner, your friends, your current or former clients, and especially, strangers.  Call me to discuss your case and any criminal conviction.

 

 

 

 

Pennsylvania’s Stregthening Disciplinary Enforcement Environment

My law practice focuses on defending professional licensee disciplinary actions based upon criminal convictions, professional competence, and/or drug and alcohol addiction and professional impairment. I write blogs about Pennsylvania professional licensing disciplinary actions.  Recently, I reviewed all of Pennsylvania’s licensing board disciplinary actions for October and November of 2016. My case load is consistent with the disciplinary orders I reviewed; the cases reflect a stiffening enforcement environment for each of Pennsylvania’s 29 licensing boards.

In November 2016 Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs’ 29 professional licensing boards entered 135 different disciplinary orders.  Board orders range from accountancy, real estate, architecture, chiropractic, massage therapy, nursing, the numerous medical fields, social workers, to veterinary medicine. Of the 135 actions, 41 or 30% of the prosecutions were against non-Pennsylvania practicing licensees. Of the remaining 94 actions (70%), 30 cases or 31% were taken against licensees in Philadelphia and its five surrounding counties. The October 2016 statistics are about the same.

The consistency in the prosecutions is staggering. Many licensees are not represented by counsel. Many orders or settlements include significant civil penalty fines. In the dental profession, there is an increase in petitions for immediate temporary suspensions, pending hearings, on the grounds that the licensee’s practice constitute an immediate and clear danger to the public health and safety. Throughout the medical professions, including pharmacy, numerous disciplinary actions are based upon misdemeanor or felony Drug Act convictions.  Accountancy and real estate board prosecutions center on fraud issues.  The statistics suggest one main point; over 60 percent of cases are from the Philadelphia area and out of state but all of which prosecutions are based upon criminal convictions or drug impairment issues.  These types of disciplinary cases can be fought and penalties reduced.  Many licensees do not think so and either do not have any counsel or they hire the wrong, incompetent counsel.  This is a mistake.

A significant aspect of my practice is reflected in the disciplinary orders. Whether a medical doctor, osteopathic doctor, or nurse, almost one half of disciplinary actions are based upon allegations of inability to practice a profession with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reasons of a mental or physical illness or condition stemming from a dependence upon alcohol or drugs that impairs judgment or coordination. Fighting these cases and contesting any allegation of drug or alcohol impairment is mandatory to keep your license.  DO NOT TAKE THESE ALLEGATIONS LIGHTLY.  DO NOT GO TO THESE ASSESSMENTS WITH OUT AN ATTORNEY.  See my other blogs on this issue.  The orders of discipline clearly reflect licensees incompetently fighting their case without counsel.  I have written extensive blogs on the importance of having an attorney.

A significant percentage of enforcement actions are based upon in or out-of state guilty pleas to either misdemeanors or felonies under the Drug Act or felonies (typically sexual assault) involved in the professional practice. The Boards are collaterally prosecuting every licensee convicted of any offense involving drugs, the violations of norms of practice of that specific profession, or crimes of moral turpitude. The criminal offense, whether drugs, DUI, or a practice related sexual offense does not have to occur in Pennsylvania. Having the right criminal attorney fighting the underlying criminal prosecution is paramount to avoiding collateral licensing prosecution.  I handle all of these criminal cases in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.  Call me to discuss the underlying criminal charges.

Out-of-state licensee’s disciplinary actions reveal a pattern of significantly harsher disciplinary outcomes. Apparently many of these licensees’ indefinite or automatic suspensions are based upon decisions to not contest the Pennsylvania disciplinary action or licensees fighting their case without counsel. Either choice is the worst possible way to address a Pennsylvania based disciplinary action. Every out-of-state licensee should fight each and every disciplinary action.

Please call me to discuss the heightened enforcement environment in Pennsylvania and your pending disciplinary action. Do not attempt to handle these cases on your own. Pennsylvania’s licensing board prosecuting attorneys are much more familiar with appropriate potential negotiating positions then the licensee. The number of professionals I represent before the various boards, and my current pending case load with the same prosecutor on your case, uniquely positions me to fight your case.

The Drug Act — Pa Doctors’ Reporting Responsibilities for Arrest, Conviction, and Automatic Suspensions

Every day I read appellate cases that review disciplinary decisions of Pennsylvania’s licensing boards. A recent case discusses physicians’ unique arrest and conviction reporting responsibility to the State Board of Medicine.  Physician’s reporting of arrests versus convictions depends on the crime involved.

Pennsylvania’s MCare’s law regarding malpractice insurance coverage, 40 P.S. § 1303. 903(4), identifies physician’s reporting responsibilities if a professional liability claim is asserted them, disciplinary action taken against them from another jurisdiction, criminal sentencing for any case, and the arrest of a physician in four very limited classes of crimes. These offenses are:

• following offenses in this Commonwealth or another state:
  • (i)  18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 25 (relating to criminal homicide);
  • (ii)  18 Pa.C.S. § 2702 (relating to aggravated assault); or
  • (iii)  18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 31 (relating to sexual offenses).
  • (iv)  A violation of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.

Physicians’ limited reporting responsibilities means arrests for following offenses does not trigger reporting to the state: domestic violence offenses, DUI’s offenses, theft offenses, or a string of federal related non-drug criminal arrest offenses.   Physicians do have to report arrests alleging a sex offense, homicide, aggravated assault, and a violation under the Drug Act.

