PNAP Case workers — Do Not Trust Them

Medical professionals or their employers call PNAP case workers and intake administrators for numerous reasons.  The initial complaint call against the licensee  generates the “Letter of Concern.”  It is the response call from the licensee to PHMP/PNAP/SARPH/PAP that starts the proverbial ball rolling.  Here are several important facts each licensee should be aware of before calling PNAP.

PNAP/PAP/PHMP caseworkers are told to not tell inquiring licensees the truth. PNAP and PHMP caseworkers are instructed to emphasize the worst possible legal and licensing consequences if there is no cooperation.  PNAP/PHMP caseworkers are instructed to intimidate and scare licensees into the program. PNAP caseworkers are instructed to tell licensees about the costs of the Mental and Physical Evaluation and court fees.  PNAP caseworkers are instructed provide the minimum legal information possible.

PNAP caseworkers do not know the law.  PNAP/PHMP/PAP case workers are not trained in the several health care boards’ regulations.  PHMP/PNAP/PAP case workers do not understand the legal implications of the wrong advice they give. PNAP case workers do not know how to tell the truth.  Some PNAP caseworkers may be in the program too.


For every medical professional, agreeing to the initial PNAP assessment is the worst thing you can do. Current conflicts between the DSM-IV and DSM V alcohol use disorder – mild, moderate, or severe – are creating significant issues in determinations of impairment for PNAP assessors.  I have learned that the PNAP assessors could be  calling the PNAP caseworker and managers, who help the assessor diagnosis an impairment. This is improper.

PNAP and PHMP assessments should be performed independently, by appropriately trained medical professionals. PNAP and PHMP supervisors (Simpson and Knipe) should not be consulted on diagnosis. This type of diagnosis cooperation smacks of a pre-ordained determination of an impairment to insure medical professionals go in the program.  Please understand the above is not an anecdote or a hypothetical scenario. I have been told about PNAP supervisors providing supplemental questions and facts to assessors to insure a determination of impairment and a conclusion that the monitoring program is required.  Ethically, any assessor/PNAP consultation is improper.

This tells me that the system of initial communication with PNAP (in which they lie to you) and the read assessment process renders this entire program unacceptable. Be careful.  Call me.

Notice of A Disciplinary Proceeding

Pennsylvania’s licensing boards officially communicate with their licensees only through regular mail or certified mail, return receipt requested.  Licensing boards are not legally authorized to communicate via email any disciplinary correspondence.   This is why every disciplinary board requires licensees, not the board staff,  to update their own mailing address.

There always is a percentage of licensees that after  licensure move throughout the Commonwealth and country.  Many fail to update their licensing board with their new mailing address. Licensees who fail to update their prospective board with their most recent address expose themselves to disciplinary action in their absence.

A new client, over two years ago became divorced, moved out-of-state, and failed to update the Pennsylvania Nursing Board with her new Florida mailing address.  Unbeknownst to her, two years ago the Pennsylvania Nursing Board commenced an investigation and initiated disciplinary proceedings against her license.  Board mail included a Mental and Physical evaluation petition, medical expert appointment scheduling notices, hearing notices, and formal board disciplinary decisions.

For the last two years her disgruntled ex-spouse – who stayed in the marital residence – received all of her mail.  He threw out all her mail, never telling her anything.  Because she was unaware, all appointments, hearings, and decisions took place in her absence. This client was ignorant to all that was taking place against her license in her absence. Her lack of notice is now causing significant long-term detrimental consequences with her license because Nursing Board disciplinary decisions were entered against her.

This client has been working in Florida under a second professional license.  Her most recent employer’s basic regulatory compliance process included an annual subscription to the National Practitioner Data Bank (“NPDB”) automated inquiry process for all licensees. Consequently, her employer was automatically notified of her 2018 Pennsylvania Nursing Board license suspension – of which she had no idea.  She was terminated and can not work until she rectifies her Pennsylvania nursing license disciplinary action.  All other potential employers will see the NPDB disciplinary action.

These disciplinary proceedings transpired over 18 months. Having not updated her formal mailing address, she did not receive the Mental and Physical Evaluation appointments, hearing notices, and formal disciplinary decisions. By the time she became aware of her Pennsylvania Nursing Board license suspension it was too late to take an appeal.


