Call a Lawyer, Not the Licensing Board, When Contacted by Board Counsel or Investigators

My administrative law practice takes me before many of Pennsylvania’s licensing boards and in hearings that address a variety of disciplinary actions.  It is during Pennsylvania’s professional licensing boards’ bimonthly meetings that disciplinary matters are commenced, reviewed, or finalized.  This is why after a given board’s monthly meeting I typically receive a wave of calls from new clients, mail that initiates disciplinary action in pending cases, or final decisions in cases.

Potential disciplinary actions a board may commence include: 1) reciprocal disciplinary actions; 2) emergency petitions to immediately take a license; 3) objections to license applications; 4)  approval of different consent agreements; 5) approval or rejection of hearing officer’s proposed adjudications; and 6) reviewing cases sent back from the Commonwealth Court for issuance of revised disciplinary action. Also, several boards have subcommittees that approve probable cause petitions compelling licensees to undergo mental and physical of evaluations.

After bimonthly board meetings I receive calls from both current or potential clients inquiring “What I should do? Who should I talk to?  or What information should be disclosed?   Many callers disclose prior conversations with board counsel, investigators, PHMP assessors, or other board representatives. I cringe when I hear this.

 

Board representatives, prosecutors, administrators, and/or medical professionals do not represent the licensee. These people are tasked with enforcing board regulations. They are tasked with complying with each and every administrative procedural requirement (of which the licensee has no idea). They are tasked with securing information against the licensee who is potentially, or actually, subject to disciplinary action. These people do not look out for the best interest of the licensee.  DO NOT TALK TO THESE PEOPLE ABOUT YOUR CASE, FACTS, OR MEDICAL CONDITIONS.  THEY WRITE EVERYTHING DOWN.

 

Board administrators and PHMP office staff are not sophisticated licensed professionals. They are unfamiliar with the actual medical issues, legal issues, or licensing process. They merely perform administrative functions. They lack any authority to adjust, regulate, or modify any correspondence.  Relying upon statements from these administrative level workers is frustrating and leads to incorrect practices.

 

I have heard on many occasions board clerical staff and social workers advise licensees and/or license applicants to cooperate – give statements or do other inaccurate suggestions – that are not in the licensees best interest.  Administrative workers routinely do not recommend hiring counsel to secure a better, more complete, or correct legal advice on how to respond to the legal correspondence  just received in the mail.

 

That is why I say do not contact these boards, rely upon what any administrator says, or even hope that they give you correct advice. Call an attorney and secure proper legal advice.  The best analogy I can give is: Do you call a doctor’s office and follow medical advice dispensed by the phone receptionist or want to talk to RN, LPN, or M.D.?  The obvious answer is no.  So why would you do that when calling a licensing board about your professional license you utilize every day?

 

Please call me to discuss the recent board ordered disciplinary correspondence you just received!

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Road Riding in the Counties

My personal and business travel is taking me to more counties throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania than ever before. The local courthouse houses in the county seats are really interesting for me. The court houses — arenas of legal combat — are throw backs to more glorious days when the local big trial was the event of the year.
In the past I took for granted these architectural gems that are spread throughout the various townships and boroughs within which I practice.   Now, I seek out and explore the courthouses. Whether by car or bike, I am having fun.
This spring I bought myself a road bike. I ride ferociously around the eastern part of Pennsylvania. I have the pleasure of routinely riding through Philadelphia,  Conshohocken, Norristown, and Valley Forge Park. All are within 5-15 miles of my house.  Sometimes I ride from my house to Philadelphia and back.
A recent Saturday took me on a further ride — from West Chester to the City of Lancaster. The road ride began in West Chester and ended in Lancaster County, behind the Court House. We departed West Chester through its southern rolling-hills of Brandywine Township. We followed Brandywine Creek through East Bradford Township, Downingtown  to West Fallowfield Township. One word — marvelous.
After 90 minutes the group ride, with me at the back of the pack, entered Lancaster County. I was greeted by signs for farm fresh brown eggs, personally constructed homes, garages, sheds, and wonderful antique tractors.
Tractors, tractors, tractors. But not your ordinary tractors.  These were green, yellow and red tractors, pulled by horses. The drawn mowing tractors were hard at work, gas free, mowing lawns and fields. Some tractors were too tired to work, gathering rust. There was no worry about rubber tires rotting. Metal wheels needed no repairs.
The morning aromas changed with each turn in the road. Pungent cow, horse, pig dung awoke my sinuses.  Crushed wild blackberries and dripping vines of honeysuckles permeated homesteads. The morning dew clung to grass blades and tree branches through the Brandywine Creek bike route. Entering Lancaster and riding down Duke Street brought with it fresh bakery smells and the Lancaster County brewing Company.
In each county seat, I look for a small coffee shop. Lancaster’s Prince Street Café did not disappoint. The fresh cappuccino after a 50 mile ride awakened all of my exhausted senses. Orange juice and fresh eggs on a croissant made me even happier. The pictures below reflects the quaintness of the café and the wonderful effort the bakers and barista’s gave the Saturday morning breakfast crowd.
An unexpected joy came as I began to get ready for my drive home. Just to the west of the Prince Street Café is the Lancaster County Donuts Shop. Homemade donuts and holes are sold with every conceivable topping — as if I was in an ice cream shop — tantalized my taste buds. The sublime chocolate with vanilla cream cheese frosting carried me through the rest of my day.
I could not have been happier. Content and satisfied by a hard work out, great ride with new friends and a bulging stomach.  Blair and Clearfield counties also did not disappoint. I’ll keep you posted.

