Try to Recognize when an Attorney is Needed

When is it important to hire an attorney in a licensing and criminal defense case? When case agent first contacts you!  Do not talk to them.  Just say thank you, I will call you back; can we meet next week; no you can not come into my house!!
Every day licensing board investigators, police detectives, human resource departments, or other government investigators reach out to targets or “individuals of interest” in a wide range of potential investigations. These law enforcement officers (most state investigators are retired police detectives) are trained to secure statements from the subject of the investigation.  They call you, show up at your house, or try to meet with you at work.  This is when you know you need a lawyer.

My blogs generate phone calls from potential clients.  A recent theme of these calls sticks out;  investigators are employing consistent, heightened and aggressive investigative techniques to surreptitiously secure statements and admissions of criminal conduct, unprofessional licensing behavior, or illegal behavior.  This is explained in one sentence; why do an investigation when an admission from the target will solve the case.

Targets give statements for one reason: ignorance and naïve understanding of the law.   Targets  or potential criminal defendants give statements because they think they are obligated to cooperate, should cooperate, or that cooperating is in their best interest.  These reasons are incorrect.
Admitting to engaging in questionable or criminal conduct eliminates investigator’s obligation and duty of proving their case through means other than an admission by the target.  Admissions to detectives and investigators eliminates their need to perform basic investigator police work.  It satisfies  the police officer’s burden of proof in securing evidence of illegal or criminal conduct against you.
Licensees who admit to a Board investigator to practicing outside the scope of their license, stealing from their clients, overcharging for services, or any other offense does the investigator’s job.  In many cases, before the statement is secured, there is only a mere suspicion of inappropriate behavior.  There is no specific evidence of a criminal act. The statement itself becomes the evidence against you. The person giving the statement creates the criminal evidence for the investigator that they did not otherwise have.   (I feel the same way  about licensees who cooperate in the PHMP VRP assessments.  Do not give the Board’s any evidence they do not have.)
Once a criminal admission is given, the police officers don’t do anymore work. The state investigators don’t do anymore work. This is why there is no legal obligation to cooperate.
Giving statements to employers in work place investigations has the same ultimate result. I have written about this many times. Choosing to not give a blood test, write a personal statement, or even provide copies of medical records cannot be held against you. You can be fired, but it can’t be held against you. At times it’s more important to choose to remain silent then to keep your job.  Anything you say in the employment setting is merely turned over to the board investigator or police.
Remaining silent and not cooperating with any investigation  — not disclosing truly damaging information — sometimes is the best defense of your license or against criminal charges.  Do not succumb to the police officer bullying. Suggestions by police that they can secure search or arrest warrants should not persuade you to give up your constitutional rights.
You do not have to give a statement. You do not have to give a DNA test. You do not have to participate in any polygraph evaluation.   If the officer does not believe your word or accept your version of events, agreeing to provide objective forensic evidence will not change their mind. You will just be giving them evidence to accumulate and use against you at a later date.
Hopefully you have the opportunity to read this blog before you have spoken to an investigator about a licensing issue, participated in the workplace related investigation, or cooperated with any police inquiry inquiry about your job or your behavior. If not, call me as soon as possible.
Whether you hire me or any other lawyer, stop stop cooperating with any police investigation.
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Road Riding in the Counties

My personal and business travel is taking me to more counties throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania than ever before. The local courthouse houses in the county seats are really interesting for me. The court houses — arenas of legal combat — are throw backs to more glorious days when the local big trial was the event of the year.
In the past I took for granted these architectural gems that are spread throughout the various townships and boroughs within which I practice.   Now, I seek out and explore the courthouses. Whether by car or bike, I am having fun.
This spring I bought myself a road bike. I ride ferociously around the eastern part of Pennsylvania. I have the pleasure of routinely riding through Philadelphia,  Conshohocken, Norristown, and Valley Forge Park. All are within 5-15 miles of my house.  Sometimes I ride from my house to Philadelphia and back.
A recent Saturday took me on a further ride — from West Chester to the City of Lancaster. The road ride began in West Chester and ended in Lancaster County, behind the Court House. We departed West Chester through its southern rolling-hills of Brandywine Township. We followed Brandywine Creek through East Bradford Township, Downingtown  to West Fallowfield Township. One word — marvelous.
After 90 minutes the group ride, with me at the back of the pack, entered Lancaster County. I was greeted by signs for farm fresh brown eggs, personally constructed homes, garages, sheds, and wonderful antique tractors.
Tractors, tractors, tractors. But not your ordinary tractors.  These were green, yellow and red tractors, pulled by horses. The drawn mowing tractors were hard at work, gas free, mowing lawns and fields. Some tractors were too tired to work, gathering rust. There was no worry about rubber tires rotting. Metal wheels needed no repairs.
The morning aromas changed with each turn in the road. Pungent cow, horse, pig dung awoke my sinuses.  Crushed wild blackberries and dripping vines of honeysuckles permeated homesteads. The morning dew clung to grass blades and tree branches through the Brandywine Creek bike route. Entering Lancaster and riding down Duke Street brought with it fresh bakery smells and the Lancaster County brewing Company.
In each county seat, I look for a small coffee shop. Lancaster’s Prince Street Café did not disappoint. The fresh cappuccino after a 50 mile ride awakened all of my exhausted senses. Orange juice and fresh eggs on a croissant made me even happier. The pictures below reflects the quaintness of the café and the wonderful effort the bakers and barista’s gave the Saturday morning breakfast crowd.
An unexpected joy came as I began to get ready for my drive home. Just to the west of the Prince Street Café is the Lancaster County Donuts Shop. Homemade donuts and holes are sold with every conceivable topping — as if I was in an ice cream shop — tantalized my taste buds. The sublime chocolate with vanilla cream cheese frosting carried me through the rest of my day.
I could not have been happier. Content and satisfied by a hard work out, great ride with new friends and a bulging stomach.  Blair and Clearfield counties also did not disappoint. I’ll keep you posted.