Her only recourse is to comply with the terms of the license suspension order. This includes now attending the Mental and Physical evaluation, petitioning the Nursing Board for Reinstatement of her license, and attending a hearing in which she must prove she can resume the competent practice of professional nursing with reasonable skill and safety.  This process will take three to six months.  She is unable to practice nursing in her new jurisdiction.  Her State of Florida Nursing Board license may also subject to disciplinary action based upon the Pennsylvania Nursing Board disciplinary action.


State boards are permitted to engage in disciplinary actions against licensees.  Boards must afford all licensees the opportunity to be heard in accordance with administrative agency law.  This law includes a provision that by regular mailing administrative actions to the licensee’s last known address the Board is affording that licensee reasonable notice of proceedings and is giving the licensee a sufficient opportunity to be heard.

Pennsylvania’s General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure (“GRAPP”) authorize service of any proceeding by regular mail, without a return receipt requested.  Email is not authorized.  Due process under both the federal and state Constitutions merely requires licensing boards make a respondent/licensee sufficiently aware of the charges against them and the procedures by which a defense can be presented.  Regular mail of any disciplinary petition or notice satisfies this constitutional obligation.  A licensee/respondent will suffer the consequences if they fail to attend evaluations, respond to petitions, file an answer within the time provided, or does not appear at hearings to challenge the charges against them.

In this client’s matter, having failed to attend a Mental and Physical and Evaluation, case law and board procedure allowed the prosecutor to file a petition Deeming Matters Admitted.  The Board accepts as true all allegations that warranted the Mental and Physical Evaluation.  This means mere suggestions of  drug use, work-related incidents, and/or drunk driving charges warranting an expert evaluation – but not proof of an impairment – become admitted and uncontested facts of an impairment.

This licensee cannot file a motion challenging the validity of the underlying mental and physical evaluation order, the factual findings of an impairment, or the need for monitoring of which the Board concluded after a hearing at which the licensee did not attend. The licensee can not contest the findings of fact or formal disciplinary action, which language the board transmits to the National Practitioner Data Bank.

This licensee’s failure to update her address precipitates a cascade of events that are easily avoided.  Licensing boards throughout the country have set in place this minimal notice and mailing procedure to be able to discipline in and out of state licensees in their absence.  The boards do not have to chase licensees down to discipline them.  Unlike in criminal matters where a defendant must almost always be present, state license boards can strip licensee’s of their property interest in their absence.  This client’s unfortunate predicament is a perfect example of the pitfalls of the failing to update your formal address with your licensing board.

GARLIC — NOBODY LIKES IT — The Case of Robert Garlick, Penn DOT, a DUI Investigation, and a Blood Test Refusal

On July 17, 2017 Robert Garlick was operating his motor vehicle in Erie County Pennsylvania.  A state Trooper investigating his 1 car accident, suspected Mr. Garlick of being under the influence of alcohol.  Garlick was arrested for suspicion of DUI.  At the barracks the Trooper read verbatim the warnings contained in the July 2016 revised Penn DOT DL-26B form.  This form provides the following warnings with regard to a chemical test of blood:

1. You are under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance in violation of Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code.

2. I am requesting that you submit to a chemical test of blood.

3. If you refuse to submit to the blood test, your operating privilege will be suspended for at least 12 months. If you previously refused a chemical test or were previously convicted of driving under the influence, you will be suspended for up to 18 months.

4. You have no right to speak with an attorney or anyone else before deciding whether to submit to testing. If you request to speak with an attorney or anyone else after being provided these warnings or you remain silent when asked to submit to a blood test, you will have refused the test.

I and many other attorneys have argued that this language in this DL-26B form fails to comply with the statutory version of §1547(b)(2) in effect at the time; that these drivers are not advised that refusing the chemical test would result in enhanced criminal penalties (i.e. the penalties provided in Section 3804(c)) as § 1547(b) requires. While there is no statutory or other requirement that the DL-26 form contain appropriate warnings, or that the form be read verbatim, it is nonetheless the duty of the police officer to inform the petitioner of the statutorily required warnings. In other words, if the police officer recites the appropriate warnings from memory without the use of any form at all that is perfectly acceptable under the law.  In this case, however, the Trooper confirmed that the only warnings he provided were those contained on the DL-26B Form which he read verbatim. Those warnings are not consistent with the law.