A Harsh Disciplinary Enforcement Environment for Pennsylvania Licensees

I write this blog in preparation for a Pennsylvania Nursing Board ordered Mental and Physical Examination (“MPE”) of a client.   It is startling the number of these board ordered evaluations or PHMP/PHP/PNAP assessments due to some type of licensee criminal conduct.  The heightened disciplinary activity among all boards reveals a much stricter atmosphere of licensee disciplinary enforcement.  Why?
Pennsylvania’s heightened disciplinary environment is based upon a single legislative occurrence and a single judicial decision.  Legislatively, passage of Pennsylvania’s medical marijuana regulatory scheme has prompted a review of all licensing laws in anticipation of increased licensee impairment and criminal activity due to marijuana usage (legal or not).
A prime example of this is Senate Bill 354 of 2017.  I wrote about this bill last week.  This bill seeks to compel any licensee charged with a crime (not convicted) to report such to their respective licensing board within 30 days of arrest.  Failure to report will constitute a separate basis for discipline.  This Bill seeks to bring the boards’ immediate knowledge of licensee’s criminal conduct so discipline can commence sooner.
Pennsylvania’s licensing boards subscribe to JNET – Pennsylvania’ criminal fingerprint data base.  The Boards already know of licensee’s criminal charges of which they already expect them to report upon conviction.  However, the Boards now want quicker reporting, with an additional and stronger basis for discipline.  False reporting and failing to report criminal conduct!!
But this bill is not not law.  So what’s the juice?  The juice is that current licensee’s facing disciplinary action for some really minor issues will think twice before smoking pot; they will tell their friends and co-workers to think twice before smoking pot and taking care of the public.  The health related boards are gearing up prosecutors for stricter supervision of all licensees.  In this conservative jurisdiction, pot is thought to be a gateway drug to heroin.  The prescription based opiate epidemic caught the health related boards with their pants down.  It will not happen again with the passage of medical marijuana.
The enforcement environment also extends to potential licensees enrolled in any health related school who apply for licensure with a criminal history of one or two DUI’s.  I represent many individuals whose licensure applications have been stalled based upon conditional denials and compelled PHMP enrollment.   A new regulation requiring  license applicants to be licensed within 12 months of taking their board examinations aides the Board in weeding out potential applicants who do not accept PHMP enrollment.
DO NOT go willy-nilly to the PHP/PHMP assessment and or evaluation with the expectation that you will pass and be given your license.  DO NOT answer the personal data sheet with out consulting an attorney.  DO NOT talk to the PHMP intake or assessors without attorney preparation.  They write everything down — your story of depression, injured or dead family members, your divorce, your child abuse history.  The PHMP people will always recommend enrollment in the VRP after you, the new licensee, admit your mental health treatment, drug use, and inability to practice safely.   How can you admit you can not practice safely if you have never practiced?  Applicants fighting their cases must be patient and call me ASAP. 
The Birchfield decision (written about in other blogs) is the judicial decision most affecting disciplinary actions.  Birchfield focused on the admissibility of blood alcohol levels as a result of a non-consensual blood draw in a DUI investigation. This case has rippled through every Pennsylvania county’s drunk driving enforcement efforts.  Birchfield ruled inadmissible DUI blood evidence that revealed drugs (illegal or prescription) and/or marijuana use.
Birchfield rendered blood drug use evidence an inappropriate basis for licensee disciplinary action.  The heightened reporting responsibilities of nurses (30 days from arrest), allow petitions for mental and physical evaluations based upon affidavits of probable cause reflecting alcohol or drug use even though blood evidence is not admissible in a court of law.  The Boards want to know right away what its licensees are smoking or drugs they are ingesting.
Pennsylvania licensees need to fight every criminal case. The new notice provisions in Bill 354 will become law.  While criminal charges are pending licensees will have to provide a potentially incriminating personal statement to a licensing board.  This is crazy.  There is no 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination in a professional license defense.  Licensees need an attorney to help draft counseled answers to strategic legal questions and statements under these circumstances.  Now, more than any time in the recent past, licensees should utilize counsel to properly protect their license.
The Boards use their experts to determine impairment.  Why shouldn’t you use your expert to protect your license?  Licensees face workplace challenges, complex life issues, and now a crazy enforcement environment in Pennsylvania.    Mail from the PHMP, PHP, and PNAP present multi- faceted traps for even the most experienced licensees.  Licensee need their own expert — an experienced criminal and administrative law attorney to effectively protect their license.  Call me to discuss your criminal or license case.

Proposed Pennsylvania Law for All Licensee’s Criminal Charge Reporting Responsibilities

In February several Pennsylvania state senators introduced Senate Bill number 354 of 2017. This bill drastically changes licensees reporting responsibilities once they are charged with a crime. Currently, most licensees (Except nurses) must report a criminal charge only upon conviction. Senate Bill 354 as currently written specifically states:

Section 2.1.  Reporting of sanctions and criminal proceedings.

(a)  Duty.–An individual who holds a license, certificate or registration issued by the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs shall, as a condition of licensure, certification or registration, do all of the following:

(1)  Report to the appropriate licensing board or licensing commission a disciplinary action taken against the licensee, certificate holder or registrant by a licensing agency of another jurisdiction.

(2)  Report to the appropriate licensing board or licensing commission an arrest, indictment or conviction of the licensee, certificate holder or registrant.

(b)  Time.–A report under subsection (a) shall be made as follows:

(1)  Within 30 days of the imposition of the sanction described under subsection (a)(1).