My County Practice – The Licensee Attorney on the Road

It is a cool, crisp 78° as I gander at the Pennsylvania Turnpike’s Blue Mountain and Kittatinny tunnels cutting through the middle of Pennsylvania. It’s 95° and 100% humidity in Philadelphia. The Blue Mountain Tunnel is one of two tunnels through Blue Mountain in Pennsylvania, located west of Newburg. It is one of seven tunnels completed for the Pennsylvania Turnpike mainline, … The Blue Mountain Tunnel is 600 ft (180 m) to the east of the Kittatinny Mountain Tunnel, separated by the Gunter Valley.

As I drive through these Pennsylvania mountains, including the tunnel at Tuscarora Mountain, I marvel at Pennsylvania’s endless greenery. Towns such as McCalloch, Lynnsburg, Sheepskin Hollow, and Mount Union dot the landscape but are surrounded by majestic trees and forests..

On Route 99 I snake through the mountain passes of Blair County. Smoke screened with early morning fog, panoramic views give way to county towns spread along the Juanita and Little Juanita River valley. Route 99 was carved out of the Lock Mountain. Its rolling hills provide necessary access to the historic railroad town of Holidaysburg. Local roads are named after long since passed farm owners who settled this area. Canoeing ramps, hiking and biking trails shunt off from the many state park.

Driving up Bald Mountain, through Phillipsburg, I left Tyrone behind. I scamper up Bald Mountain, through the pass, on the way to Clearfield County. Route 350 welcomes me with Victorian style homes. Phillipsburg is a brief one  light hamlet. Leaving Phillipsburg, I approach the Upper Susquehanna River and Clearfield Creek. Here the rolling mountains roads are dotted with roadside homes, businesses, and flow slowed by summer road construction.

Arriving in Clearfield County I am surprised by the size of the borough. I am taken aback at the age of the courthouse. Pictured below, its courthouse is regal, sturdy and welcoming.

 

 

 

 

Proposed Pennsylvania Law for All Licensee’s Criminal Charge Reporting Responsibilities

In February several Pennsylvania state senators introduced Senate Bill number 354 of 2017. This bill drastically changes licensees reporting responsibilities once they are charged with a crime. Currently, most licensees (Except nurses) must report a criminal charge only upon conviction. Senate Bill 354 as currently written specifically states:

Section 2.1.  Reporting of sanctions and criminal proceedings.

(a)  Duty.–An individual who holds a license, certificate or registration issued by the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs shall, as a condition of licensure, certification or registration, do all of the following:

(1)  Report to the appropriate licensing board or licensing commission a disciplinary action taken against the licensee, certificate holder or registrant by a licensing agency of another jurisdiction.

(2)  Report to the appropriate licensing board or licensing commission an arrest, indictment or conviction of the licensee, certificate holder or registrant.

(b)  Time.–A report under subsection (a) shall be made as follows:

(1)  Within 30 days of the imposition of the sanction described under subsection (a)(1).

(2)  Except as set forth in paragraph (3), within 30 days of the earlier of:

(i)  an arrest under subsection (a)(2); or

(ii)  an indictment under subsection (a)(2).; or

(iii)  a conviction under subsection (a)(2).

(3)  In the case of a criminal action under subsection (a)(2) that is initiated prior to the effective date of this paragraph, within 30 days from the later of:

(i)  the date of conviction; or

(ii)  the effective date of this paragraph.

If a licensee does not report a new arrest within 30 days, the licensee is subject to additional disciplinary action.

All Pennsylvania licensees may soon become subject to disciplinary action as a result of accused, not convicted, criminal conduct.  This is a much different from the current scenario of disciplinary action upon conviction. The remaining subsection identified below is consistent with current procedural due process rights to a licensee whose license is subject to an immediate clear and present danger emergent suspension.

(a)  Temporary suspension.–A licensing board or licensing commission may temporarily suspend a license, certificate or registration under circumstances as determined by the board or commission to be an immediate and clear danger to the public health and safety. The board or commission shall issue an order to that effect without a hearing, but upon due notice, to the licensee or, certificate holder or registrant concerned at his last known address, which shall include a written statement of all allegations against the licensee or, certificate holder or registrant. After issuing the order, the board or commission shall commence formal action to suspend, revoke or restrict the license or, certificate or registration of the person concerned as otherwise provided for by law. All actions shall be taken promptly and without delay.

