Birchfield, Rufusals, and PennDot’s DL – 26B Form

In many pending 2017 Pennsylvania DUI and civil license refusal cases stemming for arrests between April 2016 and July 2017 police officers administered incorrect chemical test warnings to Pennsylvania motorists.  Use of the DL 26B form, I think, is legally insufficient pursuant to the then effective 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(2).  Counsel should file suppression motions.  A corollary issue is whether these drivers are capable as a matter of law of refusing the blood test where the police officer testifies he read the illegal PennDOT DL-26B form.

In May/June 2016 PennDOT created the new DL 26B form in response to Birchfield.  Birchfield held that criminally coercing a blood draw — compelling a defendant to testify/provide blood evidence against themselves or face jail time — is unconstitutional.  After Birchfield, enhanced penalties and threats of jail to secure evidence in DUI cases require suppression of blood evidence.  In response PennDOT changed its DUI informed consent form, the DL 26B document that local and state police read to DUI suspects when the want the suspect to give blood.  The General Assembly did not give PennDOT authority to do this.  This is the topic of this blog.

The suppression argument is as follows:  The arresting officer’s warnings to the DUI suspect fail to comply with Section 1547(b)(2) in that the driver was not advised that refusing the chemical test would result in enhanced criminal penalties (i.e. the penalties provided in Section 3804(c)) as § 1547(b) (pre-July 2017) requires.  While there is no statutory or other requirement that any DL-26 Form contain appropriate warnings, or that the form be read verbatim, it is nonetheless the duty of the police officer to inform the petitioner of the statutorily required warnings.  (See Section 1547(b)(2)).  In other words, if the police officer recites the appropriate warnings from memory without the use of any form at all that is perfectly acceptable under the law.  If an officer confirms the only warnings provided were those contained on the DL-26B Form, those warnings are not consistent with the statutory law prior to July 2017.

This date is important because on July 20, 2017, the governor approved Act 30 of 2017 which provides for an amendment to Section 1547(b)(2), removing language requiring a police officer to provide the warnings relating to enhanced criminal penalties for refusal. While this amendment was not effective on the date of petitioner’s incident, the fact that the legislature  amended  it is indicative  of its acknowledgement that such an amendment was necessary to effectuate the change required of the warnings pursuant to Birchfield.

Importantly, the §1547 pre-July 2017 statute includes the word shall.   The legislature’s use of the term “shall” establishes that police officers must comply with the §1547 language mandate. In Comm v. Weaver, the 2006 Pennsylvania Supreme Court interprets §1547(b)(2) verbiage (the same was in effect on prior to July 2017) reaching the same conclusion.  Following the September 2003 amendments to the Implied Consent Law, PennDOT implemented the language of§ 1547(b)(2)(ii) into a new DL-26 form. This led to a significant amount of litigation over whether the warnings printed on the December 2003 version of the Department of Transportation’s DL-26 form were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of§ 1547(b)(2). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Weaver, held that the warnings printed on that version of the DL-26 form were legally sufficient to satisfy those requirements.  In reaching its decision, the Weaver Court stated:

The legislature’s use of the term “shall” clearly establishes that police officers must comply with  this mandate.   Subparagraph (ii) commands police officers to inform an arrestee that “(ii) upon conviction, plea or adjudication of delinquency for violating section 3802(a), the person will be subject to penalties provided in section 3804(c) (relating to penalties).” The words of this statute are clear and free from all ambiguity; thus, we will glean the legislative intent from those words. The plain language requires only that the officer inform the arrestee that if he is convicted of DUI, refusal will result in additional penalties.

Accordingly, under the plain language of the statute, the warnings set forth in the 2017 version of § 1547(b)(2) are mandatory and must be strictly complied with in order to suspend a motorist’s operating privilege pursuant to the Vehicle Code. Previously, in very certain terms, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court has held that, in requesting a chemical test, the police officer must inform the arrestee of the consequences of refusal and notify the arrestee that there is no right to consult with an attorney before making a decision. See O’Connell, 555 A.2d at 877-78.12 “An arrestee is entitled to this information so that his choice to take a [chemical] test can be knowing and conscious.” Id. at 878. The choice belongs to the arrestee, not the police officer.

In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation v Kennedy, 66 A.3d 818 (Pa. Comw. 2013), the Court says that:

“the warning delivered to [licensee] fully complies with the statutory requirements. The statute simply does not require any specific explanation as to the length of the civil suspension and does not require explanation of criminal penalties set forth in §3804(c). The statute requires only that the police provide notice that refusal will result in license suspension and, that if the licensee is driving under the influence, refusal will result in additional penalties. [The licensee] receives this information. Kennedy requires that the officer deliver only the statutory authorized 1547(b) authorized penalties of a refusal. While there is no specific language that the Courts have determined these police officers must read licensees, once the officer begins notifying potential motorists of license refusal consequences, only those consequences that are set forth in the statute must be read.”

Our Pennsylvania Supreme Court has confirmed police officers’ obligation to advise motorists of the exact warning contained in §1547(b)(2). In this 15 month period, police officers utilizing the DL-26B form did not comply with statutory law requiring the correct consequences be advised to these motorists. PennDOT’s utilization of the revised DL-26B was not sanctioned by the General Assembly and not legally effective on the date and time of these arrest render the information provided to them insufficient as a matter of law.

§1547 prior to July 2017 required reading all language contained therein, even those provisions deemed unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. This tension between the current statutory laws and judicial decisions create a situation fraught with potential that motorists will not receive sufficient information to make a voluntary, informed decision regarding consent to the requested chemical testing.

The complex criminal versus civil application of Birchfield, Weaver, Kennedy, supra, is born out in Boseman v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 157 A.3d 10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), and Gray v. Commonwealth , Dep’t of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, No. 1759 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 2536439, at *7–8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 9, 2017), reargument denied (Aug. 7, 2017).  These cases maintain  arresting officer’s statutory obligation to inform a motorist of the General Assembly’s defined § 1547(b)’s ramifications of a refusal – not PennDOT’s version.

In Boseman  and Gray, supra, Commonwealth Court states Birchfield does not apply to PennDOT license suspension refusal cases. As such, any court finding that Birchfield effectively compelled PennDOT to unilaterally re-write the 1547(b) mandatory warning, to a non-statutorily authorized version, is not supported by the Commonwealth Court’s application of Birchfield in the §1547(b) refusal context. Boseman, Gray, Weaver, Kennedy, supra.

In Gray and Boseman, supra, Judge McCullough dissents.  Judge McCullough convincingly points out the incongruity of the constitutional right of privacy and self-incrimination Birchfield establishes (adopted by Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323 (Pa. Super. 2016)) and Commonwealth Court’s dismissing such argument in the civil license suspension context when ONLY a state based property right (a motor vehicle operator’s license) is at issue.

In Price v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing,, No. 1873 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 4321625, at *6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept. 29, 2017), Judge McCullough concurs in the result (she is constrained to follow Boseman, supra) but reiterates her position set forth in Gray and Boseman.  However, Judge Cosgroves dissents:

While Birchfield is not directly applicable here, it does stand for a principle which the former DL–26 does not reflect. And while Birchfield allows implementation of civil penalties for refusal to submit to a blood test in cases such as this, it does not give states permission to misinform a licensee as to the consequences of a refusal.

As such, Courts may, on alternative grounds, conclude Birchfield applies in the civil, administrative license suspension realm as a driver’s licenses in this day and age constitutes a property right to which criminal threat of incarceration to surrender (the proper § 1547(b) language to be read but was not) violates her constitutional rights, voiding any refusal. This conclusion is sought even though the DL-26 Form with the enhanced penalties was not read to these motorists.  It was still required to be read, but was not.