(2)  Except as set forth in paragraph (3), within 30 days of the earlier of:

(i)  an arrest under subsection (a)(2); or

(ii)  an indictment under subsection (a)(2).; or

(iii)  a conviction under subsection (a)(2).

(3)  In the case of a criminal action under subsection (a)(2) that is initiated prior to the effective date of this paragraph, within 30 days from the later of:

(i)  the date of conviction; or

(ii)  the effective date of this paragraph.

If a licensee does not report a new arrest within 30 days, the licensee is subject to additional disciplinary action.

All Pennsylvania licensees may soon become subject to disciplinary action as a result of accused, not convicted, criminal conduct.  This is a much different from the current scenario of disciplinary action upon conviction. The remaining subsection identified below is consistent with current procedural due process rights to a licensee whose license is subject to an immediate clear and present danger emergent suspension.

(a)  Temporary suspension.–A licensing board or licensing commission may temporarily suspend a license, certificate or registration under circumstances as determined by the board or commission to be an immediate and clear danger to the public health and safety. The board or commission shall issue an order to that effect without a hearing, but upon due notice, to the licensee or, certificate holder or registrant concerned at his last known address, which shall include a written statement of all allegations against the licensee or, certificate holder or registrant. After issuing the order, the board or commission shall commence formal action to suspend, revoke or restrict the license or, certificate or registration of the person concerned as otherwise provided for by law. All actions shall be taken promptly and without delay.

(b)  Hearing.–Within 30 days following the issuance of an order temporarily suspending a license, certificate or registration, the licensing board or licensing commission shall conduct or cause to be conducted a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is a prima facie case supporting the suspension. The licensee or, certificate holder or registrant whose license or, certificate or registration has been temporarily suspended may be present at the preliminary hearing and may be represented by counsel, cross-examine witnesses, inspect physical evidence, call witnesses, offer evidence and testimony and make a record of the proceedings. If it is determined that there is not a prima facie case, the suspended license, certificate or registration shall be immediately restored. The temporary suspension shall remain in effect until vacated by the board or commission, but in no event longer than 180 days.

(c)  Automatic suspension.–A license or, certificate or registration issued by a licensing board or licensing commission shall automatically be suspended upon:

(1)  the legal commitment to an institution of a licensee or, certificate holder or registrant because of mental incompetency for any cause upon filing with the board or commission a certified copy of the commitment; or

(2)  conviction of a felony under the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L.233, No.64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, or conviction of an offense under the laws of another jurisdiction which, if committed in this Commonwealth, would be a felony under The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.

(d)  Stay.–Automatic suspension under subsection (c) shall not be stayed pending an appeal of a conviction.

(e)  Restoration.–Restoration of a license or, certificate or registration shall be made as provided by law in the case of revocation or suspension of the license or, certificate or registration.

New to the licensing and regulatory scheme for every licensee is the ability of a licensing board to automatically suspend a license if the licensee is committed to a mental health facility for any reason or a conviction under the Drug Act. Restoration of the licensees license suspended under Senate Bill 354 shall be consistent with any other procedural due process rights.
Please call me to discuss your case

A Great Commonwealth Court Appellate Review

April has been a busy month for appellate decisions.  A recent case of my was decided in my client’s favor.  Important lessons are learned from this case.

On March 27, 2015, the Board issued an order to show cause why Freeman’s license should not be suspended, revoked, restricted, or a civil penalty imposed, for violating the Practical Nurse Law, 63 P.S. §§651-667.8, and the Criminal History Record Information Act (CHRIA), 18 Pa. C.S. §§9101-9183. The six counts set forth by the Board as follows:

(1) under Section 16(a)(5) of the Practical Nurse Law, 63 P.S. §666(a)(5),3Link to the text of the note because Freeman was convicted of a crime of moral turpitude (criminal conspiracy to commit theft by deception from Home Depot);

(2) under Section 16(a)(5) of the Practical Nurse Law, because Freeman was convicted of a crime of moral turpitude (theft by deception from a Majestic Oaks resident);

(3) under Section 9124(c)(2) of CHRIA,4Link to the text of the note because Freeman was convicted of a misdemeanor related to the profession (theft by deception from a Majestic Oaks resident);

(4) under Section 16(a)(4) of the Practical Nurse Law, 63 P.S. §666(a)(4),5Link to the text of the note in that Freeman [*4]  committed fraud or deceit in securing her admission to practice (by failing to truthfully answer the question about having pending criminal charges on her biennial renewal application);

(5) under Section 16(a)(8) of the Practical Nurse Law, 63 P.S. §666(a)(8),6Link to the text of the note in that Freeman was guilty of unprofessional conduct (by committing theft by deception from a Majestic Oaks resident); and

(6) under Section 16(a)(3) of the Practical Nurse Law, 63 P.S. §666(a)(3),7Link to the text of the note for violating the Board’s regulation at 49 Pa. Code §21.148(b)(4),8Link to the text of the note which prohibits nurses from misappropriating property or money from patients (by committing theft by deception from a Majestic Oaks resident).

When the board entered a penalty of license suspension rather than probation. Factually, my presentation of the evidence at the hearing was given great weight on appeal.

Freeman testified on her own behalf. Regarding the criminal charges that led to ARD, Freeman explained that a friend had asked her to drive her to Home Depot to make a return. Her friend did not have a receipt or her driver’s license, which the store required to process a return. Accordingly, Freeman gave her driver’s license to the store clerk. While Freeman was waiting for the return to be processed, her friend borrowed her car keys and placed shoplifted merchandise in Freeman’s car.