(b)  Hearing.–Within 30 days following the issuance of an order temporarily suspending a license, certificate or registration, the licensing board or licensing commission shall conduct or cause to be conducted a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is a prima facie case supporting the suspension. The licensee or, certificate holder or registrant whose license or, certificate or registration has been temporarily suspended may be present at the preliminary hearing and may be represented by counsel, cross-examine witnesses, inspect physical evidence, call witnesses, offer evidence and testimony and make a record of the proceedings. If it is determined that there is not a prima facie case, the suspended license, certificate or registration shall be immediately restored. The temporary suspension shall remain in effect until vacated by the board or commission, but in no event longer than 180 days.

(c)  Automatic suspension.–A license or, certificate or registration issued by a licensing board or licensing commission shall automatically be suspended upon:

(1)  the legal commitment to an institution of a licensee or, certificate holder or registrant because of mental incompetency for any cause upon filing with the board or commission a certified copy of the commitment; or

(2)  conviction of a felony under the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L.233, No.64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, or conviction of an offense under the laws of another jurisdiction which, if committed in this Commonwealth, would be a felony under The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.

(d)  Stay.–Automatic suspension under subsection (c) shall not be stayed pending an appeal of a conviction.

(e)  Restoration.–Restoration of a license or, certificate or registration shall be made as provided by law in the case of revocation or suspension of the license or, certificate or registration.

New to the licensing and regulatory scheme for every licensee is the ability of a licensing board to automatically suspend a license if the licensee is committed to a mental health facility for any reason or a conviction under the Drug Act. Restoration of the licensees license suspended under Senate Bill 354 shall be consistent with any other procedural due process rights.
Please call me to discuss your case

Pennsylvania’s New DUI Case Law

Since Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016), Pennsylvania’s DUI statute as applied to blood draws and refusals to submit to blood draws has because unenforceable.  The illegal escalation of criminal penalties for refusing to submit to a blood draw, or even being told of the enhanced penalties, has created an untenable situation for every police department in the Commonwealth.  They are still doing it wrong. Do not plead guilty.  Fight these cases.

Some departments are still reading the old refusal warnings.  Some are still taking people to the hospital when a simple breath test will work.  Some are making up new refusal warnings.  Some are trying to get people to freely consent to a blood draw without telling them of the consequences.  These, I think are all illegal procedures.  The cases are coming down every week limiting how the Commonwealth can gather evidence and what evidence can be used to prosecute the cases under the post-Birchfield paradigm.

It is the Commonwealth’s burden of proof to establish a DUI suspect’s consent to give blood is the product of essentially free and unconstrained choice—not the result of duress, coercion, expressed or applied. Commonwealth v. Gaetano, 2017 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1241 (April 4, 2017); Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323, 2016 PA Super 293 (Pa. Super. filed December 20, 2016). The standard for measuring the scope of a person’s consent is based upon an objective evaluation of what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the person who gave such consent.

Gaetano and Evans  in applying Birchfield hold that the Commonwealth may not impose criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test.  Reading a person the now illegal O’Connell warning’s, or any other fabricated, constructed, newly designed version thereof, threat of enhanced criminal prosecution and incarceration vitiate consensual submission to a blood draw absent a warrant. Gaetano and Evans state it is the Commonwealth’s burden of proof to establish that a defendant’s consent is freely given and not the product of coercion.

It is not the a defendant’s burden of proof to establish or place in the record his subjective feelings of coercion. Commonwealth v. Fink, 2016 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 4704, *13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).  The mere language of the O’Connell warning, or any other fabricated, constructed, newly designed version thereof, include a threat of enhanced criminal prosecution are coercive and the Commonwealth cannot establish coercive free consent.   Objective evidence of duress that is the basis for Gaetano and Evans will be present in almost every defendant’s arrest record, thus vitiating alleged voluntary consent to give blood draw.

Upon deciding a Motion to Suppress the blood evidence, trial courts cannot, and it is irrelevant to the constitutional evaluation under the Supreme Court precedent, put the burden on the defendant, as to what their objective state of mind was upon giving consent for a blood draw.

As for the specific refusal statute, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547, Superior Court has concluded that it or police departments newly fabricated, constructed threat of enhanced criminal prosecution vitiates any consent given to a warrantless blood draw.  Gaetano and Evans maintain that subjecting defendants to warrantless blood draws based upon the illegal O’Connell warning consent provisions (or any other fabricated, constructed, newly designed but improper version thereof, threat of enhanced criminal prosecution) is illegal and unconstitutional under US Supreme Court and Pennsylvania appellate court jurisprudence.

In looking at the totality of the circumstances the court must determine that any consent is not voluntary and coerced. Birchfield’s review of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on blood testing compels a review of Missouri v. McNeely, 566 U.S ___ (2012),  where the Court refused to adopt a per se rule that “whenever an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol, circumstances will necessary exist because blood alcohol content evidence is inheritably evanescent.”  Id. at ____, (slip op., at 8).