Call me to discuss your case.

 

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A Major Constitutional Decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

In 2011 the General Assembly enacted, consistent with federal mandate, Pennsylvania’s latest version of Megan’s Law.  Entitled SORNA or the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, the law became effective on December 12, 2012.

SORNA, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10 to 9799.41, classifies offenders and their offenses into three tiers, 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.14. Those convicted of Tier I offenses are subject to registration for a period of 15 years and are required to verify their registration information and be photographed, in person at an approved registration site, annually, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a)(1), (e)(1). Those convicted of Tier II offenses are subject to registration for a period of 25 years and are required to verify their registration information and be photographed, in person at an approved registration site, semi-annually, § 9799.15(a)(2), (e)(2).  This registration scheme greatly extended the registration responsibilities for defendants whose criminal acts occurred prior to December 2012.

I have written several blogs on this issue: SORNA’s retroactive registration requirement for those previously convicted of crimes enumerated within the law purview.  The law specifically states that any individual under supervision (probation, parole, or prison – but not registration supervision) on December 12, 2012 was subject to reclassification of their registration scheme.  The reclassification effectively altered every supervised defendant’s SORNA’s registration requirements from 10 years to 15, 25 or life and changed the annual to quarterly registrations.

My blogs focused on the Pennsylvania State Police’s effort to reclassify offenders who were not under supervision, but were still registering consistent with their guilty plea or sentencing scheme.  In these cases the defendants served their sentence, had complied with their guilty plea agreement, but the State Police sought to reclassify and extent their registration requirements.  The Supreme and Superior court decisions in these cases (Nase, Haisworth and Martinez) dealt with these cases, declaring the State Police’s unilateral reclassification of non-supervised defendant a breach of the guilty plea agreement.

Various state court judges not willing to terminate a SORNA registration requirement found every way possible to deny these defendants post-conviction non-PCRA relief.

On July 19, 2017 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued the decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 2017 Pa Lexis 1682.  The facts are as follows: On February 7, 2007, after a bench trial in Cumberland County, appellant was convicted of two counts of indecent assault arising out of an incident where he touched the breasts of his girlfriend’s twelve-year old daughter.  Sentencing was scheduled for May 8, 2007, at which time appellant would have been ordered to register as a sex offender with the Pennsylvania State Police for a period of ten years pursuant to then-effective Megan’s Law III. See 42 Pa.C.S. §9795.1 (expired).  However, appellant failed to appear for his sentencing hearing and absconded until he was apprehended on unrelated charges in Rhode Island in September 2014. N.T., 10/14/14 at 2. During his absence, the General Assembly [*3] had replaced Megan’s Law III with SORNA. Under SORNA, persons convicted of indecent assault of a person less than thirteen years of age, 18 Pa.C.S. §3126(a)(7), are categorized as Tier III offenders and are required to register as sex offenders for the remainder of their lives.

Appellant Muniz was sentenced to four to fourteen months’ imprisonment and ordered to comply with lifetime registration requirements under SORNA. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion seeking application of the ten-year registration period under Megan’s Law III, which was the law in place at the time of his offense and conviction, instead of lifetime registration under SORNA. The trial court denied Muniz’ motion and he appealed to the Superior Court, claiming retroactive application of SORNA violates the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, and the reputation clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Importantly, the court found that Muniz’ seven year absence from the Commonwealth is of no moment. SORNA applies retroactively to any individual serving a sentence for a sexual offense or any individual who had not completed their registration period under prior registration statutes as of SORNA’s effective date of December 20, 2012. 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.13. Had Muniz been sentenced in 2007 and subject to registration under Megan’s Law III, he would not have completed his ten-year registration period when SORNA became effective and thus his ten-year registration period would have been converted to a term of lifetime registration.  This foot note number 3 applies to every case for which pre-December 2012 defendants may now seek to contest their post-sentencing reclassification!

Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal raising two questions regarding SORNA’s “sexual offenses and tier system” provisions set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.14:
1) Does applying [42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14]  retroactively violate the Federal Constitution?
2) Does applying [42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14] retroactively violate the Pennsylvania
Constitution?

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court said YES to both questions:   The retroactive application of SORNA’s new harsh, punitive shaming registration scheme to defendants whose sex related crimes were committed prior to December 12, 2012 is unconstitutional.   The Court rules that SORNA increases punishment for conduct which occurred before its enactment and such retroactive application violates both federal and state constitutional bans on ex post facto laws; in doing so, the court finds that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protection than the United States Constitution, that SORNA is therefore unconstitutional as applied to someone like Muniz whose conviction predated its enactment. The Pennsylvania State Police can not now lawfully retroactive apply SORNA and reclassify defendants (under supervision or not) for criminal conduct occurring prior to December 2012.  This is huge.

Call me to discuss your case.

Road Riding in the Counties

My personal and business travel is taking me to more counties throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania than ever before. The local courthouse houses in the county seats are really interesting for me. The court houses — arenas of legal combat — are throw backs to more glorious days when the local big trial was the event of the year.
In the past I took for granted these architectural gems that are spread throughout the various townships and boroughs within which I practice.   Now, I seek out and explore the courthouses. Whether by car or bike, I am having fun.
This spring I bought myself a road bike. I ride ferociously around the eastern part of Pennsylvania. I have the pleasure of routinely riding through Philadelphia,  Conshohocken, Norristown, and Valley Forge Park. All are within 5-15 miles of my house.  Sometimes I ride from my house to Philadelphia and back.
A recent Saturday took me on a further ride — from West Chester to the City of Lancaster. The road ride began in West Chester and ended in Lancaster County, behind the Court House. We departed West Chester through its southern rolling-hills of Brandywine Township. We followed Brandywine Creek through East Bradford Township, Downingtown  to West Fallowfield Township. One word — marvelous.
After 90 minutes the group ride, with me at the back of the pack, entered Lancaster County. I was greeted by signs for farm fresh brown eggs, personally constructed homes, garages, sheds, and wonderful antique tractors.
Tractors, tractors, tractors. But not your ordinary tractors.  These were green, yellow and red tractors, pulled by horses. The drawn mowing tractors were hard at work, gas free, mowing lawns and fields. Some tractors were too tired to work, gathering rust. There was no worry about rubber tires rotting. Metal wheels needed no repairs.
The morning aromas changed with each turn in the road. Pungent cow, horse, pig dung awoke my sinuses.  Crushed wild blackberries and dripping vines of honeysuckles permeated homesteads. The morning dew clung to grass blades and tree branches through the Brandywine Creek bike route. Entering Lancaster and riding down Duke Street brought with it fresh bakery smells and the Lancaster County brewing Company.
In each county seat, I look for a small coffee shop. Lancaster’s Prince Street Café did not disappoint. The fresh cappuccino after a 50 mile ride awakened all of my exhausted senses. Orange juice and fresh eggs on a croissant made me even happier. The pictures below reflects the quaintness of the café and the wonderful effort the bakers and barista’s gave the Saturday morning breakfast crowd.
An unexpected joy came as I began to get ready for my drive home. Just to the west of the Prince Street Café is the Lancaster County Donuts Shop. Homemade donuts and holes are sold with every conceivable topping — as if I was in an ice cream shop — tantalized my taste buds. The sublime chocolate with vanilla cream cheese frosting carried me through the rest of my day.
I could not have been happier. Content and satisfied by a hard work out, great ride with new friends and a bulging stomach.  Blair and Clearfield counties also did not disappoint. I’ll keep you posted.

Pennsylvania’s New DUI Case Law

Since Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016), Pennsylvania’s DUI statute as applied to blood draws and refusals to submit to blood draws has because unenforceable.  The illegal escalation of criminal penalties for refusing to submit to a blood draw, or even being told of the enhanced penalties, has created an untenable situation for every police department in the Commonwealth.  They are still doing it wrong. Do not plead guilty.  Fight these cases.