The law in effect in July of 2016 was 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547.  Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code in effect on May 24, 2017, provides in pertinent part:

(a) General rule.—Any person who drives, operates or is in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in this Commonwealth shall be deemed to have given consent to one or more chemical tests of breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of a controlled substance if a police Officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving, operating or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle:

(1) in violation of section 1543(b)(1.1) (relating to driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked), 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance)….
* * *

(b) Suspension for refusal.—

(1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of section 3802 is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted but upon notice by the police officer, the [D]epartment shall suspend the operating privilege of the person as follows:
(i) Except as set forth in subparagraph (ii), for a period of 12 months.
* * *
(2) It shall be the duty of the police Officer to inform the person that:

(i) the person’s operating privilege will be suspended upon refusal to submit to chemical testing; and
(ii) if the person refuses to submit to chemical testing, upon conviction or plea for violating section 3802(a)(1), the person will be subject to the penalties provided in section 3804(c) (relating to penalties). 75 Pa. C.S. § 1547(a),(b).

On July 20, 2017, the governor approved Act 30 of 2017 which provides for an amendment to Section 1547(b)(2) removing the language requiring a police officer  to provide the warnings relating to enhanced criminal penalties for refusal. This amendment was not effective on the date of Garlick’s incident.  The fact that the legislature amended it is indicative of its acknowledgement that such an amendment was necessary to effectuate the change required of the warnings pursuant to Birchfield.

Drivers license attorneys and I argue PennDOT’s amended DL–26B form, created post-Birchfield, removes references to §3804 criminal penalties. This form is not consistent with the statutory framework of the motor vehicle code and not consistent with any legislative authority. Various courts have been confronted with post-Birchfield amended O’Connell warnings that do not contain the mandatory/ statutory language of § 1547(b)(2).  These cases do not address the illegality of the DL-26B form and the incorrect recitation of law to the motorists deemed refusing.

Mr. Garlick objected to amended DL 26B reading.  The Erie County Court of Common Pleas judge denied his legal argument.  On appeal to the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial judge and found PennDOT correctly altered its DL-26B form after the Birchfield case.  As you recall, Birchfield v North Dakota, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania jurisprudence interpreting it hold that 75 Pa.C.S.A. §1547(b) and Pennsylvania’s enhanced criminal penalties for refusing a chemical blood test are unconstitutional.

The complex criminal versus civil application of Birchfield, is born out in the case of Boseman v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 157 A.3d 10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), and Gray v. Commonwealth , Dep’t of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, No. 1759 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 2536439, at *7–8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 9, 2017), reargument denied (Aug. 7, 2017). These cases maintain arresting officer’s statutory obligation to inform a motorist of the General Assembly’s defined § 1547(b)’s ramifications of a refusal – not PennDOT’s version.

Garlick v. PennDOT is the first case to decide the exact argument I have raised in several cases.  Garlick rejects, though without explanation, the argument that the PennDOT revised DL-26 form is illegal.  The court  opinion adopts much of my and other defense counsel’s reasoning that; “It is true, as Licensee argues, that the language contained in Section 1547(b)(2)(ii) was mandatory at the time Trooper requested that Licensee submit to a blood test. However, while Section 1547(b)(2)(ii) then “command[ed]” that a warning about enhanced criminal penalties be given the purpose behind that provision is to make a licensee aware “of the consequences of a refusal to take the test so that he can make a knowing and conscious choice.” Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 555 A.2d 873, 877 (Pa. 1989); see Commonwealth v. Myers, 164 A.3d 1162, 1171 n.12 (Pa. 2017) (plurality) (“purpose of [Section 1547(b)(2)] ‘is to entitle arrestees to the information necessary to assess the dire consequences they face if they fail to consent to chemical testing, to ensure their choice in that regard is knowing and conscious, as we described in O’Connell’”

However, the court proceeds to state “Given our review of the current state of the law, Licensee’s argument that his license must be reinstated because he was not warned that he would be subject to no longer constitutionally permissible enhanced criminal penalties for refusing blood testing is unpersuasive. Trooper specifically and accurately warned Licensee about the consequences of refusing a blood test that remain following Birchfield, that is, the suspension of his license. Therefore, common pleas did not err when it denied Licensee’s appeal.”

This conclusion ignores the realty of the legislative dictate that the law as written and authorized by the General Assembly is the only permitted and regally authorized language Penn DOT can read to licensees.  More appeal will follow because of this specious and ill-informed decision.

