A Major Constitutional Decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

In 2011 the General Assembly enacted, consistent with federal mandate, Pennsylvania’s latest version of Megan’s Law.  Entitled SORNA or the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, the law became effective on December 12, 2012.

SORNA, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10 to 9799.41, classifies offenders and their offenses into three tiers, 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.14. Those convicted of Tier I offenses are subject to registration for a period of 15 years and are required to verify their registration information and be photographed, in person at an approved registration site, annually, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a)(1), (e)(1). Those convicted of Tier II offenses are subject to registration for a period of 25 years and are required to verify their registration information and be photographed, in person at an approved registration site, semi-annually, § 9799.15(a)(2), (e)(2).  This registration scheme greatly extended the registration responsibilities for defendants whose criminal acts occurred prior to December 2012.

I have written several blogs on this issue: SORNA’s retroactive registration requirement for those previously convicted of crimes enumerated within the law purview.  The law specifically states that any individual under supervision (probation, parole, or prison – but not registration supervision) on December 12, 2012 was subject to reclassification of their registration scheme.  The reclassification effectively altered every supervised defendant’s SORNA’s registration requirements from 10 years to 15, 25 or life and changed the annual to quarterly registrations.

My blogs focused on the Pennsylvania State Police’s effort to reclassify offenders who were not under supervision, but were still registering consistent with their guilty plea or sentencing scheme.  In these cases the defendants served their sentence, had complied with their guilty plea agreement, but the State Police sought to reclassify and extent their registration requirements.  The Supreme and Superior court decisions in these cases (Nase, Haisworth and Martinez) dealt with these cases, declaring the State Police’s unilateral reclassification of non-supervised defendant a breach of the guilty plea agreement.

Various state court judges not willing to terminate a SORNA registration requirement found every way possible to deny these defendants post-conviction non-PCRA relief.

On July 19, 2017 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued the decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 2017 Pa Lexis 1682.  The facts are as follows: On February 7, 2007, after a bench trial in Cumberland County, appellant was convicted of two counts of indecent assault arising out of an incident where he touched the breasts of his girlfriend’s twelve-year old daughter.  Sentencing was scheduled for May 8, 2007, at which time appellant would have been ordered to register as a sex offender with the Pennsylvania State Police for a period of ten years pursuant to then-effective Megan’s Law III. See 42 Pa.C.S. §9795.1 (expired).  However, appellant failed to appear for his sentencing hearing and absconded until he was apprehended on unrelated charges in Rhode Island in September 2014. N.T., 10/14/14 at 2. During his absence, the General Assembly [*3] had replaced Megan’s Law III with SORNA. Under SORNA, persons convicted of indecent assault of a person less than thirteen years of age, 18 Pa.C.S. §3126(a)(7), are categorized as Tier III offenders and are required to register as sex offenders for the remainder of their lives.

Appellant Muniz was sentenced to four to fourteen months’ imprisonment and ordered to comply with lifetime registration requirements under SORNA. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion seeking application of the ten-year registration period under Megan’s Law III, which was the law in place at the time of his offense and conviction, instead of lifetime registration under SORNA. The trial court denied Muniz’ motion and he appealed to the Superior Court, claiming retroactive application of SORNA violates the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, and the reputation clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Importantly, the court found that Muniz’ seven year absence from the Commonwealth is of no moment. SORNA applies retroactively to any individual serving a sentence for a sexual offense or any individual who had not completed their registration period under prior registration statutes as of SORNA’s effective date of December 20, 2012. 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.13. Had Muniz been sentenced in 2007 and subject to registration under Megan’s Law III, he would not have completed his ten-year registration period when SORNA became effective and thus his ten-year registration period would have been converted to a term of lifetime registration.  This foot note number 3 applies to every case for which pre-December 2012 defendants may now seek to contest their post-sentencing reclassification!

Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal raising two questions regarding SORNA’s “sexual offenses and tier system” provisions set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.14:
1) Does applying [42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14]  retroactively violate the Federal Constitution?
2) Does applying [42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14] retroactively violate the Pennsylvania
Constitution?

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court said YES to both questions:   The retroactive application of SORNA’s new harsh, punitive shaming registration scheme to defendants whose sex related crimes were committed prior to December 12, 2012 is unconstitutional.   The Court rules that SORNA increases punishment for conduct which occurred before its enactment and such retroactive application violates both federal and state constitutional bans on ex post facto laws; in doing so, the court finds that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protection than the United States Constitution, that SORNA is therefore unconstitutional as applied to someone like Muniz whose conviction predated its enactment. The Pennsylvania State Police can not now lawfully retroactive apply SORNA and reclassify defendants (under supervision or not) for criminal conduct occurring prior to December 2012.  This is huge.

Call me to discuss your case.