McNeely is applicable in Pennsylvania DUI cases because officers in drunk-driving investigations can reasonably obtain a warrant before having a blood sample drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search.  The Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.  They are no doing so.  The court has held that it is not enough to claim that “circumstances may make obtaining a warrant impractical such that the alcohol’s dissipation will support an exigency.” This is to be decided in each case on its facts.  The Court did not create a general rule based upon “considerable over generalization” that a per se rule would reflect.

Pennsylvania has said the same thing.  “The Fourth Amendment to the [United States] Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of [the Pennsylvania] Constitution protects Pennsylvania’s citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 2012 PA Super 118, 46 A.3d 781, 784 (Pa. Super. 2012). “A search conducted without a warrant is deemed to be unreasonable and therefore constitutionally impermissible, unless an established exception applies.” Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (Pa. 2000).  “Exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception . . . , the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. Dunnavant, 2013 PA Super 38, 63 A.3d 1252, 1257 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013).

As for blood, the “administration of a blood test . . . performed by an agent of, or at the direction of the government” constitutes a search under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152, 615 A.2d 308, 315 (Pa. 1992); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966).  Since the DUI blood tests are typically performed without a warrant, the search is preemptively unreasonable “and therefore constitutionally impermissible, unless an established exception applies.”

In determining the validity of a given consent, the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a consent is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice — not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne — under the totality of the circumstances.  The standard for measuring the scope of a person’s consent is based on an objective evaluation of what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the person who gave the consent.  Such evaluation includes an objective examination of the maturity, sophistication and mental or emotional state of the defendant. Gauging the scope of a defendant’s consent is an inherent and necessary part of the process of determining, on the totality of the circumstances presented, whether the consent is objectively valid, or instead the product of coercion, deceit, or misrepresentation.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 621 Pa. 218, 77 A.3d 562, 573 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations, quotations, and corrections omitted).

I think the DUI case law requires that the police tell the arrestee of the consequences of a refusal to take the test so that he can make a knowing and conscious choice.  When requested to take a breathalyzer or blood test, the court insists that in addition to telling an arrestee that his license will be suspended for one year if he refuses to take a breathalyzer test, the police instruct the arrestee that such rights are inapplicable to the breathalyzer test and that the arrestee does not have the right to consult with an attorney or anyone else prior to taking the test. An arrestee is entitled to this information so that his choice to take a breathalyzer test can be knowing and conscious and we believe that requiring the police to qualify the extent of the right to counsel is neither onerous nor will it unnecessarily delay the taking of the test.  Commonwealth v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873 (1989).

In many cases, the police claim a defendant allegedly consents to the warrantless blood draw during a custodial interrogation after the police inform him of some fabricated, constructed, newly designed informed consent language not court or legislatively approved. This is not proper.  Currently, the only available law requires the police to advise a defendant that: “if you refuse to submit to chemical test and you are convicted or plead to violating § 3802(a)(1) related to impaired driving under the vehicle code, because of your refusal, you will be subject to more severe penalties set forth in § 3804(c)[,] relating to penalties, the same as if you were — if you would be convicted at the highest rate of alcohol.”

This makes the verbal consent to a warrantless blood draw  during a non-mirandized, custodial interrogation in illegal statement subject to suppression.  Absent verbal consent, there is none.  Further, since Birchfield held that  a state may not “impose criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to [a warrantless blood] test,” the police officer’s advisory to any defendant on the non-legislatively permitted language illegal. Birchfield, 136 S.Ct. at 2186. This then requires a court to conclude that the search incident to arrest doctrine does not justify  warrantless blood testing compelled through enhanced criminal sentencing provisions for refusing to take that blood test.  This in turn means that the enhanced criminal offense, both in charges filed and potential sentencing scheme set forth in 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(b)(1)(2), compels this County Courts of Common Pleas to hold that “motorists cannot be deemed to of consent to submit to a blood test on fate of committing a criminal offense.”

Call me to discuss you DUI and blood draw evidence.

Another Really Nice Client Review with my Response

Here is another really nice and very accurate client review and my response. I can write blogs about this stuff. But, client testimonial about how aggressive and direct my representation is becomes the best blog.

I received a “letter of concern” from Pa nursing board after a charge of public intoxication.I unwittingly responded to the Board before contacting Richard.What a mistake!!!!The Board is not your ally-quite the opposite.Their job is to destroy you both financially and mentally.
Fortunately,Richard was able to expertly win our court case.Unfortunately,unbeknownst to me,I had been suffering from Bipolar disorder all the while,and the relentless emotional stresses caused by the Board caused me to suffer deep depression and a resulting manic swing where I had 2 DUI’s in a span of less than 2 weeks. Richard was right there for me and had my charges lessened significantly.Despite that,the Board required that I participate in their onerous,soul and money sucking program.I chose to voluntarily suspend my RN license rather than go through with that.I would not be able to work in my specialty during the 3+ years in the program,be out of thousands of dollars,and may not be employable when all is said and done.32 years as a nurse is enough for my lifetime anyway.
Richard Hark is an expert in protecting licenses of health care professionals and will work tirelessly to win your case.He is also very understanding and helpful with your anxieties at such a stressful and unsure time.I recommend him 100%.