Still on the topic of refusals to submit to  a breath or blood test, a new bill introduced into the General assembly in 2018, Senate Bill 553, makes changes to the state’s DUI laws and will take effect Jan. 11.  Among them is a new fee for refusing to submit to a blood-alcohol test, after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2016 that police can’t obtain blood samples without a warrant or consent.  Under the revised law, drivers who refuse a blood-alcohol test but are convicted and lose their license will have to pay a “restoration fee” for their license of up to $2,000 — $500 for the first time a test is refused, $1,000 for the second time and $2,000 for the third and each time after. The law requires officers to inform suspects of the costs when they’re pulled over.

Alcohol Use Disorder and Self-Help Remedies — Licensees Be Careful

My blog topics sometimes originate from media outlets  discussing issues that impact my professional clients. NPR published an article this week discussing a new National Institute of Health (“NIH”) alcohol use disorder online self- help tool.  The attached link presents a significant web presence on alcohol consumption, alcohol use disorders, and other NIH discussion pieces on a national alcohol abuse epidemic. NPR, NIH Alcohol Use Disorder Article

The website reveals a national problem with alcohol consumption and provides a means for self diagnosis of one’s alcohol use disorder (“AUD”) through a DSM questionnaire.  In prior blogs I discuss the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”) as the tool mental health professionals utilize to diagnose mental health conditions.  An Alcohol Use Disorder is one such identified mental health disease.  The DSM-V, the latest and current version, identifies any person meeting two of the following 11 criteria during a 12 month period as suffering from an alcohol use disorder.

  • Had times when you ended up drinking more, or longer than you intended?
  • More than once wanted to cut down or stop drinking, or tried to, but couldn’t?
  • Spent a lot of time drinking? Or being sick or getting over the aftereffects?
  • Experienced craving — a strong need, or urge, to drink?
  • Found that drinking — or being sick from drinking — often interfered with taking care of your home or family? Or caused job troubles? Or school problems?
  • Continued to drink even though it was causing trouble with your family or friends?
  • Given up or cut back on activities that were important or interesting to you, or gave you pleasure, in order to drink?
  • More than once gotten into situations while or after drinking that increased your chances of getting hurt (such as driving, swimming, using machinery, walking in a dangerous area, or having unsafe sex)?
  • Continued to drink even though it was making you feel depressed or anxious or adding to another health problem? Or after having had a memory blackout?
  • Had to drink much more than you once did to get the effect you want? Or found that your usual number of drinks had much less effect than before?
  • Found that when the effects of alcohol were wearing off, you had withdrawal symptoms, such as trouble sleeping, shakiness, irritability, anxiety, depression, restlessness, nausea, or sweating? Or sensed things that were not there?

As an an attorney representing medical or other licensed professionals possibly suffering from AUD, or other DSM-V criteria disorders, you’re wondering why I’m writing this blog.  The NIH web page, marketing campaign, and DSM assessment tool are very helpful for life correcting and treatment of a medical condition.

However,  licensed professionals should not seek treatment as a result of a self-help assessment in an on-line article, not conducted by a professional.  Such an endeavor could create significant potential professional license exposure. Obviously your health is a paramount concern.  Seek help if you need it.  But before doing so, understand there could be significant legal and professional ramifications.

Licensed professionals who self diagnose themselves and then seek drug and alcohol treatment through any number or type of treatment facilities opens a Pandora’s box of medical records and mental health disclosure issues and potential employment and license reporting responsibilities.   The wrong treatment facility could seek employment related information. Thereafter, under various state and federal regulations, these drug or alcohol treatment facilities (whom the licensee sought for help and stress reduction) become mandatory reporters to state professional licensing boards – causing huge stress. This creates the scenario where someone seeks inpatient treatment and the treatment provider reports a person’s drug or alcohol use to their professional licensing board. This exposes the professional licensee to a disciplinary process.

Self disclosure to any drug or alcohol treatment facility becomes a medical record subject to mandatory disclosure to a licensing board if a petition for a Mental and Physical Evaluation is ordered. By this I mean, once a treating facility reports a licensed professional as suffering from a drug or alcohol use disorder (without any type of criminal or workplace related event), the licensee’s words become the basis for disciplinary action.  Petitions to Compel Mental and Physical Evaluations require disclosure of the medical records from the self-help treatment facility.  The licensee’s words become the proverbial nail in the coffin of any disciplinary action.