Road Riding in the Counties

My personal and business travel is taking me to more counties throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania than ever before. The local courthouse houses in the county seats are really interesting for me. The court houses — arenas of legal combat — are throw backs to more glorious days when the local big trial was the event of the year.
In the past I took for granted these architectural gems that are spread throughout the various townships and boroughs within which I practice.   Now, I seek out and explore the courthouses. Whether by car or bike, I am having fun.
This spring I bought myself a road bike. I ride ferociously around the eastern part of Pennsylvania. I have the pleasure of routinely riding through Philadelphia,  Conshohocken, Norristown, and Valley Forge Park. All are within 5-15 miles of my house.  Sometimes I ride from my house to Philadelphia and back.
A recent Saturday took me on a further ride — from West Chester to the City of Lancaster. The road ride began in West Chester and ended in Lancaster County, behind the Court House. We departed West Chester through its southern rolling-hills of Brandywine Township. We followed Brandywine Creek through East Bradford Township, Downingtown  to West Fallowfield Township. One word — marvelous.
After 90 minutes the group ride, with me at the back of the pack, entered Lancaster County. I was greeted by signs for farm fresh brown eggs, personally constructed homes, garages, sheds, and wonderful antique tractors.
Tractors, tractors, tractors. But not your ordinary tractors.  These were green, yellow and red tractors, pulled by horses. The drawn mowing tractors were hard at work, gas free, mowing lawns and fields. Some tractors were too tired to work, gathering rust. There was no worry about rubber tires rotting. Metal wheels needed no repairs.
The morning aromas changed with each turn in the road. Pungent cow, horse, pig dung awoke my sinuses.  Crushed wild blackberries and dripping vines of honeysuckles permeated homesteads. The morning dew clung to grass blades and tree branches through the Brandywine Creek bike route. Entering Lancaster and riding down Duke Street brought with it fresh bakery smells and the Lancaster County brewing Company.
In each county seat, I look for a small coffee shop. Lancaster’s Prince Street Café did not disappoint. The fresh cappuccino after a 50 mile ride awakened all of my exhausted senses. Orange juice and fresh eggs on a croissant made me even happier. The pictures below reflects the quaintness of the café and the wonderful effort the bakers and barista’s gave the Saturday morning breakfast crowd.
An unexpected joy came as I began to get ready for my drive home. Just to the west of the Prince Street Café is the Lancaster County Donuts Shop. Homemade donuts and holes are sold with every conceivable topping — as if I was in an ice cream shop — tantalized my taste buds. The sublime chocolate with vanilla cream cheese frosting carried me through the rest of my day.
I could not have been happier. Content and satisfied by a hard work out, great ride with new friends and a bulging stomach.  Blair and Clearfield counties also did not disappoint. I’ll keep you posted.

Pennsylvania’s Accepts the Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Act

Pennsylvania has finalized its membership in the Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Act.  Found at 63 P.S. §395.2, the General Assembly authorizes the Governor to execute the Interstate Compact for Medical Licensure of non-Pennsylvania based physicians.  As I wrote previously last summer, the proposal substantially strips Pennsylvania medical licensees of many due process rights.

Pennsylvania based physicians who seek licensure in member states become subject to those jurisdictions’ criminal and disciplinary process, investigations and actions.  My prior blog addresses the significant pit falls of that process.  Reviewing the definition section of the enabling legislation (which is a nationwide standard set of definitions and procedures) helps understand how and why Commonwealth Pennsylvania physicians seeking multi-state licensure are at substantial exposure to extra jurisdiction disciplinary action without the many protections of Pennsylvania’s administrative due process.

A physician’s medical license, granted by a member state to an eligible physician, is subject to this new law’s legal definitions. First and foremost is the definition of conviction of any type of criminal act. Conviction means: a finding by a court that an individual is guilty of a criminal offense through adjudication, or entry of a plea of guilt or no contest to the charge by the offender. Evidence of an entry of a conviction of a criminal offense by the court shall be considered final for purposes of disciplinary action by a member board.  Potential criminal acts — any “Offense” means: a felony, gross misdemeanor or crime of moral turpitude.

At issue for Pennsylvania and/or New Jersey doctors is the difference in criminal versus administrative matters.  A DUI in Pennsylvania is criminal versus New Jersey it is administrative.  There are many matters in Pennsylvania that result in a summary resolution, not a felony and misdemeanor conviction.  What is a gross misdemeanor?  The Act does not differentiate.  In Pennsylvania, criminal charges are brought after a  preliminary hearing.  Many states proceed by indictment.  The Act does not distinguish enrollment in a non-conviction based diversion program.  How difference states render disciplinary action based upon different standards of conduct (from that of Pennsylvania Medical Board) and resolution – which each member state will now have to unilaterally accept – is significant.

These huge differences apply to all physicians.  Who is a physician.  Physician under the Act means a person who:

1. is a graduate of a medical school accredited by the Liaison Committee on Medical Education, the Commission on Osteopathic College Accreditation or a medical school listed in the International Medical Education Directory or its equivalent;
2. passed each component of the United States Medical Licensing Examination or the Comprehensive Osteopathic Medical Licensing Examination within three attempts or any of its predecessor examinations accepted by a state medical board as an equivalent examination for licensure purposes;
3. successfully completed graduate medical education approved by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education or the American Osteopathic Association;
4. holds specialty certification or a time-unlimited specialty certificate recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties or the American Osteopathic Association’s Bureau of Osteopathic Specialists;
5. possesses a full and unrestricted license to engage in the practice of medicine issued by a member board;
6. has never been convicted, received adjudication, deferred adjudication, community supervision or deferred disposition for any offense by a court of appropriate jurisdiction;
7. has never held a license authorizing the practice of medicine subjected to discipline by a licensing agency in a state, federal or foreign jurisdiction, excluding an action related to non-payment of fees related to a license;
8. has never had a controlled substance license or permit suspended or revoked by a state or the United States Drug Enforcement Administration; and
9. is not under active investigation by a licensing agency or law enforcement authority in a state, federal or foreign jurisdiction.