Richard Quinton Hark’s response: “Thank you. I am so happy to help. I aggressively support every client’s need to take their medication without VRP and PHMP interjection in you, the professional’s, course of medical care and treatment. The one size fits all, regulatory approach does not work for everyone. We live in the best time of medical care and lawful prescription medication management of many medical conditions. Do not be ashamed or scared of your medical care as it pertains to your license. Anxiety, depression, ADHD are commonly diagnosed medical conditions for which properly administered and dosed medication management is no one’s business but the patient. Do not tell your job, your manager, the D.O.N., or any police officer in a DUI investigation. Do not respond to any letter of concern or sign medical authorizations releasing your medical care and treatment history to a social worker. Call me. This client and the others who have reviewed me attest to my aggressive defense of you, your privacy, and your license. I couldn’t be happier for this client who trusted my professional experience to help them, and won!!!!!!!”

Pennsylvania’s DUI Statute and Warrantless Blood Draws On An Unconscious Person

Since Birchfield v. N. Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2173, 2185, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016), the Pennsylvania Supreme court has swiftly moved to invigorate and buttress Pennsylvania civil liberties and motor vehicle drivers’ privacy rights.  On July 19, 2017, in Commonwealth v. Myers, 2017 Pa. LEXIS 1689, 2017 WL 3045867, the Court upheld lower court rulings granting suppression of blood evidence seized from a drunk, unconscious motorist.

The facts are simple. Myers was visibly drunk, operated the motor vehicle, was arrested by one police officer, and taken to the hospital for a blood draw. A second officer arrived at the hospital, did not observe Myers or ask his consent to take his blood before hospital staff administered medication rendering Myers unconscious.  Unable to respond to his commands, the 2nd police officer instructed the nurse to draw Myers’ blood for testing.  The police did not secure a warrant to draw or search drunk, unconscious Myers’ blood.

The Court granted the appeal to consider the lawfulness of a warrantless blood draw conducted upon a motorist who, having been arrested for DUI, had then been rendered unconscious by medical personnel before a police officer provided O’Connell warnings and before the officer requested the motorist’s submission to a chemical test. The Philadelphia Municipal Court, the Court of Common Pleas, and Superior Court all held that a blood draw conducted under these circumstances is impermissible, and that the results of the derivative blood test are accordingly inadmissible at trial. Because the seizure of Myers‘ blood violated Pennsylvania’s implied consent statute, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, and because no other circumstances justified the failure to obtain a search warrant, the Court affirmed all of the lower courts’ decisions suppressing the blood evidence.

At the intermediate appellate level, in Commonwealth v. Myers, 2015 PA Super 140, 118 A.3d 1122 (Pa. Super. 2015), the court stated that Subsection 1547(b)(1) “provides a driver under arrest with [a] statutory right of refusal to blood testing.” (quoting 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1)).  Because Myers was unconscious at the time that Officer Domenic requested the blood draw, the court observed that Myers “could not claim the statutory protection” of Subsection 1547(b)(1). 

Superior Court also relies upon Missouri v. McNeely,     U.S.    , 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), holding that, “because police did not act pursuant to the implied consent law until 4:45 p.m., after Myers had been rendered unconscious by an intervening cause that occurred subsequent to his DUI arrest and transport to the hospital, … McNeely controls here.”  Like the trial court, Superior Court determines the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate the impracticability of obtaining a warrant prior to the blood draw. Therefore, the panel held that the trial court correctly affirmed the Municipal Court’s order granting Myers‘ motion to suppress.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Commonwealth argues that the implied consent statute establishes a valid exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and that the statutory right to refuse chemical testing does not apply to unconscious arrestees. The Commonwealth’s central premise is that, under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a), “any individual who exercises the privilege of driving in Pennsylvania has consented to a blood draw.” 

Although a conscious individual may refuse to submit to a chemical test, the Commonwealth asserts that “[t]here is no law in Pennsylvania that treats an unconscious defendant as having revoked his already-provided consent.”  The Commonwealth faults the Superior Court for “distinguish[ing] between conscious and unconscious drivers without any analysis.” (emphasis omitted). In the Commonwealth’s view, an arrestee’s state of consciousness matters only to the extent that “[u]nconsciousness . . . prevents the suspect from refusing the blood draw,” but it “does not somehow negate his existing consent.”  The Supreme Court categorically rejects this argument.

 

A review of the DUI informed consent issue is a good place to start.  Consistent with 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1547(c) the Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle code imposes evidentiary admissibility standards for blood tests consensually drawn without a warrant. Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle code addressing driving under the influence (“DUI”) of alcohol or controlled substances, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802 (b)(c) & (d) each contain as an essential element of the criminal offense a defendant’s blood alcohol concentration level.

The grading provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle code, 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3803(d), as they relate to DUI charges, identify in subsections 1 through 4 that any individual who is under investigation for violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802, et seq., (accusing an individual of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol such that they are incapable of safely driving) and refuses to voluntary submit to a warrant-less blood test, is to receive enhanced criminal sentencing terms of incarceration solely as a result of the refusal to voluntarily submit to the blood draw.