Regarding the conviction for theft, Freeman acknowledged that she used a patient’s personal financial information to pay her utility bills. She explained:

Well, at the time, I was raising my son on my own as a single mother. Everything was on the verge of being cut off. You know, I didn’t want to have to go back to the shelter. I made a stupid decision to do that.

Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 7/2/2015, at 33; R.R. 56. Freeman expressed remorse for her actions, stating:

I mean, I’m just nervous because — you know, I worked so hard to get where I am today. I do regret the — some of the decision[s] that I’ve made, because I love my career. I love helping people. I love what I do, and based on the decisions that I’ve made, it’s just jeopardizing my whole career. I had to spend lots of money, you know, for lawyers and court costs, fees and everything. But yes, I do regret being here today, in the situation that I’m in today, I mean.

Id. at 43-44; R.R. 66-67.

Freeman recounted the difficult circumstances she overcame in her personal life. Freeman explained that, after graduating from high school, she became involved in an abusive relationship for approximately one year. She moved to a shelter, where she lived for two years. Id. at 46; R.R. 69. While living at the shelter, Freeman enrolled in a certified nursing assistant (CNA) training program and obtained her CNA license. She found employment and, after saving some money, moved out of the shelter and into a one-bedroom apartment. Shortly thereafter, Claimant gave birth to a son, for whom she was solely responsible because the father was incarcerated. Freeman worked several jobs while continuing her nursing education and, in April 2013, earned her certificate in practical nursing.

As I have said many times, mitigation evidence is huge.  Handling these cases at a hearing requires trained counsel to properly distill the facts for the court.  On appeal, finding the winning argument also takes experience.  In this case, the multitude of criminal allegations confused the Board.  It disciplined her for a conviction she did not suffer.

Freeman challenges the Board’s sanction because it cited crimes for which she was not convicted and facts not in the record. The record showed that Freeman pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit theft at Home Depot and one count of theft for stealing financial information from a nursing home resident. She was not convicted of stealing the resident’s jewelry; that criminal charge was nolle prossed. The Commonwealth responds that it matters only that Freeman was convicted of theft. Whether it was theft of jewelry and banking account information, or just banking account information, is irrelevant. The Board argues that its reference to a conviction of theft of jewelry was harmless error. We disagree.

In making its decision to increase the penalty, the Board stated that “[Freeman] was convicted of theft for stealing jewelry and using the bank account of an elderly patient to pay her personal bills.” Board Adjudication, 7/26/2016, at 1; Freeman Brief at P29 (emphasis added). This fact is not supported by the record. The charge related to theft of jewelry was nolle prossed, and there is a difference between a criminal charge and a criminal conviction. Freeman asserts this requires a reversal of the Board’s sanction. The Board responds that the record supports this disputed statement and directs this Court to the Hearing Examiner’s finding of fact that “[t]he charge of Theft by False Impression was the result of [Freeman’s] theft of property including jewelry and checking account information….” Proposed Adjudication, 11/19/2015, at 5; Freeman Brief at P39.

A charge is an accusation or allegation that a person committed an offense. By contrast, a conviction is a finding by a court that a person is guilty of a criminal offense. In short, the finding of fact cited by the Board does not support its assertion that Freeman was “convicted” of “stealing jewelry.”

We won this case.  The license suspension was reversed.  The case has been sent back down to the Board.

 

 

To Testify or Not – A Licensee’s Hearing Rights

The confluence of administrative and criminal procedure is a significant issue I confront defending licensee disciplinary cases.  Sometimes, during a hearing, or a pre-complaint investigatory meeting, a licensee is asked — almost expected — to give a statement.  During a hearing, with a criminal case pending, a licensee sometimes must strategically choose or not to testify.  This issue was recently addressed in the case of Blair Anthony Hawkins v. Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational Affairs, 2017 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 112 (Commw. Ct. Feb. 16, 2017).

In that matter, after the Department presented its evidence, Hawkins argued that the Board denied him a full and fair hearing when it failed to continue the hearing until after the resolution of the criminal case, thus resulting in Hawkins’ decision to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination before the Board.  However, Hawkins was not forced to testify.  Hawkins invoked his 5th Amendment Rights against self-incrimination.

A hearing was held on January 8, 2016, at which Petitioner renewed his request for a continuance until after the criminal charges were resolved. The Board denied the continuance request. Therefore, Hawkins asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and did not answer any questions.  This looks horrible in a hearing.

Prior to the hearing, the parties exchanged pre-hearing statements, identified witnesses and exhibits, and participated in a pre-hearing conferences. On the day before the hearing, Petitioner requested a continuance via email, until Hawkins’ criminal charges were resolved. The Department opposed the continuance request. The Board denied the continuance, noting that Petitioner had previously been granted a continuance, had indicated that he was available for the hearing on January 8, 2016, had participated in a pre-hearing conference a few days prior, and had failed to identify an emergent reason for requiring a continuance.

Initially, the continuance request was handled improperly.  Either at a pre-hearing conference, or in a separate motion to continue the hearing, counsel for Hawkins should have sought a continuance much sooner, with greater vigor.  Counsel, not Hawkins, put his client in the trap the licensee board prosecutors set.  The Board prosecutor set the trap, showed the trap to counsel, and counsel messed up the case.  The matter should have been continued way before the hearing until after the criminal case had resolved.