Some departments are still reading the old refusal warnings.  Some are still taking people to the hospital when a simple breath test will work.  Some are making up new refusal warnings.  Some are trying to get people to freely consent to a blood draw without telling them of the consequences.  These, I think are all illegal procedures.  The cases are coming down every week limiting how the Commonwealth can gather evidence and what evidence can be used to prosecute the cases under the post-Birchfield paradigm.

It is the Commonwealth’s burden of proof to establish a DUI suspect’s consent to give blood is the product of essentially free and unconstrained choice—not the result of duress, coercion, expressed or applied. Commonwealth v. Gaetano, 2017 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1241 (April 4, 2017); Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323, 2016 PA Super 293 (Pa. Super. filed December 20, 2016). The standard for measuring the scope of a person’s consent is based upon an objective evaluation of what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the person who gave such consent.

Gaetano and Evans  in applying Birchfield hold that the Commonwealth may not impose criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test.  Reading a person the now illegal O’Connell warning’s, or any other fabricated, constructed, newly designed version thereof, threat of enhanced criminal prosecution and incarceration vitiate consensual submission to a blood draw absent a warrant. Gaetano and Evans state it is the Commonwealth’s burden of proof to establish that a defendant’s consent is freely given and not the product of coercion.

It is not the a defendant’s burden of proof to establish or place in the record his subjective feelings of coercion. Commonwealth v. Fink, 2016 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 4704, *13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).  The mere language of the O’Connell warning, or any other fabricated, constructed, newly designed version thereof, include a threat of enhanced criminal prosecution are coercive and the Commonwealth cannot establish coercive free consent.   Objective evidence of duress that is the basis for Gaetano and Evans will be present in almost every defendant’s arrest record, thus vitiating alleged voluntary consent to give blood draw.

Upon deciding a Motion to Suppress the blood evidence, trial courts cannot, and it is irrelevant to the constitutional evaluation under the Supreme Court precedent, put the burden on the defendant, as to what their objective state of mind was upon giving consent for a blood draw.

As for the specific refusal statute, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547, Superior Court has concluded that it or police departments newly fabricated, constructed threat of enhanced criminal prosecution vitiates any consent given to a warrantless blood draw.  Gaetano and Evans maintain that subjecting defendants to warrantless blood draws based upon the illegal O’Connell warning consent provisions (or any other fabricated, constructed, newly designed but improper version thereof, threat of enhanced criminal prosecution) is illegal and unconstitutional under US Supreme Court and Pennsylvania appellate court jurisprudence.

In looking at the totality of the circumstances the court must determine that any consent is not voluntary and coerced. Birchfield’s review of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on blood testing compels a review of Missouri v. McNeely, 566 U.S ___ (2012),  where the Court refused to adopt a per se rule that “whenever an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol, circumstances will necessary exist because blood alcohol content evidence is inheritably evanescent.”  Id. at ____, (slip op., at 8).

McNeely is applicable in Pennsylvania DUI cases because officers in drunk-driving investigations can reasonably obtain a warrant before having a blood sample drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search.  The Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.  They are no doing so.  The court has held that it is not enough to claim that “circumstances may make obtaining a warrant impractical such that the alcohol’s dissipation will support an exigency.” This is to be decided in each case on its facts.  The Court did not create a general rule based upon “considerable over generalization” that a per se rule would reflect.

Pennsylvania has said the same thing.  “The Fourth Amendment to the [United States] Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of [the Pennsylvania] Constitution protects Pennsylvania’s citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 2012 PA Super 118, 46 A.3d 781, 784 (Pa. Super. 2012). “A search conducted without a warrant is deemed to be unreasonable and therefore constitutionally impermissible, unless an established exception applies.” Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (Pa. 2000).  “Exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception . . . , the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. Dunnavant, 2013 PA Super 38, 63 A.3d 1252, 1257 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013).

As for blood, the “administration of a blood test . . . performed by an agent of, or at the direction of the government” constitutes a search under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152, 615 A.2d 308, 315 (Pa. 1992); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966).  Since the DUI blood tests are typically performed without a warrant, the search is preemptively unreasonable “and therefore constitutionally impermissible, unless an established exception applies.”

In determining the validity of a given consent, the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a consent is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice — not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne — under the totality of the circumstances.  The standard for measuring the scope of a person’s consent is based on an objective evaluation of what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the person who gave the consent.  Such evaluation includes an objective examination of the maturity, sophistication and mental or emotional state of the defendant. Gauging the scope of a defendant’s consent is an inherent and necessary part of the process of determining, on the totality of the circumstances presented, whether the consent is objectively valid, or instead the product of coercion, deceit, or misrepresentation.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 621 Pa. 218, 77 A.3d 562, 573 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations, quotations, and corrections omitted).

I think the DUI case law requires that the police tell the arrestee of the consequences of a refusal to take the test so that he can make a knowing and conscious choice.  When requested to take a breathalyzer or blood test, the court insists that in addition to telling an arrestee that his license will be suspended for one year if he refuses to take a breathalyzer test, the police instruct the arrestee that such rights are inapplicable to the breathalyzer test and that the arrestee does not have the right to consult with an attorney or anyone else prior to taking the test. An arrestee is entitled to this information so that his choice to take a breathalyzer test can be knowing and conscious and we believe that requiring the police to qualify the extent of the right to counsel is neither onerous nor will it unnecessarily delay the taking of the test.  Commonwealth v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873 (1989).

In many cases, the police claim a defendant allegedly consents to the warrantless blood draw during a custodial interrogation after the police inform him of some fabricated, constructed, newly designed informed consent language not court or legislatively approved. This is not proper.  Currently, the only available law requires the police to advise a defendant that: “if you refuse to submit to chemical test and you are convicted or plead to violating § 3802(a)(1) related to impaired driving under the vehicle code, because of your refusal, you will be subject to more severe penalties set forth in § 3804(c)[,] relating to penalties, the same as if you were — if you would be convicted at the highest rate of alcohol.”

This makes the verbal consent to a warrantless blood draw  during a non-mirandized, custodial interrogation in illegal statement subject to suppression.  Absent verbal consent, there is none.  Further, since Birchfield held that  a state may not “impose criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to [a warrantless blood] test,” the police officer’s advisory to any defendant on the non-legislatively permitted language illegal. Birchfield, 136 S.Ct. at 2186. This then requires a court to conclude that the search incident to arrest doctrine does not justify  warrantless blood testing compelled through enhanced criminal sentencing provisions for refusing to take that blood test.  This in turn means that the enhanced criminal offense, both in charges filed and potential sentencing scheme set forth in 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(b)(1)(2), compels this County Courts of Common Pleas to hold that “motorists cannot be deemed to of consent to submit to a blood test on fate of committing a criminal offense.”

Call me to discuss you DUI and blood draw evidence.

Pennsylvania’s DUI Statute and Warrantless Blood Draws On An Unconscious Person

Since Birchfield v. N. Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2173, 2185, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016), the Pennsylvania Supreme court has swiftly moved to invigorate and buttress Pennsylvania civil liberties and motor vehicle drivers’ privacy rights.  On July 19, 2017, in Commonwealth v. Myers, 2017 Pa. LEXIS 1689, 2017 WL 3045867, the Court upheld lower court rulings granting suppression of blood evidence seized from a drunk, unconscious motorist.