Pennsylvania’s implied consent law requires motorist who drive on our roads to automatically consent to a blood draw if under police investigation for alleged DUI.  75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(2) (prescribing the “duty of the police officer” to inform a DUI arrestee of the consequences of refusal); Pa. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873, 877 (Pa. 1989) (“The law has always required that the police must tell the arrestee of the consequences of a refusal to take [a chemical] test so that he can make a knowing and conscious choice.”)  If the operator refuses, no blood draw can take place.  Now after, Birchfield, the motorist can not be criminally penalized for refusing the blood draw.

By operation of the implied consent statute, once a police officer establishes reasonable grounds to suspect that a motorist has committed a DUI offense, that motorist “shall be deemed to have given consent to one or more chemical tests of breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of a controlled substance.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a). Notwithstanding this provision, Subsection 1547(b)(1) confers upon all individuals under arrest for DUI an explicit statutory right to refuse chemical testing, the invocation of which triggers specified consequences. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1) (“If any person placed under arrest for [DUI] is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted”); Eisenhart, 611 A.2d at 683 (“The statute grants an explicit right to a driver who is under arrest for [DUI] to refuse to consent to chemical testing.”).

The Court rules that under this statutory scheme, a motorist placed under arrest for DUI has a critical decision to make. The arrestee may submit to a chemical test and provide the police with evidence that may be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution, or the arrestee may invoke the statutory right to refuse testing, which: (i) results in a mandatory driver’s license suspension under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1); (ii) renders the fact of refusal admissible as evidence in a subsequent DUI prosecution pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(e); and (iii) authorizes heightened criminal penalties under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(c) if the arrestee later is convicted of DUI.

Previously, in very certain terms, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court has held that, in requesting a chemical test, the police officer must inform the arrestee of the consequences of refusal and notify the arrestee that there is no right to consult with an attorney before making a decision. See O’Connell, 555 A.2d at 877-78.12Link to the text of the note “An arrestee is entitled to this information so that his choice to take a [chemical] test can be knowing and conscious.” Id. at 878. The choice belongs to the arrestee, not the police officer.

In determining the validity of a given consent, the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a consent is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice — not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne — under the totality of the circumstances. The standard for measuring the scope of a person’s consent is based on an objective evaluation of what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the person who gave the consent. Such evaluation includes an objective examination of the maturity, sophistication and mental or emotional state of the defendant. Gauging the scope of a defendant’s consent is an inherent and necessary part of the process of determining, on the totality of the circumstances presented, whether the consent is objectively valid, or instead the product of coercion, deceit, or misrepresentation.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 621 Pa. 218, 77 A.3d 562, 573 (Pa. 2013).

The case of Commonwealth v. Evans, 2016 PA Super 293  (December 20, 2016), is the first major Pennsylvania Appellate Court decision discussing Pennsylvania’s DUI statute, the Implied Consent Law (“O’Connell Warnings”), and the prosecutor’s burden of proof at the suppression hearing.  Evans holds that a defendant does not have to prove they gave consent only based upon the threat of a more severe criminal penalty (jail and further license suspension).  Rather, the statute itself establishes this burden and the Prosecutor must rebut that legal presumption.  Because there is no ability to rebut a presumption of illegitimate consent when threatened with enhanced jail penalties, all motions to suppress must be granted.

Myers takes Evans one step further, finding that “Subsection 1547(b)(1) does not distinguish in any way between conscious and unconscious individuals, but, rather, provides the statutory right of refusal to “any person placed under arrest” for DUI. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1) (emphasis added). By its plain meaning, “any person” necessarily includes an unconscious person. Accordingly, we hold that Myers had an absolute right to refuse chemical testing pursuant to the implied consent statute, that his unconscious state prevented him from making a knowing and conscious choice as to whether to exercise that right, and that the implied consent statute does not authorize a blood test conducted under such circumstances.”

Pennsylvania Drug Act Charges — Doctors and Nurses — Reputation

My last blog focused on physicians’ criminal Drug Act conduct and reporting responsibilities to the Medical Board.  Whether a physician or professional nurse, the typical triggering event requiring reporting to a professional license board is a charge or conviction for violating Pennsylvania’s Drug Act.  Aside from license impacts, the evidentiary important of such a charge or conviction is profound.

There is a string of cases in Pennsylvania that identify a Drug Act offense as a crime of moral turpitude and crimen falsii.  What are these characterizations and import on your license defense shall be addressed in this blog.

The esteemed Leonard Packel and Anne Poulin, wrote the book Pennsylvania Evidence § 609 (1987 and Supp. 1994).   At the time of publication, the book did not contain drug violations in either category.  In Commonwealth v. Candia, 286 Pa.Super. 282, 428 A.2d 993 (1981), Pa Superior Court stated that Drug Act offenses were not crimen falsi.

There are several federal decisions, one in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824 (1977), where the court held that importation of cocaine was not clearly crimen falsi, but could be if the particular facts demonstrated that the importation involved false written or oral statements on customs forms.  That court weighed the effect on credibility of various drug violations, stating smuggling “ranks relatively high on the scale of veracity-related crimes, but that mere narcotics possession would be less highly ranked on that same scale.