 

Licensees must identify a state of primary licensure.  That state will verify eligibility, conduct background checks, and maintain fingerprint and biometric data. However, these investigations and parameters are set through federal regulations, and not individual state law. Expedited licensure issued by the central processing state makes that interstate commission more powerful than the individual primary state. The interstate license is limited to a specific period of time in the same manner as required for the physicians holding a full unrestricted license within that state. And expedited license obtained through the compact shall be terminated if the physician fails to maintain a license in the state of principle licensure for a non-disciplinary reason, without re-designation of a new state or principle licensure.

Because there’s a coordinated information system, Pennsylvania’s law allows member boards to report to the interstate commission any public action or complaints against a licensed physician who has applied to receive the expedited license through the compact. Member boards report disciplinary or investigation information and determine if it is necessary and proper basis for disciplinary action by the interstate commissions. Member boards may report any non-public complaint, disciplinary or investigative information to the commission. Member boards will share complaint or disciplinary information.. This means even the most minimal initial disciplinary investigatory claims, unfounded, without final disciplinary decision, by a member state is automatically reported to the entire commission. Disciplinary action from the commission, not an individual state jurisdiction, could be the basis for disciplinary action. How does the physician defend himself or herself against this.

The Act specifically says “any disciplinary action taken by any member board against a physician license through the compact shall be deemed unprofessional conduct which may be subject to discipline by other member boards, in addition to any violation of the medical practices act or regulations in that state. Such a disciplinary action by one state may be deemed conclusive as to a matter of law in fact, allowing the member jurisdictions to impose the same or less or sanction or pursue a separate disciplinary action against position under its respective medical practices act, regardless of action taken and other member states.

 

Call me about your license application, conditional approvals, of pending discipline.

Proposed Pennsylvania Law for All Licensee’s Criminal Charge Reporting Responsibilities

In February several Pennsylvania state senators introduced Senate Bill number 354 of 2017. This bill drastically changes licensees reporting responsibilities once they are charged with a crime. Currently, most licensees (Except nurses) must report a criminal charge only upon conviction. Senate Bill 354 as currently written specifically states:

Section 2.1.  Reporting of sanctions and criminal proceedings.

(a)  Duty.–An individual who holds a license, certificate or registration issued by the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs shall, as a condition of licensure, certification or registration, do all of the following:

(1)  Report to the appropriate licensing board or licensing commission a disciplinary action taken against the licensee, certificate holder or registrant by a licensing agency of another jurisdiction.

(2)  Report to the appropriate licensing board or licensing commission an arrest, indictment or conviction of the licensee, certificate holder or registrant.

(b)  Time.–A report under subsection (a) shall be made as follows:

(1)  Within 30 days of the imposition of the sanction described under subsection (a)(1).

(2)  Except as set forth in paragraph (3), within 30 days of the earlier of:

(i)  an arrest under subsection (a)(2); or

(ii)  an indictment under subsection (a)(2).; or

(iii)  a conviction under subsection (a)(2).

(3)  In the case of a criminal action under subsection (a)(2) that is initiated prior to the effective date of this paragraph, within 30 days from the later of:

(i)  the date of conviction; or

(ii)  the effective date of this paragraph.

If a licensee does not report a new arrest within 30 days, the licensee is subject to additional disciplinary action.

All Pennsylvania licensees may soon become subject to disciplinary action as a result of accused, not convicted, criminal conduct.  This is a much different from the current scenario of disciplinary action upon conviction. The remaining subsection identified below is consistent with current procedural due process rights to a licensee whose license is subject to an immediate clear and present danger emergent suspension.

(a)  Temporary suspension.–A licensing board or licensing commission may temporarily suspend a license, certificate or registration under circumstances as determined by the board or commission to be an immediate and clear danger to the public health and safety. The board or commission shall issue an order to that effect without a hearing, but upon due notice, to the licensee or, certificate holder or registrant concerned at his last known address, which shall include a written statement of all allegations against the licensee or, certificate holder or registrant. After issuing the order, the board or commission shall commence formal action to suspend, revoke or restrict the license or, certificate or registration of the person concerned as otherwise provided for by law. All actions shall be taken promptly and without delay.

(b)  Hearing.–Within 30 days following the issuance of an order temporarily suspending a license, certificate or registration, the licensing board or licensing commission shall conduct or cause to be conducted a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is a prima facie case supporting the suspension. The licensee or, certificate holder or registrant whose license or, certificate or registration has been temporarily suspended may be present at the preliminary hearing and may be represented by counsel, cross-examine witnesses, inspect physical evidence, call witnesses, offer evidence and testimony and make a record of the proceedings. If it is determined that there is not a prima facie case, the suspended license, certificate or registration shall be immediately restored. The temporary suspension shall remain in effect until vacated by the board or commission, but in no event longer than 180 days.

(c)  Automatic suspension.–A license or, certificate or registration issued by a licensing board or licensing commission shall automatically be suspended upon:

(1)  the legal commitment to an institution of a licensee or, certificate holder or registrant because of mental incompetency for any cause upon filing with the board or commission a certified copy of the commitment; or

(2)  conviction of a felony under the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L.233, No.64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, or conviction of an offense under the laws of another jurisdiction which, if committed in this Commonwealth, would be a felony under The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.

(d)  Stay.–Automatic suspension under subsection (c) shall not be stayed pending an appeal of a conviction.

(e)  Restoration.–Restoration of a license or, certificate or registration shall be made as provided by law in the case of revocation or suspension of the license or, certificate or registration.