The facts are simple. Myers was visibly drunk, operated the motor vehicle, was arrested by one police officer, and taken to the hospital for a blood draw. A second officer arrived at the hospital, did not observe Myers or ask his consent to take his blood before hospital staff administered medication rendering Myers unconscious.  Unable to respond to his commands, the 2nd police officer instructed the nurse to draw Myers’ blood for testing.  The police did not secure a warrant to draw or search drunk, unconscious Myers’ blood.

The Court granted the appeal to consider the lawfulness of a warrantless blood draw conducted upon a motorist who, having been arrested for DUI, had then been rendered unconscious by medical personnel before a police officer provided O’Connell warnings and before the officer requested the motorist’s submission to a chemical test. The Philadelphia Municipal Court, the Court of Common Pleas, and Superior Court all held that a blood draw conducted under these circumstances is impermissible, and that the results of the derivative blood test are accordingly inadmissible at trial. Because the seizure of Myers‘ blood violated Pennsylvania’s implied consent statute, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, and because no other circumstances justified the failure to obtain a search warrant, the Court affirmed all of the lower courts’ decisions suppressing the blood evidence.

At the intermediate appellate level, in Commonwealth v. Myers, 2015 PA Super 140, 118 A.3d 1122 (Pa. Super. 2015), the court stated that Subsection 1547(b)(1) “provides a driver under arrest with [a] statutory right of refusal to blood testing.” (quoting 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1)).  Because Myers was unconscious at the time that Officer Domenic requested the blood draw, the court observed that Myers “could not claim the statutory protection” of Subsection 1547(b)(1). 

Superior Court also relies upon Missouri v. McNeely,     U.S.    , 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), holding that, “because police did not act pursuant to the implied consent law until 4:45 p.m., after Myers had been rendered unconscious by an intervening cause that occurred subsequent to his DUI arrest and transport to the hospital, … McNeely controls here.”  Like the trial court, Superior Court determines the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate the impracticability of obtaining a warrant prior to the blood draw. Therefore, the panel held that the trial court correctly affirmed the Municipal Court’s order granting Myers‘ motion to suppress.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Commonwealth argues that the implied consent statute establishes a valid exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and that the statutory right to refuse chemical testing does not apply to unconscious arrestees. The Commonwealth’s central premise is that, under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a), “any individual who exercises the privilege of driving in Pennsylvania has consented to a blood draw.” 

Although a conscious individual may refuse to submit to a chemical test, the Commonwealth asserts that “[t]here is no law in Pennsylvania that treats an unconscious defendant as having revoked his already-provided consent.”  The Commonwealth faults the Superior Court for “distinguish[ing] between conscious and unconscious drivers without any analysis.” (emphasis omitted). In the Commonwealth’s view, an arrestee’s state of consciousness matters only to the extent that “[u]nconsciousness . . . prevents the suspect from refusing the blood draw,” but it “does not somehow negate his existing consent.”  The Supreme Court categorically rejects this argument.

 

A review of the DUI informed consent issue is a good place to start.  Consistent with 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1547(c) the Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle code imposes evidentiary admissibility standards for blood tests consensually drawn without a warrant. Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle code addressing driving under the influence (“DUI”) of alcohol or controlled substances, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802 (b)(c) & (d) each contain as an essential element of the criminal offense a defendant’s blood alcohol concentration level.

The grading provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle code, 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3803(d), as they relate to DUI charges, identify in subsections 1 through 4 that any individual who is under investigation for violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802, et seq., (accusing an individual of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol such that they are incapable of safely driving) and refuses to voluntary submit to a warrant-less blood test, is to receive enhanced criminal sentencing terms of incarceration solely as a result of the refusal to voluntarily submit to the blood draw.

Pennsylvania’s implied consent law requires motorist who drive on our roads to automatically consent to a blood draw if under police investigation for alleged DUI.  75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(2) (prescribing the “duty of the police officer” to inform a DUI arrestee of the consequences of refusal); Pa. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873, 877 (Pa. 1989) (“The law has always required that the police must tell the arrestee of the consequences of a refusal to take [a chemical] test so that he can make a knowing and conscious choice.”)  If the operator refuses, no blood draw can take place.  Now after, Birchfield, the motorist can not be criminally penalized for refusing the blood draw.

By operation of the implied consent statute, once a police officer establishes reasonable grounds to suspect that a motorist has committed a DUI offense, that motorist “shall be deemed to have given consent to one or more chemical tests of breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of a controlled substance.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a). Notwithstanding this provision, Subsection 1547(b)(1) confers upon all individuals under arrest for DUI an explicit statutory right to refuse chemical testing, the invocation of which triggers specified consequences. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1) (“If any person placed under arrest for [DUI] is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted”); Eisenhart, 611 A.2d at 683 (“The statute grants an explicit right to a driver who is under arrest for [DUI] to refuse to consent to chemical testing.”).

The Court rules that under this statutory scheme, a motorist placed under arrest for DUI has a critical decision to make. The arrestee may submit to a chemical test and provide the police with evidence that may be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution, or the arrestee may invoke the statutory right to refuse testing, which: (i) results in a mandatory driver’s license suspension under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1); (ii) renders the fact of refusal admissible as evidence in a subsequent DUI prosecution pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(e); and (iii) authorizes heightened criminal penalties under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(c) if the arrestee later is convicted of DUI.

Previously, in very certain terms, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court has held that, in requesting a chemical test, the police officer must inform the arrestee of the consequences of refusal and notify the arrestee that there is no right to consult with an attorney before making a decision. See O’Connell, 555 A.2d at 877-78.12Link to the text of the note “An arrestee is entitled to this information so that his choice to take a [chemical] test can be knowing and conscious.” Id. at 878. The choice belongs to the arrestee, not the police officer.

In determining the validity of a given consent, the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a consent is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice — not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne — under the totality of the circumstances. The standard for measuring the scope of a person’s consent is based on an objective evaluation of what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the person who gave the consent. Such evaluation includes an objective examination of the maturity, sophistication and mental or emotional state of the defendant. Gauging the scope of a defendant’s consent is an inherent and necessary part of the process of determining, on the totality of the circumstances presented, whether the consent is objectively valid, or instead the product of coercion, deceit, or misrepresentation.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 621 Pa. 218, 77 A.3d 562, 573 (Pa. 2013).

The case of Commonwealth v. Evans, 2016 PA Super 293  (December 20, 2016), is the first major Pennsylvania Appellate Court decision discussing Pennsylvania’s DUI statute, the Implied Consent Law (“O’Connell Warnings”), and the prosecutor’s burden of proof at the suppression hearing.  Evans holds that a defendant does not have to prove they gave consent only based upon the threat of a more severe criminal penalty (jail and further license suspension).  Rather, the statute itself establishes this burden and the Prosecutor must rebut that legal presumption.  Because there is no ability to rebut a presumption of illegitimate consent when threatened with enhanced jail penalties, all motions to suppress must be granted.

Myers takes Evans one step further, finding that “Subsection 1547(b)(1) does not distinguish in any way between conscious and unconscious individuals, but, rather, provides the statutory right of refusal to “any person placed under arrest” for DUI. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1) (emphasis added). By its plain meaning, “any person” necessarily includes an unconscious person. Accordingly, we hold that Myers had an absolute right to refuse chemical testing pursuant to the implied consent statute, that his unconscious state prevented him from making a knowing and conscious choice as to whether to exercise that right, and that the implied consent statute does not authorize a blood test conducted under such circumstances.”

The Drug Act — Pa Doctors’ Reporting Responsibilities for Arrest, Conviction, and Automatic Suspensions

Every day I read appellate cases that review disciplinary decisions of Pennsylvania’s licensing boards. A recent case discusses physicians’ unique arrest and conviction reporting responsibility to the State Board of Medicine.  Physician’s reporting of arrests versus convictions depends on the crime involved.