Understanding what offenses are Drug Act offenses, not just possession or selling drugs, under The Act that are important.  Drug Act charges include patient record keeping, charting issues, and properly recording and dispensing medications.  Section 780-111 of the Drug Act focuses  on professional prescription, administration, and dispensing of drugs.  Here, the Act states:

• (a)  Except when dispensed or administered directly to the patient by a practitioner or his authorized agent, other than a pharmacist, to an ultimate user, no controlled substance in Schedule II, may be dispensed without the written prescription of a practitioner, except in emergency situations, as prescribed by the secretary by regulation. No prescription for a controlled substance in Schedule II may be refilled.

• (b)  Except when dispensed directly by a practitioner, other than a pharmacist, to an ultimate user, no controlled substance in Schedule III or IV, may be dispensed without a written or oral prescription. Such prescriptions shall not be filled or refilled more than six months after the date thereof or be refilled more than five times after the date of the prescription unless renewed by the practitioner.

• (c)  No controlled substance in Schedule V may be distributed or dispensed for other than a medicinal purpose.

• (d)  A practitioner may prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance or other drug or device only (i) in good faith in the course of his professional practice, (ii) within the scope of the patient relationship, and (iii) in accordance with treatment principles accepted by a responsible segment of the medical profession. A practitioner may cause a controlled substance, other drug or device or drug to be administered by a professional assistant under his direction and supervision.

• (d.1)  A practitioner shall not prescribe, administer or dispense any anabolic steroid for the purpose of enhancing a person’s performance in an exercise, sport or game. A practitioner may not prescribe, administer or dispense any anabolic steroid for the purpose of hormonal manipulation intended to increase muscle mass, strength or weight except when medically necessary.

• (e)  A veterinarian may prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance, other drug or device only (i) in good faith in the course of his professional practice, and (ii) not for use by a human being. He may cause a controlled substance, other drug or device to be administered by a professional assistant under his direction and supervision.

• (f)  Any drug or device dispensed by a pharmacist pursuant to a prescription order shall bear a label showing (i) the name and address of the pharmacy and any registration number obtained pursuant to any applicable Federal laws, (ii) the name of the patient, or, if the patient is an animal, the name of the owner of the animal and the species of the animal, (iii) the name of the practitioner by whom the prescription order was written, and (iv) the serial number and date of filing of the prescription order. In addition, the following statement shall be required on the label of a controlled substance: “Transfer of this drug to anyone other than the patient for whom it was prescribed is illegal.”

§ 780-112 focuses on records of distribution of controlled substances

• (a)  Every person who sells or otherwise distributes controlled substances, shall keep records of all purchases or other receipt and sales or other distribution of such substances for two years from the date of purchase or sale. Such records shall include the name and address of the person from whom purchased or otherwise received or to whom sold or otherwise distributed, the date of purchase or receipt or sale or distribution, and the quantity involved: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply to a practitioner who dispenses controlled substances to his patients, unless the practitioner is regularly engaged in charging his patients, whether separately or together with charges for other professional services, for substances so dispensed.

• (b)  Every practitioner licensed by law to administer, dispense or distribute controlled substances shall keep a record of all such substances administered, dispensed or distributed by him, showing the amount administered, dispensed or distributed, the date, the name and address of the patient, and in the case of a veterinarian, the name and address of the owners of the animal to whom such substances are dispensed or distributed. Such record shall be kept for two years from the date of administering, dispensing or distributing such substance and shall be open for inspection by the proper authorities.

• (c)  Persons registered or licensed to manufacture or distribute or dispense a controlled substance, other drug or device under this act shall keep records and maintain inventories in conformity with the record-keeping, order form and inventory requirements of Federal law and with any additional regulations the secretary issues. Controlled substances in Schedules I and II shall be distributed by a registrant to another registrant only pursuant to an order form.

Violations of either of these two subsections and their itemized list, by either doctors or other health care nurses is dealt with under section § 780-123, revocation of licenses of practitioners.

• (a)  Any license or registration heretofore issued to any practitioner may either be revoked or suspended by the proper officers or boards having power to issue licenses or registration to any of the foregoing, upon proof that the licensee or registrant is a drug dependent person on the use of any controlled substance, after giving such licensee or registrant reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.

• (b)  The appropriate licensing boards in the Department of State are hereby authorized to revoke or suspend the registration or license of any practitioner when such person has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or has been convicted of a felony under this act or any similar State or Federal law. Before any such revocation or suspension, the licensee or registrant shall be given a hearing before the appropriate board. At such hearing the accused may be represented by counsel and shall be entitled to compulsory attendance of witnesses.

• (c)  The appropriate licensing boards in the Department of State shall automatically suspend, for a period not to exceed one year, the registration or license of any practitioner when the person has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or has been convicted of a misdemeanor under this act. The district attorney of each county shall immediately notify the appropriate State licensing board of practitioners subject to the provisions of this section. However, the provisions of such automatic suspension may be stayed by the appropriate State licensing board in those cases where a practitioner has violated the provisions of this act only for the personal use of controlled substances by the practitioner and the practitioner participates in the impaired professional program approved by the appropriate State licensing board for a period of between three and five years, as directed by the appropriate licensing board. If the practitioner fails to comply in all respects with the standards of such a program, the appropriate licensing board shall immediately vacate the stay of the enforcement of the suspension provided for herein. Automatic suspension shall not be stayed pending any appeal of a conviction. Restoration of such license shall be made as in the case of a suspension of license.

35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-123

Case law addressing practitioner’s objections to the emergent and disparate impact Drug Act convictions and their automatic suspensions have on doctors is very clear.   Board discretion and legislative prerogative regarding public safety out weight a physician’s property right in their license.  “Licensed medical practitioners’ unique access to controlled drugs and a physician’s appropriation of this access for illegal purposes presents a danger to the Commonwealth, for which the General Assembly has legitimately and rationally adopted a separate policing device.”  Call me to discuss your case.