New to the licensing and regulatory scheme for every licensee is the ability of a licensing board to automatically suspend a license if the licensee is committed to a mental health facility for any reason or a conviction under the Drug Act. Restoration of the licensees license suspended under Senate Bill 354 shall be consistent with any other procedural due process rights.
Please call me to discuss your case

Pennsylvania’s Stregthening Disciplinary Enforcement Environment

My law practice focuses on defending professional licensee disciplinary actions based upon criminal convictions, professional competence, and/or drug and alcohol addiction and professional impairment. I write blogs about Pennsylvania professional licensing disciplinary actions.  Recently, I reviewed all of Pennsylvania’s licensing board disciplinary actions for October and November of 2016. My case load is consistent with the disciplinary orders I reviewed; the cases reflect a stiffening enforcement environment for each of Pennsylvania’s 29 licensing boards.

In November 2016 Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs’ 29 professional licensing boards entered 135 different disciplinary orders.  Board orders range from accountancy, real estate, architecture, chiropractic, massage therapy, nursing, the numerous medical fields, social workers, to veterinary medicine. Of the 135 actions, 41 or 30% of the prosecutions were against non-Pennsylvania practicing licensees. Of the remaining 94 actions (70%), 30 cases or 31% were taken against licensees in Philadelphia and its five surrounding counties. The October 2016 statistics are about the same.

The consistency in the prosecutions is staggering. Many licensees are not represented by counsel. Many orders or settlements include significant civil penalty fines. In the dental profession, there is an increase in petitions for immediate temporary suspensions, pending hearings, on the grounds that the licensee’s practice constitute an immediate and clear danger to the public health and safety. Throughout the medical professions, including pharmacy, numerous disciplinary actions are based upon misdemeanor or felony Drug Act convictions.  Accountancy and real estate board prosecutions center on fraud issues.  The statistics suggest one main point; over 60 percent of cases are from the Philadelphia area and out of state but all of which prosecutions are based upon criminal convictions or drug impairment issues.  These types of disciplinary cases can be fought and penalties reduced.  Many licensees do not think so and either do not have any counsel or they hire the wrong, incompetent counsel.  This is a mistake.

A significant aspect of my practice is reflected in the disciplinary orders. Whether a medical doctor, osteopathic doctor, or nurse, almost one half of disciplinary actions are based upon allegations of inability to practice a profession with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reasons of a mental or physical illness or condition stemming from a dependence upon alcohol or drugs that impairs judgment or coordination. Fighting these cases and contesting any allegation of drug or alcohol impairment is mandatory to keep your license.  DO NOT TAKE THESE ALLEGATIONS LIGHTLY.  DO NOT GO TO THESE ASSESSMENTS WITH OUT AN ATTORNEY.  See my other blogs on this issue.  The orders of discipline clearly reflect licensees incompetently fighting their case without counsel.  I have written extensive blogs on the importance of having an attorney.

A significant percentage of enforcement actions are based upon in or out-of state guilty pleas to either misdemeanors or felonies under the Drug Act or felonies (typically sexual assault) involved in the professional practice. The Boards are collaterally prosecuting every licensee convicted of any offense involving drugs, the violations of norms of practice of that specific profession, or crimes of moral turpitude. The criminal offense, whether drugs, DUI, or a practice related sexual offense does not have to occur in Pennsylvania. Having the right criminal attorney fighting the underlying criminal prosecution is paramount to avoiding collateral licensing prosecution.  I handle all of these criminal cases in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.  Call me to discuss the underlying criminal charges.

Out-of-state licensee’s disciplinary actions reveal a pattern of significantly harsher disciplinary outcomes. Apparently many of these licensees’ indefinite or automatic suspensions are based upon decisions to not contest the Pennsylvania disciplinary action or licensees fighting their case without counsel. Either choice is the worst possible way to address a Pennsylvania based disciplinary action. Every out-of-state licensee should fight each and every disciplinary action.

Please call me to discuss the heightened enforcement environment in Pennsylvania and your pending disciplinary action. Do not attempt to handle these cases on your own. Pennsylvania’s licensing board prosecuting attorneys are much more familiar with appropriate potential negotiating positions then the licensee. The number of professionals I represent before the various boards, and my current pending case load with the same prosecutor on your case, uniquely positions me to fight your case.

The Drug Act — Pa Doctors’ Reporting Responsibilities for Arrest, Conviction, and Automatic Suspensions

Every day I read appellate cases that review disciplinary decisions of Pennsylvania’s licensing boards. A recent case discusses physicians’ unique arrest and conviction reporting responsibility to the State Board of Medicine.  Physician’s reporting of arrests versus convictions depends on the crime involved.

Pennsylvania’s MCare’s law regarding malpractice insurance coverage, 40 P.S. § 1303. 903(4), identifies physician’s reporting responsibilities if a professional liability claim is asserted them, disciplinary action taken against them from another jurisdiction, criminal sentencing for any case, and the arrest of a physician in four very limited classes of crimes. These offenses are:

  • following offenses in this Commonwealth or another state:
    • (i)  18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 25 (relating to criminal homicide);
    • (iii)  18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 31 (relating to sexual offenses).
    • (iv)  A violation of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.
Physicians’ limited reporting responsibilities means arrests for following offenses does not trigger reporting to the state: domestic violence offenses, DUI’s offenses, theft offenses, or a string of federal related non-drug criminal arrest offenses.   Physicians do have to report arrests alleging a sex offense, homicide, aggravated assault, and a violation under the Drug Act.
Understanding what offenses are Drug Act offenses, not just possession or selling drugs, under The Act that are important.  Drug Act charges include patient record keeping, charting issues, and properly recording and dispensing medications.  Section 780-111 of the Drug Act focuses  on professional prescription, administration, and dispensing of drugs.  Here, the Act states:
  • (a)  Except when dispensed or administered directly to the patient by a practitioner or his authorized agent, other than a pharmacist, to an ultimate user, no controlled substance in Schedule II, may be dispensed without the written prescription of a practitioner, except in emergency situations, as prescribed by the secretary by regulation. No prescription for a controlled substance in Schedule II may be refilled.
  • (b)  Except when dispensed directly by a practitioner, other than a pharmacist, to an ultimate user, no controlled substance in Schedule III or IV, may be dispensed without a written or oral prescription. Such prescriptions shall not be filled or refilled more than six months after the date thereof or be refilled more than five times after the date of the prescription unless renewed by the practitioner.
  • (c)  No controlled substance in Schedule V may be distributed or dispensed for other than a medicinal purpose.
  • (d)  A practitioner may prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance or other drug or device only (i) in good faith in the course of his professional practice, (ii) within the scope of the patient relationship, and (iii) in accordance with treatment principles accepted by a responsible segment of the medical profession. A practitioner may cause a controlled substance, other drug or device or drug to be administered by a professional assistant under his direction and supervision.
  • (d.1)  A practitioner shall not prescribe, administer or dispense any anabolic steroid for the purpose of enhancing a person’s performance in an exercise, sport or game. A practitioner may not prescribe, administer or dispense any anabolic steroid for the purpose of hormonal manipulation intended to increase muscle mass, strength or weight except when medically necessary.
  • (e)  A veterinarian may prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance, other drug or device only (i) in good faith in the course of his professional practice, and (ii) not for use by a human being. He may cause a controlled substance, other drug or device to be administered by a professional assistant under his direction and supervision.
  • (f)  Any drug or device dispensed by a pharmacist pursuant to a prescription order shall bear a label showing (i) the name and address of the pharmacy and any registration number obtained pursuant to any applicable Federal laws, (ii) the name of the patient, or, if the patient is an animal, the name of the owner of the animal and the species of the animal, (iii) the name of the practitioner by whom the prescription order was written, and (iv) the serial number and date of filing of the prescription order. In addition, the following statement shall be required on the label of a controlled substance: “Transfer of this drug to anyone other than the patient for whom it was prescribed is illegal.”

§ 780-112 focuses on records of distribution of controlled substances

  • (a)  Every person who sells or otherwise distributes controlled substances, shall keep records of all purchases or other receipt and sales or other distribution of such substances for two years from the date of purchase or sale. Such records shall include the name and address of the person from whom purchased or otherwise received or to whom sold or otherwise distributed, the date of purchase or receipt or sale or distribution, and the quantity involved: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply to a practitioner who dispenses controlled substances to his patients, unless the practitioner is regularly engaged in charging his patients, whether separately or together with charges for other professional services, for substances so dispensed.
  • (b)  Every practitioner licensed by law to administer, dispense or distribute controlled substances shall keep a record of all such substances administered, dispensed or distributed by him, showing the amount administered, dispensed or distributed, the date, the name and address of the patient, and in the case of a veterinarian, the name and address of the owners of the animal to whom such substances are dispensed or distributed. Such record shall be kept for two years from the date of administering, dispensing or distributing such substance and shall be open for inspection by the proper authorities.
  • (c)  Persons registered or licensed to manufacture or distribute or dispense a controlled substance, other drug or device under this act shall keep records and maintain inventories in conformity with the record-keeping, order form and inventory requirements of Federal law and with any additional regulations the secretary issues. Controlled substances in Schedules I and II shall be distributed by a registrant to another registrant only pursuant to an order form.
Violations of either of these two subsections and their itemized list, by either doctors or other health care nurses is dealt with under section § 780-123, revocation of licenses of practitioners.
  • (a)  Any license or registration heretofore issued to any practitioner may either be revoked or suspended by the proper officers or boards having power to issue licenses or registration to any of the foregoing, upon proof that the licensee or registrant is a drug dependent person on the use of any controlled substance, after giving such licensee or registrant reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.
  • (b)  The appropriate licensing boards in the Department of State are hereby authorized to revoke or suspend the registration or license of any practitioner when such person has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or has been convicted of a felony under this act or any similar State or Federal law. Before any such revocation or suspension, the licensee or registrant shall be given a hearing before the appropriate board. At such hearing the accused may be represented by counsel and shall be entitled to compulsory attendance of witnesses.
  • (c)  The appropriate licensing boards in the Department of State shall automatically suspend, for a period not to exceed one year, the registration or license of any practitioner when the person has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or has been convicted of a misdemeanor under this act. The district attorney of each county shall immediately notify the appropriate State licensing board of practitioners subject to the provisions of this section. However, the provisions of such automatic suspension may be stayed by the appropriate State licensing board in those cases where a practitioner has violated the provisions of this act only for the personal use of controlled substances by the practitioner and the practitioner participates in the impaired professional program approved by the appropriate State licensing board for a period of between three and five years, as directed by the appropriate licensing board. If the practitioner fails to comply in all respects with the standards of such a program, the appropriate licensing board shall immediately vacate the stay of the enforcement of the suspension provided for herein. Automatic suspension shall not be stayed pending any appeal of a conviction. Restoration of such license shall be made as in the case of a suspension of license.