Pennsylvania’s MCare’s law regarding malpractice insurance coverage, 40 P.S. § 1303. 903(4), identifies physician’s reporting responsibilities if a professional liability claim is asserted them, disciplinary action taken against them from another jurisdiction, criminal sentencing for any case, and the arrest of a physician in four very limited classes of crimes. These offenses are:

  • following offenses in this Commonwealth or another state:
    • (i)  18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 25 (relating to criminal homicide);
    • (iii)  18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 31 (relating to sexual offenses).
    • (iv)  A violation of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.
Physicians’ limited reporting responsibilities means arrests for following offenses does not trigger reporting to the state: domestic violence offenses, DUI’s offenses, theft offenses, or a string of federal related non-drug criminal arrest offenses.   Physicians do have to report arrests alleging a sex offense, homicide, aggravated assault, and a violation under the Drug Act.
Understanding what offenses are Drug Act offenses, not just possession or selling drugs, under The Act that are important.  Drug Act charges include patient record keeping, charting issues, and properly recording and dispensing medications.  Section 780-111 of the Drug Act focuses  on professional prescription, administration, and dispensing of drugs.  Here, the Act states:
  • (a)  Except when dispensed or administered directly to the patient by a practitioner or his authorized agent, other than a pharmacist, to an ultimate user, no controlled substance in Schedule II, may be dispensed without the written prescription of a practitioner, except in emergency situations, as prescribed by the secretary by regulation. No prescription for a controlled substance in Schedule II may be refilled.
  • (b)  Except when dispensed directly by a practitioner, other than a pharmacist, to an ultimate user, no controlled substance in Schedule III or IV, may be dispensed without a written or oral prescription. Such prescriptions shall not be filled or refilled more than six months after the date thereof or be refilled more than five times after the date of the prescription unless renewed by the practitioner.
  • (c)  No controlled substance in Schedule V may be distributed or dispensed for other than a medicinal purpose.
  • (d)  A practitioner may prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance or other drug or device only (i) in good faith in the course of his professional practice, (ii) within the scope of the patient relationship, and (iii) in accordance with treatment principles accepted by a responsible segment of the medical profession. A practitioner may cause a controlled substance, other drug or device or drug to be administered by a professional assistant under his direction and supervision.
  • (d.1)  A practitioner shall not prescribe, administer or dispense any anabolic steroid for the purpose of enhancing a person’s performance in an exercise, sport or game. A practitioner may not prescribe, administer or dispense any anabolic steroid for the purpose of hormonal manipulation intended to increase muscle mass, strength or weight except when medically necessary.
  • (e)  A veterinarian may prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance, other drug or device only (i) in good faith in the course of his professional practice, and (ii) not for use by a human being. He may cause a controlled substance, other drug or device to be administered by a professional assistant under his direction and supervision.
  • (f)  Any drug or device dispensed by a pharmacist pursuant to a prescription order shall bear a label showing (i) the name and address of the pharmacy and any registration number obtained pursuant to any applicable Federal laws, (ii) the name of the patient, or, if the patient is an animal, the name of the owner of the animal and the species of the animal, (iii) the name of the practitioner by whom the prescription order was written, and (iv) the serial number and date of filing of the prescription order. In addition, the following statement shall be required on the label of a controlled substance: “Transfer of this drug to anyone other than the patient for whom it was prescribed is illegal.”

§ 780-112 focuses on records of distribution of controlled substances

  • (a)  Every person who sells or otherwise distributes controlled substances, shall keep records of all purchases or other receipt and sales or other distribution of such substances for two years from the date of purchase or sale. Such records shall include the name and address of the person from whom purchased or otherwise received or to whom sold or otherwise distributed, the date of purchase or receipt or sale or distribution, and the quantity involved: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply to a practitioner who dispenses controlled substances to his patients, unless the practitioner is regularly engaged in charging his patients, whether separately or together with charges for other professional services, for substances so dispensed.
  • (b)  Every practitioner licensed by law to administer, dispense or distribute controlled substances shall keep a record of all such substances administered, dispensed or distributed by him, showing the amount administered, dispensed or distributed, the date, the name and address of the patient, and in the case of a veterinarian, the name and address of the owners of the animal to whom such substances are dispensed or distributed. Such record shall be kept for two years from the date of administering, dispensing or distributing such substance and shall be open for inspection by the proper authorities.
  • (c)  Persons registered or licensed to manufacture or distribute or dispense a controlled substance, other drug or device under this act shall keep records and maintain inventories in conformity with the record-keeping, order form and inventory requirements of Federal law and with any additional regulations the secretary issues. Controlled substances in Schedules I and II shall be distributed by a registrant to another registrant only pursuant to an order form.
Violations of either of these two subsections and their itemized list, by either doctors or other health care nurses is dealt with under section § 780-123, revocation of licenses of practitioners.
  • (a)  Any license or registration heretofore issued to any practitioner may either be revoked or suspended by the proper officers or boards having power to issue licenses or registration to any of the foregoing, upon proof that the licensee or registrant is a drug dependent person on the use of any controlled substance, after giving such licensee or registrant reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.
  • (b)  The appropriate licensing boards in the Department of State are hereby authorized to revoke or suspend the registration or license of any practitioner when such person has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or has been convicted of a felony under this act or any similar State or Federal law. Before any such revocation or suspension, the licensee or registrant shall be given a hearing before the appropriate board. At such hearing the accused may be represented by counsel and shall be entitled to compulsory attendance of witnesses.
  • (c)  The appropriate licensing boards in the Department of State shall automatically suspend, for a period not to exceed one year, the registration or license of any practitioner when the person has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or has been convicted of a misdemeanor under this act. The district attorney of each county shall immediately notify the appropriate State licensing board of practitioners subject to the provisions of this section. However, the provisions of such automatic suspension may be stayed by the appropriate State licensing board in those cases where a practitioner has violated the provisions of this act only for the personal use of controlled substances by the practitioner and the practitioner participates in the impaired professional program approved by the appropriate State licensing board for a period of between three and five years, as directed by the appropriate licensing board. If the practitioner fails to comply in all respects with the standards of such a program, the appropriate licensing board shall immediately vacate the stay of the enforcement of the suspension provided for herein. Automatic suspension shall not be stayed pending any appeal of a conviction. Restoration of such license shall be made as in the case of a suspension of license.

35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-123

Case law addressing practitioner’s objections to the emergent and disparate impact Drug Act convictions and their automatic suspensions have on doctors is very clear.   Board discretion and legislative prerogative regarding public safety out weight a physician’s property right in their license.  “Licensed medical practitioners’ unique access to controlled drugs and a physician’s appropriation of this access for illegal purposes presents a danger to the Commonwealth, for which the General Assembly has legitimately and rationally adopted a separate policing device.”  Call me to discuss your case.

New Registration Requirement Rules

I write  frequently about the Pennsylvania General Assembly routinely adding criminal and civil consequences to convicted sex offenders ‘s sentences after judicial pronouncement of the sentence. Modifying Megan’s Law registration requirements for convicted sex offenders is the most prominent of these tough-on-crime fighting, constituent-appeasing measures. Megan’s Law V is called the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.
 
The Pennsylvania General Assembly has modified and/or extended Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law so many times that our Commonwealth now has five different Megan’s Law registration statutes. Parts of Megan’s Law, II-IV were declared unconstitutional. Megan’s Law V’s December 20, 2012 reclassification and extension of registration scheme for sex offenders – whether under supervision or not as of December 20, 2012- is now being attacked.  Defendants who complied with all terms and conditions of their criminal sentences and originally imposed registration requirements object to their reclassification. Successful legal arguments have focused on this provision.