That court stated impeachment use of a conviction involving dishonesty or false statement refers to allegations particularly focusing on credibility issues, such as those for ‘perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense.  Each of these cases involves the commission of acts which involve a basic intent element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused’s propensity to testify truthfully.

Pennsylvania has determined a similar list of crimes to constitute crimen falsi.  Included in this list, a recent Superior court decision holds, is writing prescriptions for a controlled substance to oneself, knowing one has a chemical dependency problem. The crime itself involves making a false statement because it necessarily involves the falsification of a prescription by a practitioner representing that it is not for a person who is chemically dependent.  As such, Drug Act prescription violations constitute crimes of crimen falsi and, thus, a crime of moral turpitude.

The import of these cases can not be understated.  The Board will look at any Drug Act conviction as a crime of moral turpitude because it relates in many different ways to the securing, utilizing, or possessing an illegal controlled substance.  Whether such is in the course of the practice or in one private life, a Drug Act violation therefore also becomes a “conduct unbecoming” violation.

Separate and aside from these issues, are the mandatory suspensions of any Drug Act conviction.  Call me to discuss your case.

Expanded Psychology Board Disciplinary Authority

On June 23, 2016 the General assembly approved act 2016–53. This is a new provision in the the Psychology Board Act.  It became effective August 23, 2016.  This an amendment to the Psychology Board’s authority in disciplining it’s licensees. The specific section in bold states:

(b) When the board finds that the license or application for license of any person may be refused, revoked, restricted or suspended under the terms of subsection (a), the board may:

(1) Deny the application for a license.

(2) Administer a public reprimand.

(3) Revoke, suspend, limit or otherwise restrict a license as determined by the board.

(4) Require a licensee to submit to the care, counseling or treatment of a physician or a psychologist designated by the board.

(5) Suspend enforcement of its findings thereof and place a licensee on probation with the right to vacate the probationary order for noncompliance.

(6) Restore a suspended license to practice psychology and impose any disciplinary or corrective measure which it might originally have imposed.

(7) Take other action as the board in the board’s discretion considers proper, including precluding a suspended licensee from engaging in counseling or any other form of mental health practice.

The import of the new (b)(7) provision cannot be under stated. The legislature has given the Board authority to take “other action” within the “Board’s discretion it considers proper”. This is just about anything.  The case law discussing licensing boards authority to discipline their licensees is clear.

Appellate review of a discretionary Board action is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated, an error of law committed, or necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. 2 Pa.C.S. § 704; Cassella v. Pennsylvania Board of Medicine, Bureau of Professions and Occupations, 119 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 394, 547 A.2d 506 (1988); DePanfilis v. State Board of Pharmacy, 121 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 526, 551 A.2d 344 (1988). The State Board of Nursing is the ultimate fact finder and may accept or reject the testimony of any witness in whole or in part.

The proper review of an agency’s action, assuming that it is not defective under the self-explanatory requirements of § 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 704, is not whether its order was reasonable, but whether it was made in accordance with law, i.e., whether it was made in bad faith, and whether it was fraudulent or capricious. A reviewing court may interfere in an agency decision only when there has been a manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion or a purely arbitrary execution of the agency’s duties or functions. Slawek v. Commonwealth, State Bd. of Med. Educ. & Licensure, 526 Pa. 316, 318, 586 A.2d 362, 363 (1991).

Where a full and complete record is made of the proceedings before the State Board of Nursing, a reviewing court must affirm the adjudication unless it is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant or not in accordance with the law, the procedural provisions of the local agency law are violated, or a finding of fact of the State Board of Nursing necessary to support its adjudication is not supported by substantial evidence. Section 754 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 754. The emphasis here is that is a full and complete record is a necessity.

Substantial evidence means that the evidence required to support the finding of an administrative agency must be “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion.”  Civil Service Com. V. Poles, 132 Pa. Commw. 593, 573 A.2d 1169, 1172 (1990); Gallagher v. Philadelphia State Board of Pharmacy, 16 Pa. Commw. 279, 330 A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).

It is imperative that counsel is present at any hearing to insure the trial evidence objections are properly set forth int he record.  In many cases, Board discretionary action can only be limited by insuring the evidence at the hearing is minimized against the licensee.  Or on Appeal, reviewing the record, to insure the Board decision is made in accordance with the facts presented at the hearing. Any decision based on facts outside of the record is not proper. Please call to discuss you psychology license disciplinary issues.

 

 

Professional Licensing Board’s Discretion and Appellate Case Review

The discretionary decision making process of Pennsylvania’s twenty six professional boards is a huge appellate issue many cases confront.  In a recent case, board discretion is discussed in the context of non-criminal conduct and the Medical Board’s authority to police its own licensees.  The case is Mosuro v. Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational Affairs, 2016 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 717 (Commw. Ct. Oct. 13, 2016).