In reviewing the choice to testify or not, the Board looked to prior case law.  In Herberg v. Commonwealth, State Board of Medical Education & Licensure, 42 A.2d 411, 412 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982), a physician’s medical license was revoked and the physician argued that during the hearing before the board, his rights pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution were violated. The physician invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination so that his testimony before the board could not be used in a later criminal proceeding.  Commonwealth Court determined that:

‘[T]here [is nothing] inherently repugnant to due process in requiring the doctor to choose between giving testimony at the disciplinary hearing, a course that may help the criminal prosecutors, and keeping silent, a course that may lead to the loss of his license.'[A]bsent a finding that a physician was forced to testify against himself, a medical disciplinary board was not constitutionally required to stay its proceedings until the criminal prosecutions against the doctor were over.

In Hawkins, the licensee was called as a witness, chose not to testify, and was not forced to testify. Thus, Hawkins’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not violated because the Board honored his choice not to testify. Further, due process rights are not violated simply because a decision on whether to testify is arduous. See PSI Upsilon v. University of Pennsylvania, 591 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. Super. 1991). Hawkins made what was assuredly a hard decision not to testify; however, making this decision did not result in a violation of his due process rights. See Herberg, 42 A.2d at 413. The Board did not err or abuse its discretion when it held Hawkins’ disciplinary hearing prior to his criminal proceeding, thus making Hawkins choose between testifying or asserting his privilege against self-incrimination.

Call me to talk about your case, investigators wanting you to give a pre-complaint statement, and how to handle your up coming hearing.

 

Pennsylvania’s DUI Statute and Warrantless Blood Draws On An Unconscious Person

Since Birchfield v. N. Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2173, 2185, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016), the Pennsylvania Supreme court has swiftly moved to invigorate and buttress Pennsylvania civil liberties and motor vehicle drivers’ privacy rights.  On July 19, 2017, in Commonwealth v. Myers, 2017 Pa. LEXIS 1689, 2017 WL 3045867, the Court upheld lower court rulings granting suppression of blood evidence seized from a drunk, unconscious motorist.

The facts are simple. Myers was visibly drunk, operated the motor vehicle, was arrested by one police officer, and taken to the hospital for a blood draw. A second officer arrived at the hospital, did not observe Myers or ask his consent to take his blood before hospital staff administered medication rendering Myers unconscious.  Unable to respond to his commands, the 2nd police officer instructed the nurse to draw Myers’ blood for testing.  The police did not secure a warrant to draw or search drunk, unconscious Myers’ blood.

The Court granted the appeal to consider the lawfulness of a warrantless blood draw conducted upon a motorist who, having been arrested for DUI, had then been rendered unconscious by medical personnel before a police officer provided O’Connell warnings and before the officer requested the motorist’s submission to a chemical test. The Philadelphia Municipal Court, the Court of Common Pleas, and Superior Court all held that a blood draw conducted under these circumstances is impermissible, and that the results of the derivative blood test are accordingly inadmissible at trial. Because the seizure of Myers‘ blood violated Pennsylvania’s implied consent statute, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, and because no other circumstances justified the failure to obtain a search warrant, the Court affirmed all of the lower courts’ decisions suppressing the blood evidence.

At the intermediate appellate level, in Commonwealth v. Myers, 2015 PA Super 140, 118 A.3d 1122 (Pa. Super. 2015), the court stated that Subsection 1547(b)(1) “provides a driver under arrest with [a] statutory right of refusal to blood testing.” (quoting 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1)).  Because Myers was unconscious at the time that Officer Domenic requested the blood draw, the court observed that Myers “could not claim the statutory protection” of Subsection 1547(b)(1). 

Superior Court also relies upon Missouri v. McNeely,     U.S.    , 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), holding that, “because police did not act pursuant to the implied consent law until 4:45 p.m., after Myers had been rendered unconscious by an intervening cause that occurred subsequent to his DUI arrest and transport to the hospital, … McNeely controls here.”  Like the trial court, Superior Court determines the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate the impracticability of obtaining a warrant prior to the blood draw. Therefore, the panel held that the trial court correctly affirmed the Municipal Court’s order granting Myers‘ motion to suppress.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Commonwealth argues that the implied consent statute establishes a valid exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and that the statutory right to refuse chemical testing does not apply to unconscious arrestees. The Commonwealth’s central premise is that, under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a), “any individual who exercises the privilege of driving in Pennsylvania has consented to a blood draw.” 

Although a conscious individual may refuse to submit to a chemical test, the Commonwealth asserts that “[t]here is no law in Pennsylvania that treats an unconscious defendant as having revoked his already-provided consent.”  The Commonwealth faults the Superior Court for “distinguish[ing] between conscious and unconscious drivers without any analysis.” (emphasis omitted). In the Commonwealth’s view, an arrestee’s state of consciousness matters only to the extent that “[u]nconsciousness . . . prevents the suspect from refusing the blood draw,” but it “does not somehow negate his existing consent.”  The Supreme Court categorically rejects this argument.

 

A review of the DUI informed consent issue is a good place to start.  Consistent with 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1547(c) the Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle code imposes evidentiary admissibility standards for blood tests consensually drawn without a warrant. Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle code addressing driving under the influence (“DUI”) of alcohol or controlled substances, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802 (b)(c) & (d) each contain as an essential element of the criminal offense a defendant’s blood alcohol concentration level.

The grading provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle code, 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3803(d), as they relate to DUI charges, identify in subsections 1 through 4 that any individual who is under investigation for violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802, et seq., (accusing an individual of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol such that they are incapable of safely driving) and refuses to voluntary submit to a warrant-less blood test, is to receive enhanced criminal sentencing terms of incarceration solely as a result of the refusal to voluntarily submit to the blood draw.