On September 28, 2016 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally decided several consolidated cases addressing this issue.  In Commonwealth v. Martinez,  2016 Pa. LEXIS 2183 (Sep. 28, 2016), the Court resolved the legality of the 2012 reclassification scheme against otherwise compliant registrants. Three combined cases present the question of whether the state police can extend or re-enroll in the sexual registry defendants who satisfied all terms and conditions of an original guilty plea agreement and were not under probation or parole supervision as of December 20, 2012. The individuals may still have had to register under Megan’s law I-V.  These cases do not apply to open plea agreements or sentences handed down after a jury or bench trial.

Factually, after December 20, 2012 the state police sent letters out to Megan’s Law registrants compelling re-enrollment or extension of their registration requirements.  Registration requirements were extended from 10 to 25 years and 25 years to life depending on the criminal conviction. If registration had been completed but the convicted offense registration was changed to 25 years instead of 10 years, re-enrollment was demanded.  Martinez and other individuals around the Commonwealth contested reclassification because they complied with all aspects of their criminal plea agreement, may have concluded probation/parole supervision before December 2012, and may have even completed their registration responsibilities.

Some Cases were filed against the state police as injunctions, writs of mandamus, or a petitions to enforce guilty plea agreements. Many of these cases failed for any number of reasons. Case rulings allow reclassification against defendants who violated any term or condition of their guilty plea agreement.  Another basis for allowing reclassification is being charged with violating the registration requirements of their original sentence.  Even being charged for a reporting violation after 2012 became a reason for further reclassification.

The Martinez defendants (as well as several of my clients) satisfied their terms of incarceration with no violations or write ups, honored all probation or parole obligations, and were fully compliant with (or completed) all registration requirements. The state police still contacted them to either re-initiate or extend registration under Megan’s Law V.
 
I, like Martinez’ counsel, filed motions to enforce their guilty plea in various Common Pleas courts around the state.  I sought, like Martinez, to enforce the terms of their pre-2012 plea agreements.  Martinez focuses exclusively on the sanctity pleas agreement as a contract into which the government entered with these defendant.  Focusing defendants’ compliance with their side of the bargain, Martinez, and one other case, Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 2013 PA Super 318, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa. Super. 2013),  present similar situated defendants.  In those cases the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the Contract Clauses of the Pennsylvania, Pa. Const. art. I, § 17, and United States Constitutions, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, prohibit the Pennsylvania Legislature from enacting laws that retroactively impair contract rights.
The Martinez case question was whether Hainesworth’s ruling, baring reclassification for defendants who complete the terms of the guilty plea contract before December 20, 2012, is proper.  The court said yes and affirms Hainesworth.  The court states “convicted criminals must fulfill the promises they make in connection with plea agreements. See Commonwealth v. Wallace, 582 Pa. 234, 870 A.2d 838, 843 n.6 (Pa. 2005) (“The defendant, on the other hand, accepts this benefit with the implicit promise that he will abide by the terms of the agreement and behave in accordance with the legal punishment imposed by the court.”).  For these defendants, the Court rules, the legislature must  honor the guilty plea agreement/contract its District Attorneys entered and the court approved. 
The issue now is does the guilty plea colloquy adequately set forth with particularity the registration requirements that are part of the guilty plea agreement.  Martinez may not apply to a cases in which the Megan’s Law terms are not stated in the record or were not negotiated.  If there is an open plea, these cases may not apply.  In the late 1990 and early 2000’s in many cases the Commonwealth simply did not negotiate terms of Megan’s Law in the guilty plea agreement or state it was negotiated on the record. 
Some experienced counsel tried to have the record reflect the plea negotiations to lower criminal charges were engaged to reduce the registration time (from a Tier II – 25 year offense to a Tier I – 10 year offense).  In those cases registration terms were reduced in guilty plea agreement by pleas to lower criminal charges.  Martinez find such stipulations in the three consolidated cases.  In Philadelphia and the local counties,  registration notification provisions were always placed in the plea agreement, with a separate signed Megan’s Law Registration form, and in colloquy at a sentencing. 
In the less sophisticated courts sometimes registration terms were not discussed in either the plea or sentencing hearings.  Importantly, counsel must secure both of these transcripts to determine in Martinez applies to the case.  Also, Martinez only applies to guilty pleas (not open pleas) for which a defendant was not under any jail, parole, or probation supervision as of December 2012.   Call me to discuss your case.
 
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JNET, Criminal Charges, and What to Do Next

The summer is over. All the fun in the sun in done. Now, back to work. But for professional licensees who had some criminal justice interactions over the summer that have been put off, ignored, or quietly resolved, these issues need attention again. This is because by now, or soon to your mailbox, you will receive notice from your professional licensing board of their knowledge of your criminal charges.

Fifteen months ago, when the Nursing Board changed its regulations to require 30-day reporting of criminal charges (not conviction), the Board needed to begin the process of making sure its licensees were timely reporting criminal charges. While the Nursing Board may have already been a subscriber to JNET, it stepped up surveillance of every licensee. What does this mean?

The Nursing Board, and every other Board, became a daily recipients of JNET computer searches results of its licensees’ criminal interactions. JNET is now an integral part of every licensing Board’s investigatory process. The Boards are subscribers to JNET to receive daily notice of any positive hit of licensee’s criminal charges through a computer algorithm search of its queried database.  AND BELIEVE ME, THE BOARDS ARE GETTING NOTICES EVERY DAY.  IN TURN, THIS MEANS THAT THE BOARDS ARE ASSIGNING THE NEW CASES TO THE PHMP, VRP, AND/OR PROSECUTORS, TO INVESTIGATE AND IF NECESSARY, FILE ORDERS TO SHOW CAUSE, PETITIONS FOR MENTAL AND PHYSICAL EVALUATIONS, OR FILE DISCIPLINARY CHARGES.

What is JNET – From the JNET WEBSITE it reads

JNET is the Pennsylvania Justice Network. The Pennsylvania Justice Network (JNET) is an integrated, secure justice portal providing an online environment for authorized users and systems to access public safety and criminal justice information. JNET is the Commonwealth’s primary public safety integration service provider. JNET is a result of a collaborative effort of municipal, county, state, bordering states and federal justice agencies to build a secure integrated justice system. While each agency maintains ownership and control of their data, JNET allows authorized criminal justice and public safety professionals to securely and safely access information from multiple providers through one interface.

The Pennsylvania Justice Network (JNET) is the Commonwealth’s primary public safety and criminal justice information broker. JNET’s integrated justice portal provides a common online environment for authorized users to access public safety and criminal justice information. This critical information comes from various contributing municipal, county, state, and federal agencies. One-time data entry has improved the effectiveness of participating agencies, and has significantly improved data accuracy throughout the Commonwealth’s criminal justice system. Information entered into a records management system at the onset of an investigation can now follow the offender throughout their criminal justice tract. As offenders pass through the gateway of justice all the way to post-sentencing supervision, offender information flows in concert with the offender’s progression.

JNET allows users to subscribe to real-time event messages for comparison against offender watch-lists. When an event message is published, it is compared against watch-list records and the subscriber is automatically notified via email. When a significant event such as an arrest, disposition, want, warrant, state parole violation, PennDOT change of address or death occurs, users are alerted to check secure JNET for detailed event information.

The licensing boards know of any criminal charge, public drunkenness, disorderly conduct , DUI, drug charges, and more withing 24-48 hours of fingerprinting and processing in ANY STATE IN THE COUNTRY. Reporting your criminal interaction timely and completely is important. Failing to report is a separate disciplinary event from the criminal offense.