35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-123

Case law addressing practitioner’s objections to the emergent and disparate impact Drug Act convictions and their automatic suspensions have on doctors is very clear.   Board discretion and legislative prerogative regarding public safety out weight a physician’s property right in their license.  “Licensed medical practitioners’ unique access to controlled drugs and a physician’s appropriation of this access for illegal purposes presents a danger to the Commonwealth, for which the General Assembly has legitimately and rationally adopted a separate policing device.”  Call me to discuss your case.

Expanded Psychology Board Disciplinary Authority

On June 23, 2016 the General assembly approved act 2016–53. This is a new provision in the the Psychology Board Act.  It became effective August 23, 2016.  This an amendment to the Psychology Board’s authority in disciplining it’s licensees. The specific section in bold states:

(b) When the board finds that the license or application for license of any person may be refused, revoked, restricted or suspended under the terms of subsection (a), the board may:

(1) Deny the application for a license.

(2) Administer a public reprimand.

(3) Revoke, suspend, limit or otherwise restrict a license as determined by the board.

(4) Require a licensee to submit to the care, counseling or treatment of a physician or a psychologist designated by the board.

(5) Suspend enforcement of its findings thereof and place a licensee on probation with the right to vacate the probationary order for noncompliance.

(6) Restore a suspended license to practice psychology and impose any disciplinary or corrective measure which it might originally have imposed.

(7) Take other action as the board in the board’s discretion considers proper, including precluding a suspended licensee from engaging in counseling or any other form of mental health practice.

The import of the new (b)(7) provision cannot be under stated. The legislature has given the Board authority to take “other action” within the “Board’s discretion it considers proper”. This is just about anything.  The case law discussing licensing boards authority to discipline their licensees is clear.

Appellate review of a discretionary Board action is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated, an error of law committed, or necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. 2 Pa.C.S. § 704; Cassella v. Pennsylvania Board of Medicine, Bureau of Professions and Occupations, 119 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 394, 547 A.2d 506 (1988); DePanfilis v. State Board of Pharmacy, 121 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 526, 551 A.2d 344 (1988). The State Board of Nursing is the ultimate fact finder and may accept or reject the testimony of any witness in whole or in part.

The proper review of an agency’s action, assuming that it is not defective under the self-explanatory requirements of § 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 704, is not whether its order was reasonable, but whether it was made in accordance with law, i.e., whether it was made in bad faith, and whether it was fraudulent or capricious. A reviewing court may interfere in an agency decision only when there has been a manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion or a purely arbitrary execution of the agency’s duties or functions. Slawek v. Commonwealth, State Bd. of Med. Educ. & Licensure, 526 Pa. 316, 318, 586 A.2d 362, 363 (1991).

Where a full and complete record is made of the proceedings before the State Board of Nursing, a reviewing court must affirm the adjudication unless it is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant or not in accordance with the law, the procedural provisions of the local agency law are violated, or a finding of fact of the State Board of Nursing necessary to support its adjudication is not supported by substantial evidence. Section 754 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 754. The emphasis here is that is a full and complete record is a necessity.

Substantial evidence means that the evidence required to support the finding of an administrative agency must be “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion.”  Civil Service Com. V. Poles, 132 Pa. Commw. 593, 573 A.2d 1169, 1172 (1990); Gallagher v. Philadelphia State Board of Pharmacy, 16 Pa. Commw. 279, 330 A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).

It is imperative that counsel is present at any hearing to insure the trial evidence objections are properly set forth int he record.  In many cases, Board discretionary action can only be limited by insuring the evidence at the hearing is minimized against the licensee.  Or on Appeal, reviewing the record, to insure the Board decision is made in accordance with the facts presented at the hearing. Any decision based on facts outside of the record is not proper. Please call to discuss you psychology license disciplinary issues.

 

 

New Registration Requirement Rules

I write  frequently about the Pennsylvania General Assembly routinely adding criminal and civil consequences to convicted sex offenders ‘s sentences after judicial pronouncement of the sentence. Modifying Megan’s Law registration requirements for convicted sex offenders is the most prominent of these tough-on-crime fighting, constituent-appeasing measures. Megan’s Law V is called the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.
 
The Pennsylvania General Assembly has modified and/or extended Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law so many times that our Commonwealth now has five different Megan’s Law registration statutes. Parts of Megan’s Law, II-IV were declared unconstitutional. Megan’s Law V’s December 20, 2012 reclassification and extension of registration scheme for sex offenders – whether under supervision or not as of December 20, 2012- is now being attacked.  Defendants who complied with all terms and conditions of their criminal sentences and originally imposed registration requirements object to their reclassification. Successful legal arguments have focused on this provision.

On September 28, 2016 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally decided several consolidated cases addressing this issue.  In Commonwealth v. Martinez,  2016 Pa. LEXIS 2183 (Sep. 28, 2016), the Court resolved the legality of the 2012 reclassification scheme against otherwise compliant registrants. Three combined cases present the question of whether the state police can extend or re-enroll in the sexual registry defendants who satisfied all terms and conditions of an original guilty plea agreement and were not under probation or parole supervision as of December 20, 2012. The individuals may still have had to register under Megan’s law I-V.  These cases do not apply to open plea agreements or sentences handed down after a jury or bench trial.

Factually, after December 20, 2012 the state police sent letters out to Megan’s Law registrants compelling re-enrollment or extension of their registration requirements.  Registration requirements were extended from 10 to 25 years and 25 years to life depending on the criminal conviction. If registration had been completed but the convicted offense registration was changed to 25 years instead of 10 years, re-enrollment was demanded.  Martinez and other individuals around the Commonwealth contested reclassification because they complied with all aspects of their criminal plea agreement, may have concluded probation/parole supervision before December 2012, and may have even completed their registration responsibilities.