Dr. Mosuro was disciplined in the state of Texas as a result of a medical relationship with a pain management clinic.  Dr. Mosuro was compensated by the owner of the clinic, an Advanced Practical Nurse (“APN”) licensed under Texas law, with a flat fee for each prescription he wrote for a clinic patient. In turn, the APN referred patients to Dr. Mosuro for other treatment.  Upon being investigated by the Texas Medical Board, but with no criminal charges being filed, the doctor enter into a consent agreement acknowledging violations State of Texas  Medical Board laws, rules, codes, and regulations due to his failure to supervise the APN and allowed her to prescribe medications that were non-therapeutic while acting under his prescriptive delegation. Charts were also not adequately documented and prescriptions were not supported by objective medical findings and data.  In sum, he allow his prescriptions to be used in a pill mill.

The Texas Board of Medicine issue the public reprimand and a $10,000 fine. He was also given a prescription prohibition on ordering, prescribing, or dispensing scheduled medication services.  The licensing authorities of Maryland, Tennessee, Alabama, and Virginia imposed similar discipline on Dr. Mosuro ‘s license.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania commenced disciplinary proceedings based upon Texas’ disciplinary action, accusing the doctor under 63 P. S. § 422.41 of improper prescribing of controlled substance through his involvement with the pill mill and his failure to properly supervise a nurse practitioner as required under Texas law. Standard of care violations, documentation of medical record violations, and unprofessional conduct were perceived by the Pennsylvania Medical Board as very serious.

After hearing in Pennsylvania, the hearing examiner proposed an Order and Adjudication of a $500 civil penalty and indefinitely suspended Doctor Mosuro license to practice medicine in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Upon review, the Pennsylvania Medical Board excepted the hearing examiner’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law but rejected the recommended order. Rather, the Medical Board ordered a public reprimand on Dr. Mosuro ‘s permanent licensing record, a $5000 civil penalty, and an indefinite suspension of his license to practice medicine and surgery in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Reinstatement may be sought upon compliance with the Texas Board order and his Texas medical license being reinstated to unrestricted status.  This totaled over $15,000 in fine for a doctor unable to practice medicine.  This Board issued this order even though Dr. Mosuro did not have an active Pennsylvania medical license, was not practicing in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and was disciplined by many other jurisdictions as a result of the same conduct.  PENNSYLVANIA’S DISCIPLINE WAS THE HARSHEST OF ALL JURISDICTIONS.
Dr. Mosuro appealed to the Commonwealth Court.  The scope of the Commonwealth Court appeal is limited to determining whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and whether the board committed errors of law or constitutional violations.” Blair v. Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational Affairs, State Bd. of Nursing, 72 A.3d 742, 750 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).  In review of the record, the appellate court concludes  the Medical Board’s extensive discipline based solely upon the opioid prescription drug abuse crisis is proper. The Board restates with approval the Pennsylvania Medical Board citation to recent Pennsylvania legislative findings regarding human suffering associated with addiction and how its epidemic has reached families throughout the Commonwealth.
The Medical Board and the Commonwealth Court use this case as a example of how to ensure public safety from medical practitioners who use their medical licenses to create “rogue pain management clinics” in Pennsylvania. Citing statistics that Pennsylvania ranks seventh in the nation for drug overdoses from prescription pain killers and the role of pill mills in the overdose epidemic, the Court approves the Medical Board utilizing these facts to “engage in its purpose under the medical practices act of safe guarding the public health and welfare”.

The Court did not address the Board’s role of insuring individual penalties to individual licensees be based upon their case facts. The Court affirms Board citation to broad policy language that the prescription overdose epidemic cannot be ignored. The Commonwealth Court concludes that when as now there is a “current threat to public health and welfare when assessing whether a Board carries out its statutory mandate in a purely arbitrary and capricious manner”, the Medical Board is properly carrying out its broader policy mandate of stopping pill mills during this great opioid epidemic.  Such is sufficient factual and legal reasoning to discipline even an in-active medical licensee.

 The Commonwealth Court limited its inquiry into the “wisdom of the board,” not reviewing the administrative decision of the Medical Board with an eye towards substituting it’s judgment of what is reasonable for that of the agency whose decision is being reviewed. The court let stand the Pennsylvania Medical Board’s perceptions of the seriousness of the doctor’s Texas discipline, how such is also a violation of Pennsylvania’s medical licensing scheme, and the Board’s broad policy reasons for its discipline.
In sum, Commonwealth Court concludes that “the board did not abuse its discretion by taking strong action to protect the safety and welfare of citizens by suspending Dr. Mosuro’s license instead of imposing conditions on his license similar to those of the Texas Board.” Dr. Mosuro’s violation is very serious. In determining that the Board did not abuse its discretion, the Court states “even if we disagreed with the severity of the sanction and thought the Texas Board’s decision was more appropriate, the sanction must be upheld because proper review is not whether it’s order is reasonable, but whether it was made in accordance with law.”  Facilitating and conspiring to engage in operation of a “pill mill”, the Court and the Medical Board conclude, is not in accordance with law and, therefore, the suspension of the medical license is within the confines of the Board’s regulatory authority.

Call me to discuss your out of state disciplinary action and Pennsylvania’s pending disciplinary action.

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