Responding to “Letters of Concern”, VRP enrollment letter, understanding what VRP, PNAP, PHMP case workers can and will do once you begin talking with them is pivotal to saving your license. Read my web site and other blogs. Attorneys handling criminal cases do not understand this professional licensing scheme, the evaluation consequences, and the prosecution attorney’s role is to protect the public .

Call me to discuss the letter in your hand, the petition sitting on your desk, or ask the questions you have after speaking to a VRP case worker who just told you to have your boss call them so you can keep working!!!!

IP Addresses and an Expectation of Privacy — NIT and Government Malware

My criminal practice recently focused on a significant case involving IP addresses and privacy rights. The case involves government use of online surreptitious surveillance methods, an NIT, in a criminal investigation to determine a potential defendant’s Internet Protocol (“IP”) address, and thus home address, to subsequently serve criminal subpoenas and search warrants on that home address. The government maintains in these types of investigations potential criminal defendants have no expectation of privacy in their IP address. However, various criminal statutes, regulatory provisions, and sentencing guidelines reflect Congress’ intent to provide a national reasonable expectation of privacy rights in “IP” addresses and thus location data. This blog shall identify several federal statutes that establish Congressional privacy rights in IP or location address data.

In one criminal statute, Congress makes it illegal under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(5) to “knowingly cause[s] the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer.” Subsection 1030(f) “does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence agency of the United States.” Congress’ requirement of a warrant in subsection (f), “prior authorization” through a judicially approved legal procedure and probable cause, indicates the privacy and constitutional rights that are applicable to these searches, when the take place in searching a defendant’s home pre-arrest.

In these cases, the Government maintains defendants do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their IP location data. They are wrong. The government thinks it is OK to hack private individual’s computers through a code or command sent to that computer. Courts have held these types of investigations are searches, requiring an authorized warrant, and thus judicial oversight. Required judicial oversight is Congressional recognition of privacy rights in location data.

This position is supported by a recent national criminal case. In 2013 various Chinese state co-conspirators were indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028 and 1030, et seq. At paragraphs 15, 18, and 43 of the indictment, the Government alleges these officials engaged in acts constituting violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(b), 1028A(c)(4), and 2. The blatant and outrageous criminal conduct at paragraphs 52-53 includes illegally taking personal identification information of another, without authorization. The Government equates stealing personal IP address and location data with violations of the United States Code.

The United States Sentencing Guidelines include a specific guideline provision devoted to theft of personal privacy data. For sentencing purposes, confidential information under 18 U.S.C. § 1039(h)(1)(A) includes personal location data. U.S.S.G. §2H3.1 addresses the manner in which federal courts are to assess offense levels and sentencing enhancements for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1039.

In the context of active location data provided through cellular telephone surveillance capabilities, there has been extensive litigation over the definition of Other Information that is generated when utilizing a cellular telephone. Congress defines Other Information as historical and real time “cell site location information” (“CSLI”), which discloses location data of persons utilizing cellular telephones. In In re Application, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit addresses probable cause requirements in warrants seeking this information based upon the privacy issues attached thereto. See (http://www.phila-criminal-lawyer.com/Publications/005061214-Hark.pdf).

In 1997 Congress passed amendments to the Communications Act of 1934. Congress, and the FCC, through enabling regulations, passed numerous rules identifying and then delineating the exact nature of customers’ privacy rights to their personal information and telecommunication companies’ duty of protecting such from commercial exploitation. 47 U.S.C. § 222 was added to the Communications Act by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Section 222 of the Act establishes a duty of every telecommunications carrier to protect the confidentiality of customer proprietary network information (” CPNI”). CPNI is “information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, location, and amount of use of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any customer of a telecommunications carrier, and that is made available to the carrier by the customer solely by virtue of the carrier-customer relationship.” 47 U.S.C. § 501 makes it a crime to knowingly and intentionally violate (disclose this information) the Act.

The Privacy Act of 1974 addresses privacy of federal employees’ personal information. “No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains [subject to 12 exceptions].” 5 U.S.C. § 552 a(b). 32 CFR 505.7 – relating to Freedom of Information Act disclosures of Federal Employees personal information states at subsection (e) (1) states “The release of home addresses and home telephone numbers normally is prohibited.”

Release of personal location information is normally considered a clearly “unwarranted invasion” of personal privacy and is exempt from mandatory release under the FOIA. 32 CFR § 505.7(d)(1)(vi) identifies home addresses as personal information not to be release without prior consent of the individual. There is an entire Department of Justice Overview of this Act on its website. The DOJ has its own Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer enforcing provisions of the Privacy Act on Federal employees and agencies. https://www.justice.gov/opcl/overview-privacy-act-1974-2015-edition.

Congress has established privacy obligations on the private sector through legislation affecting the financial services, health care, government, and Internet sectors. Federal regulations issued to carry out federal privacy laws impose obligations on covered entities to implement information security programs to protect unauthorized dissemination of private individual’s personal information. Protected personal information (“PPI”) in each service field typically includes name, address (location) date of birth, and social security numbers of the persons affected. A short list of CFR sections addressing PPI includes 32 CFR 701.115, 32 CFR 505.7, and 36 CFR 902.56.

In light of numerous federal statutes criminalizing any disclosure of personal privacy information (address location data) of both private and government employees, every defendant or target has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location data, to which a legal and proper warrant is required for the Government to discover such information.

Please call me to discuss your case.

Network Investigative Techniques, Federal Criminal Search Tools, and Your 4Th Amendment Rights

My involvement for twenty five years in federal criminal matters has resulted in me handing many different Motions to Suppress. Recently, in the context of Federal internet criminal investigations, I have gained extensive experience fighting the new federal investigative techniques, (“NIT”) that reveal personal identity and location data.

Once such case involves the Government’s use of an NIT or Network Investigative Technique. The NIT is a malware program placed on a computer server that launches itself into each computer accessing that server to engage in alleged criminal activity.  The accessing computers utilize the TOR network for anonymity purposes.  Upon accessing specific areas of the server, the malware on the server then sends to the activating computer (in another state typically inside a person’s home) a code instruction to search, secure, and transmit back to the server the user’s IP address. Thereafter, search warrants secure the personal identification and location information of the accessing computer owner.

I have filed motions to suppress this search technique.  The Government bears the burden of showing, under the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of each individual act constituting a search or seizure. The burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. The court is presented with the choice of two tracks of analysis. Does the court choose to evaluate these defendants’ constitutional rights affected by the NIT Warrant under the:
1) Reasonable expectation of privacy test set forth in United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); or
2) The property-based Fourth Amendment test set forth in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). There, the court exclusively applied the property-based approach to determine whether a search occurs when the Government physically occupies private property of another for the purposes obtaining information. This approach keeps easy cases easy.

  1. PROPERTY-BASED FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS

The court must choose the property-based search analysis set forth in JonesJones holds that surveillance on a person through electronic means without a warrant constitutes a trespass and may be an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. 132 S.Ct. at 953–54. Even though Jones involved warrantless global positioning system (“GPS”) searching, the analysis applies because the NIT warrant is illegal. Jones makes clear the constitutional nature of computer searches, especially in the privacy of one’s home.

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), follows Jones’ property – based Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  The Jardines court held that a warrantless dog sniffing through the front door of Jardines’ home constitutes an unconstitutional search of a constitutionally protected area.  In Jardines, as here, “the officers learn what they learned only by physically intruding on Jardines’ property to gather evidence.”  This search activity is enough to establish that a search occurred. These cases stand for the proposition that the “Fourth Amendment, at its very core, stands for the right of a man to retreat into his home and there be free from unreasonable Government intrusion.” Jardines, supra.