Some Cases were filed against the state police as injunctions, writs of mandamus, or a petitions to enforce guilty plea agreements. Many of these cases failed for any number of reasons. Case rulings allow reclassification against defendants who violated any term or condition of their guilty plea agreement.  Another basis for allowing reclassification is being charged with violating the registration requirements of their original sentence.  Even being charged for a reporting violation after 2012 became a reason for further reclassification.

The Martinez defendants (as well as several of my clients) satisfied their terms of incarceration with no violations or write ups, honored all probation or parole obligations, and were fully compliant with (or completed) all registration requirements. The state police still contacted them to either re-initiate or extend registration under Megan’s Law V.
 
I, like Martinez’ counsel, filed motions to enforce their guilty plea in various Common Pleas courts around the state.  I sought, like Martinez, to enforce the terms of their pre-2012 plea agreements.  Martinez focuses exclusively on the sanctity pleas agreement as a contract into which the government entered with these defendant.  Focusing defendants’ compliance with their side of the bargain, Martinez, and one other case, Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 2013 PA Super 318, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa. Super. 2013),  present similar situated defendants.  In those cases the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the Contract Clauses of the Pennsylvania, Pa. Const. art. I, § 17, and United States Constitutions, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, prohibit the Pennsylvania Legislature from enacting laws that retroactively impair contract rights.
The Martinez case question was whether Hainesworth’s ruling, baring reclassification for defendants who complete the terms of the guilty plea contract before December 20, 2012, is proper.  The court said yes and affirms Hainesworth.  The court states “convicted criminals must fulfill the promises they make in connection with plea agreements. See Commonwealth v. Wallace, 582 Pa. 234, 870 A.2d 838, 843 n.6 (Pa. 2005) (“The defendant, on the other hand, accepts this benefit with the implicit promise that he will abide by the terms of the agreement and behave in accordance with the legal punishment imposed by the court.”).  For these defendants, the Court rules, the legislature must  honor the guilty plea agreement/contract its District Attorneys entered and the court approved. 
The issue now is does the guilty plea colloquy adequately set forth with particularity the registration requirements that are part of the guilty plea agreement.  Martinez may not apply to a cases in which the Megan’s Law terms are not stated in the record or were not negotiated.  If there is an open plea, these cases may not apply.  In the late 1990 and early 2000’s in many cases the Commonwealth simply did not negotiate terms of Megan’s Law in the guilty plea agreement or state it was negotiated on the record. 
Some experienced counsel tried to have the record reflect the plea negotiations to lower criminal charges were engaged to reduce the registration time (from a Tier II – 25 year offense to a Tier I – 10 year offense).  In those cases registration terms were reduced in guilty plea agreement by pleas to lower criminal charges.  Martinez find such stipulations in the three consolidated cases.  In Philadelphia and the local counties,  registration notification provisions were always placed in the plea agreement, with a separate signed Megan’s Law Registration form, and in colloquy at a sentencing. 
In the less sophisticated courts sometimes registration terms were not discussed in either the plea or sentencing hearings.  Importantly, counsel must secure both of these transcripts to determine in Martinez applies to the case.  Also, Martinez only applies to guilty pleas (not open pleas) for which a defendant was not under any jail, parole, or probation supervision as of December 2012.   Call me to discuss your case.
 
 t.

Pennsylvania Criminal Expungement and the Pennsylvania Licensee

Expungements are major issue with every professional licensee.  Many licensees are involved in some type of criminal conduct that result in enrollment into Pennsylvania’s pretrial probation – Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition –  program (ARD).  Some cases also involve Drug Court or Section 17 dismissals under Pennsylvania’s Drug Act. I field many telephone and Internet inquiries regarding criminal convictions and ARD results that require reporting to Pennsylvania licensing boards.  Reporting is either within 30 days of arrest (Nursing Board), 30 days of conviction, or enrollment in the ARD or Drug Court programs.

An issue has arisen regarding expunging dismissed criminal records from one’s Pennsylvania administrative licensing board record.  Typically, licensees who win their criminal cases seek to have those criminal records expunged at the earliest possible date. The expungement process is found under 18 Pa. C.S. § 9122. This Chapter is known as the Criminal History Record Information Act (“CHIRA”). This provision is part of the same statutory chapter, 18 Pa. C.S. § 9161(3), that renders admissible criminal convictions in administrative licensing proceedings. As such, the necessity of expunging criminal arrests that result in not guilty, dismissals or ARD is of key value to every Pennsylvania licensee. But for the criminal charges, there is no administrative disciplinary basis under CHIRA to commence a disciplinary process.
The problem, however, unlike other states, for example Ohio, is that Pennsylvania expungement rules do not specifically provide for an expungement of a criminal arrest record subsequently dismissed that became the basis for an administrative licensing disciplinary proceeding. Pennsylvania’s expungement process allows only for specific administrative licensing expungements in drivers license matters. This is in contrast to Ohio law at section Ohio revised code 2953. 32 and 2953. 52.  This conclusion is drawn because one provision of Pennsylvania’s expungement law, § 9122(a)(3), specifically states “the court shall order the expungement of all criminal history record information and all administrative records of the Department of Transportation.” Leaving absent all other administrative licensing boards allows these Boards to not expunge their Board proceedings that rely upon criminal charges that were eventually dismissed or expunged.
This is a complex reporting issue for Pennsylvania’s nurses.  In October 2015 Pennsylvania Nursing Board regulations changed, requiring reporting of criminal arrests within 30 days of the arrest.  Other licensees who receives ARD or other pretrial probationary dismissal of offenses under the Drug Act only have to report upon the conclusion of the offense.   I am now finding that nursing license prosecutions are commencing soon after the initial reporting of the criminal arrest and not upon its conclusion.  This creates important 5th Amendment self-incrimination questions for the licensee trying to maintain their profession and their license in the midst of a criminal case.