Pennsylvania’s implied consent law requires motorist who drive on our roads to automatically consent to a blood draw if under police investigation for alleged DUI.  75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(2) (prescribing the “duty of the police officer” to inform a DUI arrestee of the consequences of refusal); Pa. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873, 877 (Pa. 1989) (“The law has always required that the police must tell the arrestee of the consequences of a refusal to take [a chemical] test so that he can make a knowing and conscious choice.”)  If the operator refuses, no blood draw can take place.  Now after, Birchfield, the motorist can not be criminally penalized for refusing the blood draw.

By operation of the implied consent statute, once a police officer establishes reasonable grounds to suspect that a motorist has committed a DUI offense, that motorist “shall be deemed to have given consent to one or more chemical tests of breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of a controlled substance.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a). Notwithstanding this provision, Subsection 1547(b)(1) confers upon all individuals under arrest for DUI an explicit statutory right to refuse chemical testing, the invocation of which triggers specified consequences. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1) (“If any person placed under arrest for [DUI] is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted”); Eisenhart, 611 A.2d at 683 (“The statute grants an explicit right to a driver who is under arrest for [DUI] to refuse to consent to chemical testing.”).

The Court rules that under this statutory scheme, a motorist placed under arrest for DUI has a critical decision to make. The arrestee may submit to a chemical test and provide the police with evidence that may be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution, or the arrestee may invoke the statutory right to refuse testing, which: (i) results in a mandatory driver’s license suspension under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1); (ii) renders the fact of refusal admissible as evidence in a subsequent DUI prosecution pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(e); and (iii) authorizes heightened criminal penalties under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(c) if the arrestee later is convicted of DUI.

Previously, in very certain terms, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court has held that, in requesting a chemical test, the police officer must inform the arrestee of the consequences of refusal and notify the arrestee that there is no right to consult with an attorney before making a decision. See O’Connell, 555 A.2d at 877-78.12Link to the text of the note “An arrestee is entitled to this information so that his choice to take a [chemical] test can be knowing and conscious.” Id. at 878. The choice belongs to the arrestee, not the police officer.

In determining the validity of a given consent, the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a consent is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice — not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne — under the totality of the circumstances. The standard for measuring the scope of a person’s consent is based on an objective evaluation of what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the person who gave the consent. Such evaluation includes an objective examination of the maturity, sophistication and mental or emotional state of the defendant. Gauging the scope of a defendant’s consent is an inherent and necessary part of the process of determining, on the totality of the circumstances presented, whether the consent is objectively valid, or instead the product of coercion, deceit, or misrepresentation.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 621 Pa. 218, 77 A.3d 562, 573 (Pa. 2013).

The case of Commonwealth v. Evans, 2016 PA Super 293  (December 20, 2016), is the first major Pennsylvania Appellate Court decision discussing Pennsylvania’s DUI statute, the Implied Consent Law (“O’Connell Warnings”), and the prosecutor’s burden of proof at the suppression hearing.  Evans holds that a defendant does not have to prove they gave consent only based upon the threat of a more severe criminal penalty (jail and further license suspension).  Rather, the statute itself establishes this burden and the Prosecutor must rebut that legal presumption.  Because there is no ability to rebut a presumption of illegitimate consent when threatened with enhanced jail penalties, all motions to suppress must be granted.

Myers takes Evans one step further, finding that “Subsection 1547(b)(1) does not distinguish in any way between conscious and unconscious individuals, but, rather, provides the statutory right of refusal to “any person placed under arrest” for DUI. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1) (emphasis added). By its plain meaning, “any person” necessarily includes an unconscious person. Accordingly, we hold that Myers had an absolute right to refuse chemical testing pursuant to the implied consent statute, that his unconscious state prevented him from making a knowing and conscious choice as to whether to exercise that right, and that the implied consent statute does not authorize a blood test conducted under such circumstances.”

A Refresher on Unprofessional Conduct in Pennsylvania as it Relates to Convictions for Assault

In preparation for every hearing, I review case law discussing the relevant legal issues.  One such recurrent topic is unprofessional or immoral conduct.  This is the vague Pandora’s box of behavior upon with both license revocation and denial may be based.  What is immoral conduct as it relates to physical fighting and the crime of assault.

One clear case involves a licensed social worker who pleaded guilty to two counts of simple assault, which is a 2nd degree misdemeanor.  The criminal charges arose from the licensee assaulting a former client and the client’s husband. The criminal complaint alleged that counselor had engaged in an affair with the former client and that upon traveling to the former client’s home, she attacked K and T.  The conduct resulted in convictions, for which the Board issued an Immediate Temporary Suspension order (ITS).  This is immoral conduct.  Do not go and assault a former client for anything, let alone braking of a relationship and returning to their spouse.

Another case is Foose v. State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons, 135 Pa. Commw. 62, 578 A.2d 1355 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990), where the Court defines crimes of moral turpitude as “anything done knowingly contrary to justice or good morals.” Foose, 578 A.2d at 1357.  Assault convictions fall within this definition because assaults “are inconsistent with the definition of good moral character [and they] involve a reprehensible state of mind.” “The reprehensible state of mind” at issue with the misdemeanors of which any licensee is convicted “is the knowing or reckless attempt to cause or causing bodily injury to another, or engaging in conduct which constitutes a physical menace intended to put another in fear of serious bodily injury.” A conviction for 1st or 2nd degree assault means you intentionally inflicted bodily injury upon that person.  Your license could be assaulted by the board for such conduct…..don’t let them do it so don’t you do it.