There is no evaluation or discussion of an expectation of privacy under the property-based Fourth Amendment jurisprudence after JonesJardines, 569 U.S. at *9.  The court recognizes a simplistic procedure.  If the Government goes on the property of another, (trespassing or not) it needs a warrant due to Fourth Amendment’s constitutional property rights. These NIT cases, the Government understood this legal necessity and secured the NIT warrant. However, the NIT warrant was illegal.

  1. The Constitutional Character of the NIT Search is Per Se Prejudicial

In today’s society, disclosing an Internet Protocol (“IP”) address is, in essence, disclosing protected location privacy. Similar to Jones‘ GPS coordinates in tracking devices or cellular telephones, location data reveals a great deal about a person.  As such, cases discussing governmental activity and search techniques that reveal a defendant/target’s location are relevant to the court’s analysis of prejudice and the constitutional level of protections in these motions to suppress.

United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D. C. Cir. 2010), affirmed, United States v. Jones, supra, stands for this proposition. Analogizing IP address location data to cellular telephones, Justice Alito writes that “society’s expectations have been that police agency and others will not secretly monitor and catalog every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period of time.” Jones at 945.

Thereafter, in Riley v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), the Supreme Court following Jones, specifically references location privacy as a reason to limit police searches of cellular telephones incident to arrest.  The Riley Court determines that due to the wealth of information electronic devices “contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans the privacies of life.” Riley at 2494–95.

Riley even states, “The fact that an arrestee has diminished privacy interests does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely. Not every search “is acceptable solely because a person is in custody.” Maryland v. King, 569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 26). To the contrary, when “privacy-related concerns are weighty enough” a “search may require a warrant, notwithstanding the diminished expectations of privacy of the arrestee.” Ibid. One such example, of course, is Chimel. Chimel refused to “characteriz[e] the invasion of privacy that results from a top-to-bottom search of a man’s house as ‘minor.’” 395 U. S., at 766–767, n. 12. Because a search of the arrestee’s entire house was a substantial invasion beyond the arrest itself, the Court concluded that a warrant was required.” Riley, supra.  Cellular telephones and home computers are simultaneously offices and personal diaries containing the most intimate details of our lives. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F. 3d. 952, 964 (9th Cir.. 2013).  Several circuits recognize these facts, uniformly requiring a warrant prior to searching a computer. United States v. Paton, 573F.3-D 859 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007).

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania addresses surveillance issues of GPS warrants in United States v. Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d. 515 (E.D.Pa. 2012). In the Court’s discussion of location data and the privacy issues, it concludes that the Government’s warrantless surveillance technique “produces location data while inside the garage of a home or other Fourth Amendment protected place”, potentially yielding information that the Supreme Court specifically found in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), is protected by the Fourth Amendment.

An unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs where, without a warrant, the Government surreptitiously employs an electronic device to obtain information it could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house. The beeper tells the agent that a particular article is actually    located at a specific time in the private residence and is in the possession of the person or persons whose residence is being watched.  Even if visual surveillance has revealed that the article to which the beeper is attached  has entered the house, the later monitoring not only verifies the officers about observations but also establishes that the article remains on the premises. United States v. Karo 468 US at 715.

Ortiz at ___.

Review of these controlling Supreme Court cases and their emphasis on the data produced through cutting edge surveillance techniques (including an NIT) on electronic mediums (cellular telephones and home computers) render’s applicable the Fourth Amendment privacy protections afforded to Jones, Jardines, and Riley.

  1. Expectation of Privacy in an IP address

An expectation of privacy in location data that IP addresses reveal is both objectively and subjectively reasonable based upon people using the TOR network and how the Government secures those person’s IP address.  The Government typically argues that because these defendants may have initially disseminated their IP address through an internet service provider (“ISP”), they have no expectation of privacy in an IP address.  This is factually wrong.

  1. Third Party Doctrine

The case of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), addresses warrantless access to information possessed by a third-party. This is the third-party doctrine set forth in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957.  Third party dissemination and reduced expectation of privacy has no applicability here because of the NIT’s mechanism of search and how Government secures that defendant’s IP address from his computer, not a third-party ISP. The court requires factual testimony on this issue.

United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114 (3d. Cir. 2014), specifically addresses the no expectation of privacy of IP addresses when a defendant uses his neighbor’s wireless router without permission. The Government found Stanley’s computer’s wireless signal piggy backing illegally on his neighbor’s unsecured wireless router. Such unauthorized use of the neighbor’s IP address through which a third-party provider secures individual media access control (“MAC”) addresses of moochers of other people’s wireless routers. The Court found this fact alone reveals that Stanley had no expectation of privacy in his IP or MAC address. Stanley‘s finding that there is not an expectation of privacy in an IP address is not binding here as such is not the basis of the Government’s investigation in this case.

These defendants’ IP addresses are not disclosed anywhere throughout the use of the TOR or his third party ISP.  Declaration, Special Agent Daniel Alfin, document no. 74-1, filed June 1, 2016, U.S. v. Matish, 4:16-cr-00016, attached hereto at Exhibit 3.  This declaration makes clear that the NIT did not secure any other defendant’s, IP address from a third-party ISP or through the TOR network. Rather, the NIT searched for and secured the accessor’s IP address SOLELY from their own computer programming.

The NIT transferred directly to the Government from that defendant’s computer, his IP address not through the ISP.  The Government must acknowledge this fact in response to court’s inquiry of how the NIT worked in Matish. The Government bluntly concedes that but for the IP address, it could not locate these defendants.  These IP address would have been unknown.  The accessing defendants’ personal location data is collected from the accessing computer. See Exhibit 3, Alfins’ declaration, ¶¶ 22 and 25; Exhibit 2, Alfin’s May 19, 2016 Testimony, page 13-17, 21–26.  Alfin makes clear this factual point.

Once put to the test in a Motion to Compel Discovery, Alfin’s testimony is in stark contrast to the NIT Affiant Special Agent Douglas Macfarlane’s affidavit stating that the NIT instructions “are designed to cause the user’s ‘activating’ computer to transmit certain information to a computer controlled by or known to the government,” including the “activating” computer’s actual IP address. See Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant, at ¶ 33.   The NIT would deploy “each time that any user or administrator log[ged] into Playpen by entering a username and password.” (Id., Ex. 1 ¶ 36.) The FBI could then link a username and its corresponding activity on the site with an IP address. (Id., Ex. 1 ¶ 37.)  This is factually wrong when compared to Alfin’s declaration and testimony regarding how the NIT worked its search functions performed when an accessing computer logged onto the Playpen Website.

The Government was less than candid with the tribunal by not advising it that the NIT would send a computer search and seizure program to the user’s home computer and then send back to the FBI computer an IP address.  The FBI was not linking a username and corresponding activity to an IP address. Further, the record is unclear if the Government told  the Magistrate that it was concurrently filing a Title III warrant.  This would have disclosed both its strategic use of a magistrate to issue the NIT Warrant and its seizure gathering mechanism of electronic information for which it required Article III judicial authorization.

The NIT that accessed these defendants’ computers operates in the computer memory locations, retrieved information, and then leaves the computer. The same situation is presented when the Government comes into your house, searches your house, and then leaves. The Government is required to advise you of the search (giving you the search warrant) and then leaves you an inventory of items seized. None of that was done in this occasion.  Jones, Riley, Jardines affirm this constitutional requirement to which Rule 41(B) codifies into a procedure implementing the Fourth Amendment’s warrant provision.

As such, the question is not whether there’s a reasonable expectation of privacy in an Internet IP address (as Werdene concluded there was not), but does a person have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area where the search (his home) occurred and in the information seized (his location).   Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Darby and Matish conclude yes.  This court must choose the property-based Fourth Amendment analysis and afford these deendants the constitutional protections because the NIT searches a home-based computer.

Call me to discuss your NIT, Playpen based federal government internet criminal matter.

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