Other cases affected by this expungement rule include enrollees of Pennsylvania Drug Act, Section 17 drug use dismissal cases, and county Drug Court programs for felony drug sale or possessory offenses. Typically, satisfactorily completing these county-based criminal court diversion programs result in dismissal of criminal charges. Thereafter, the licensee is eligible for the expungement in criminal court of those dismissed criminal allegations. Nonetheless, the licensee will have already reported on their annual renewal or initial licensure application their involvement in these criminal cases. Reporting of Drug Act or pretrial ARD or Drug Court involvement automatically results in licensure disciplinary action even though the charges are eventually dismissed and expunged.

Pennsylvania’s expungement rules do not waiver on this issue.  As well, CHIRA and the Drug Act specifically provides for automatic Licensing Board disciplinary action of any licensee enrollment in any Drug Act pre-trial probation program that eventually results in dismissal and expungement eligibility.  It is the old fashion Blue Law, religious based abstinence theory of the Pennsylvania laws that have not progressed with the rest of the country.  Kicking people out of their jobs and taking their licenses, rather than treatment and keeping them productive members of society, like in OHIO, is how Pennsylvania currently functions.

Participate In Your Professional License Defense

Occasionally my daily review of Commonwealth Court decisions discussing professional licensing board cases reveal remarkable decisions. This happened again this week. I came across a decision discussing a professional who chose to represent himself. Unfortunately, the individual had no comprehension the legal mess he was creating for himself by not employing an attorney.

Stubbornness and disgust towards the regulatory process of a licensing disciplinary action creates a blindness in unrepresented parties. These professionals almost always fail in their both legal obligations to comply with the professional licensing board procedures and hearing regulations while representing of themselves at these hearing. This weeks case is another example of this unfortunate circumstance.

Dr. Mohammed Ali Hammad received notice of an investigation and a request to inspect his medical office. The notice required Dr. Hammad to allow a Veterinarian Board professional conduct investigator to visit his office to conduct a visual inspection of medical records and office administration. Dr. Hammad refused unless he was given a copy of the formal complaint and the name of the patient who initiated the investigation. This is not permitted. All complaints are confidential in the investigatory stage. While the investigator may read the complaint, a formal copy of the complaint and the name of the complainant is not disclosed.

Each licensing scheme has similar investigatory authority requiring licensees to allow, without subpoena or formal court process, an inspection and copying of medical or other business records. Each professional board’s regulations have long established their authority to conduct investigations of their licensees through a board investigator. The investigator closed the file and notified the legal prosecution department of Dr. Hammad’s refusal to allow the office investigation consistent with the Veterinary Board rules and procedures.

The failure to comply with the basic investigation requests creates a separate cause for discipline distinct from the underlying basis of the investigation. Dr. Hammad’s refusal to allow the inspection or produce medical records escalated the cause of his eventual discipline. This case discusses the discipline against Dr. Hammad’s solely for this stupid refusal to comply with the investigation.

In a prior 2013 disciplinary petition for some insignificant issue Dr. Hammad did file an answer to the case, object to the delegation of the case to a hearing examiner, and request a formal board hearing. However, Dr. Hammad did not appear at the prior board hearing. The state proceeded with that prior discipline case without him. There the hearing examiner proposed order and adjudication found Dr. Hammad violated Veterinary Board rules. That proposed adjudication immediately suspended Dr. Hammad’s Veterinary license. The board excepted the proposed adjudication, entered a final order, to which Dr. Hammond did not appeal.

Dr. Hammond nonetheless continued to practice veterinary medicine. This case then arose when an investigatory contacted him to conduct an office visit. Here, he was specifically cited for not allowing the inspection and for failing to honor the prior Veterinary Board order. Having failed to go to the hearing again, the discipline this time was not suspending, but revoking Dr. Hammad’s license to practice veterinary medicine and ordering him to pay a $20,000 civil penalty. This time the doctor appealed to the Commonwealth Court.

The appeals court had no patience for the doctor’s argument. Claims of due process violation’s fell on deaf years. The court cites long-standing procedures that notice of hearing prior to imposition of sanctions is the sole procedural due process required. Finding that Dr. Hammad received notice and “failed to appear to engage in the process he was due does not amount to an error in the process or to a violation of his rights. ”

Dr. Hammad’s objections to Veterinary Board process and authority to discipline are also summarily swept aside. Suggesting the Board did not have authority to fine him for wasting it’s time and investigatory expenses are quickly dispensed. The board did have pity on him and reduce the civil fine from $20,000 to $15,000. Nonetheless the appeals court strenuously affirms each and every licensing board’s authority to investigate, seek licensee compliance, and enforce their rules of discipline on their licensees.

This case is another example of how important it is to have an attorney at the inception of every single professional license investigation or disciplinary matter. Timely responding to petitions and requests for hearings are not enough. Licensees do not know the administrative rules and procedural safeguards to ensure protection of their professional license and therefore their livelihood. Difficult financial times do not give rise to wholesale abandonment of one’s license. Giving up should never be the ultimate decision in any case.

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