Sometimes a Board will distinguish third-degree misdemeanor simple assault, which involves conduct that may be lacking in a “reprehensible state of mind” that could arise in a situation such as “a fight or flight scuffle by mutual consent.” However, other Boards have been persuaded that intentional appearance at a victim’s home to conduct an assault constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. It is a reasonable interpretation and the appellate courts have concluded such.

In another case involving a teacher and his wife, the governing regulations provided that the only relevant inquiry when questioning whether a crime is one of moral turpitude relates to the particular elements of the crime committed, not to the facts underlying the particular commission of the crime. The regulatory provision at issue, 22 Pa. Code § 237.9(a), provided guidance, defining “moral turpitude” as including “reckless conduct causing bodily injury to another.” Importantly, many professional licensing regulations do not include this specific inclusive language.

Although the definition in the teacher regulations also included “conduct done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty or good morals,” some courts have opined that the term “moral turpitude” as defined in the regulation, as well as the definitions arising in other statutory contexts requires a reprehensible state of mind or mens rea. Thus, it may be an “act of baseness, vileness, or depravity, contrary to the accepted customary rule of right and duty between two human beings.” Such an act requires at least knowledge of private impropriety or the potential for social disruption. Also an act of moral turpitude may consist of intentional, knowing or reckless conduct.  A teacher, hitting his spouse, has been interpreted as depraved conduct warranting licensing revocation or discipline.

In sum, do not assault your partner, your friends, your current or former clients, and especially, strangers.  Call me to discuss your case and any criminal conviction.

 

 

 

 

Pennsylvania Drug Act Charges — Doctors and Nurses — Reputation

My last blog focused on physicians’ criminal Drug Act conduct and reporting responsibilities to the Medical Board.  Whether a physician or professional nurse, the typical triggering event requiring reporting to a professional license board is a charge or conviction for violating Pennsylvania’s Drug Act.  Aside from license impacts, the evidentiary important of such a charge or conviction is profound.

There is a string of cases in Pennsylvania that identify a Drug Act offense as a crime of moral turpitude and crimen falsii.  What are these characterizations and import on your license defense shall be addressed in this blog.

The esteemed Leonard Packel and Anne Poulin, wrote the book Pennsylvania Evidence § 609 (1987 and Supp. 1994).   At the time of publication, the book did not contain drug violations in either category.  In Commonwealth v. Candia, 286 Pa.Super. 282, 428 A.2d 993 (1981), Pa Superior Court stated that Drug Act offenses were not crimen falsi.

There are several federal decisions, one in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824 (1977), where the court held that importation of cocaine was not clearly crimen falsi, but could be if the particular facts demonstrated that the importation involved false written or oral statements on customs forms.  That court weighed the effect on credibility of various drug violations, stating smuggling “ranks relatively high on the scale of veracity-related crimes, but that mere narcotics possession would be less highly ranked on that same scale.

That court stated impeachment use of a conviction involving dishonesty or false statement refers to allegations particularly focusing on credibility issues, such as those for ‘perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense.  Each of these cases involves the commission of acts which involve a basic intent element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused’s propensity to testify truthfully.

Pennsylvania has determined a similar list of crimes to constitute crimen falsi.  Included in this list, a recent Superior court decision holds, is writing prescriptions for a controlled substance to oneself, knowing one has a chemical dependency problem. The crime itself involves making a false statement because it necessarily involves the falsification of a prescription by a practitioner representing that it is not for a person who is chemically dependent.  As such, Drug Act prescription violations constitute crimes of crimen falsi and, thus, a crime of moral turpitude.

The import of these cases can not be understated.  The Board will look at any Drug Act conviction as a crime of moral turpitude because it relates in many different ways to the securing, utilizing, or possessing an illegal controlled substance.  Whether such is in the course of the practice or in one private life, a Drug Act violation therefore also becomes a “conduct unbecoming” violation.

Separate and aside from these issues, are the mandatory suspensions of any Drug Act conviction.  Call me to discuss your case.

The Drug Act — Pa Doctors’ Reporting Responsibilities for Arrest, Conviction, and Automatic Suspensions

Every day I read appellate cases that review disciplinary decisions of Pennsylvania’s licensing boards. A recent case discusses physicians’ unique arrest and conviction reporting responsibility to the State Board of Medicine.  Physician’s reporting of arrests versus convictions depends on the crime involved.

Pennsylvania’s MCare’s law regarding malpractice insurance coverage, 40 P.S. § 1303. 903(4), identifies physician’s reporting responsibilities if a professional liability claim is asserted them, disciplinary action taken against them from another jurisdiction, criminal sentencing for any case, and the arrest of a physician in four very limited classes of crimes. These offenses are:

  • following offenses in this Commonwealth or another state:
    • (i)  18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 25 (relating to criminal homicide);
    • (iii)  18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 31 (relating to sexual offenses).
    • (iv)  A violation of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.
Physicians’ limited reporting responsibilities means arrests for following offenses does not trigger reporting to the state: domestic violence offenses, DUI’s offenses, theft offenses, or a string of federal related non-drug criminal arrest offenses.   Physicians do have to report arrests alleging a sex offense, homicide, aggravated assault, and a violation under the Drug Act.
Understanding what offenses are Drug Act offenses, not just possession or selling drugs, under The Act that are important.  Drug Act charges include patient record keeping, charting issues, and properly recording and dispensing medications.  Section 780-111 of the Drug Act focuses  on professional prescription, administration, and dispensing of drugs.  Here, the Act states:
  • (a)  Except when dispensed or administered directly to the patient by a practitioner or his authorized agent, other than a pharmacist, to an ultimate user, no controlled substance in Schedule II, may be dispensed without the written prescription of a practitioner, except in emergency situations, as prescribed by the secretary by regulation. No prescription for a controlled substance in Schedule II may be refilled.
  • (b)  Except when dispensed directly by a practitioner, other than a pharmacist, to an ultimate user, no controlled substance in Schedule III or IV, may be dispensed without a written or oral prescription. Such prescriptions shall not be filled or refilled more than six months after the date thereof or be refilled more than five times after the date of the prescription unless renewed by the practitioner.
  • (c)  No controlled substance in Schedule V may be distributed or dispensed for other than a medicinal purpose.
  • (d)  A practitioner may prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance or other drug or device only (i) in good faith in the course of his professional practice, (ii) within the scope of the patient relationship, and (iii) in accordance with treatment principles accepted by a responsible segment of the medical profession. A practitioner may cause a controlled substance, other drug or device or drug to be administered by a professional assistant under his direction and supervision.
  • (d.1)  A practitioner shall not prescribe, administer or dispense any anabolic steroid for the purpose of enhancing a person’s performance in an exercise, sport or game. A practitioner may not prescribe, administer or dispense any anabolic steroid for the purpose of hormonal manipulation intended to increase muscle mass, strength or weight except when medically necessary.
  • (e)  A veterinarian may prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance, other drug or device only (i) in good faith in the course of his professional practice, and (ii) not for use by a human being. He may cause a controlled substance, other drug or device to be administered by a professional assistant under his direction and supervision.
  • (f)  Any drug or device dispensed by a pharmacist pursuant to a prescription order shall bear a label showing (i) the name and address of the pharmacy and any registration number obtained pursuant to any applicable Federal laws, (ii) the name of the patient, or, if the patient is an animal, the name of the owner of the animal and the species of the animal, (iii) the name of the practitioner by whom the prescription order was written, and (iv) the serial number and date of filing of the prescription order. In addition, the following statement shall be required on the label of a controlled substance: “Transfer of this drug to anyone other than the patient for whom it was prescribed is illegal.”

§ 780-112 focuses on records of distribution of controlled substances

  • (a)  Every person who sells or otherwise distributes controlled substances, shall keep records of all purchases or other receipt and sales or other distribution of such substances for two years from the date of purchase or sale. Such records shall include the name and address of the person from whom purchased or otherwise received or to whom sold or otherwise distributed, the date of purchase or receipt or sale or distribution, and the quantity involved: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply to a practitioner who dispenses controlled substances to his patients, unless the practitioner is regularly engaged in charging his patients, whether separately or together with charges for other professional services, for substances so dispensed.
  • (b)  Every practitioner licensed by law to administer, dispense or distribute controlled substances shall keep a record of all such substances administered, dispensed or distributed by him, showing the amount administered, dispensed or distributed, the date, the name and address of the patient, and in the case of a veterinarian, the name and address of the owners of the animal to whom such substances are dispensed or distributed. Such record shall be kept for two years from the date of administering, dispensing or distributing such substance and shall be open for inspection by the proper authorities.
  • (c)  Persons registered or licensed to manufacture or distribute or dispense a controlled substance, other drug or device under this act shall keep records and maintain inventories in conformity with the record-keeping, order form and inventory requirements of Federal law and with any additional regulations the secretary issues. Controlled substances in Schedules I and II shall be distributed by a registrant to another registrant only pursuant to an order form.
Violations of either of these two subsections and their itemized list, by either doctors or other health care nurses is dealt with under section § 780-123, revocation of licenses of practitioners.
  • (a)  Any license or registration heretofore issued to any practitioner may either be revoked or suspended by the proper officers or boards having power to issue licenses or registration to any of the foregoing, upon proof that the licensee or registrant is a drug dependent person on the use of any controlled substance, after giving such licensee or registrant reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.
  • (b)  The appropriate licensing boards in the Department of State are hereby authorized to revoke or suspend the registration or license of any practitioner when such person has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or has been convicted of a felony under this act or any similar State or Federal law. Before any such revocation or suspension, the licensee or registrant shall be given a hearing before the appropriate board. At such hearing the accused may be represented by counsel and shall be entitled to compulsory attendance of witnesses.
  • (c)  The appropriate licensing boards in the Department of State shall automatically suspend, for a period not to exceed one year, the registration or license of any practitioner when the person has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or has been convicted of a misdemeanor under this act. The district attorney of each county shall immediately notify the appropriate State licensing board of practitioners subject to the provisions of this section. However, the provisions of such automatic suspension may be stayed by the appropriate State licensing board in those cases where a practitioner has violated the provisions of this act only for the personal use of controlled substances by the practitioner and the practitioner participates in the impaired professional program approved by the appropriate State licensing board for a period of between three and five years, as directed by the appropriate licensing board. If the practitioner fails to comply in all respects with the standards of such a program, the appropriate licensing board shall immediately vacate the stay of the enforcement of the suspension provided for herein. Automatic suspension shall not be stayed pending any appeal of a conviction. Restoration of such license shall be made as in the case of a suspension of license.

35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-123

Case law addressing practitioner’s objections to the emergent and disparate impact Drug Act convictions and their automatic suspensions have on doctors is very clear.   Board discretion and legislative prerogative regarding public safety out weight a physician’s property right in their license.  “Licensed medical practitioners’ unique access to controlled drugs and a physician’s appropriation of this access for illegal purposes presents a danger to the Commonwealth, for which the General Assembly has legitimately and rationally adopted a separate policing device.”  Call me to discuss your case.
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