Before you proceed through an NIH or other self-help drug and alcohol use disorder assessment and then contact an inpatient treatment provider (which really just wants your money) please call to discuss the legal ramifications of your need for medical care. While your health and welfare are paramount, take into consideration the broader range of factors, including the status of your ability to work, maintain gainful employment, and practice your profession.  If your life is already full or stress (from family, marriage, work,  finances, and life), causing professional downfall, legal fees, or disciplinary action will just add to the current stress level. Eliminating additional stress is a huge factor in maintaining sobriety, maintaining confidence, and psychological stability.

Drug Act, Automatic Suspensions, and the Time Period for Reinstatement

In November, I wrote a blog about  McGrath v. Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational Affairs, No. 5 WAP 2017, 2017 Pa. LEXIS 3109, at *12-13 (Nov. 22, 2017). Felony Convictions and License Reinstatement This case has now been interpreted in a second license revocation appeal. Joseph Thomas Acri, D.O., Petitioner v. Bureau of Professional…, — A.3d —- (2018). Acri, a D.O., medical license was suspended due to prescription fraud.   The State Board of Osteopathic Medicine (Board), automatically suspended his license to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery pursuant to section 14(b) of the Osteopathic Medical Practice Act (Act) based upon his felony convictions under The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (CSA), 35 P.S. §§ 780-101—780-144.   He appealed his 10 year ineligibility for license reissuance.

In McGrath, the key holding focuses on the 10 year license ineligibility after a Drug Act felony conviction.  The Court there ruled that the statute evidenced irreconcilable ambiguities regarding whether an individual must wait ten years before applying for reinstatement after having his or her license suspended for violating the CSA. In so holding, the Court noted that a general provision in the Law granted the licensing board with authority to reissue a suspended license, irrespective of a time frame; the section providing for a ten-year waiting period applied to “applicants;” the section dealing with a five-year waiting period concerned the “revocation” and not the “suspension” of a license; and the provisos relating to the “restoration” or “reissuance” of a license made it unclear through which provision the licensing board should consider an application for reinstatement.

After applying the general rules of statutory construction, the Court in McGrath determined that the statutory language remained ambiguous, and because the Law was penal in nature, the court construed it strictly and in favor of the individual. Therefore, the court reversed the licensing board’s order to the extent it imposed a license suspension for a mandatory period of not less than ten years and concluded that the licensing board should process any application for reissuance in accordance with the general, discretionary provision of the Law granting it the power to reissue a suspended license.


McGrath’s nursing license was automatically suspended – not revoked – when she was convicted of violating the Drug Act (it seems a felony).  McGrath petitioned for reinstatement of her nursing sometime shorter than 10 years.  McGrath argued the Nursing Act’s provision for reinstatement allowed for the Board to grant such application within its discretion at any time, not earlier then 10 years stated under a separate provision of the Nursing Act.  The Court agreed, stating it is within the Board’s discretionary provision of the Law granting it the power to reissue a suspended license.


Acri argued the same logic and reasoning applied to the statutes and Board regulations applicable to license doctors under the Osteopathic Act, 63 P.S. § 271..2 and 14a.  Acri maintained the Board’s order automatically suspending his licenses for a period of not less than ten years was in error.  The Court agreed!   Importantly, at oral argument before the appellate court, the Board conceded that there were no statutory time constraints placed upon Petitioner and that he could apply for reinstatement or reissuance when he so desires.  This is the ruling of McGrath!


The Acri Court, however,  admonishes the Osteopathic Board and all other licensing Boards to implement this procedure.  “However, this concession does not alter the fact that the Board’s order strongly suggests otherwise, or is at least ambiguous. Although we have no doubt that, in the future, the Board will fulfill its promise to interpret and apply its order in the way that it said it would, this Court nevertheless has an obligation to address the legal issue presented to it.”


Here the court is saying to the licensing boards, fix your Board disciplinary orders and remove the time period of disqualification for petitions for reinstatement.   The Court’s language is very instructive. “Therefore, pursuant to our decision in McGrath, we modify the Board’s order insofar as it imposed a mandatory five or ten year suspension on Petitioner’s license. In accordance with this memorandum opinion, any reissuance request from a suspension for violating the CSA shall be processed and reviewed under section 15(c)(6) of the Act.”

These two decisions continue in the process of allowing for license reinstatement or reissuance sooner, and not under and specific time period of preclusion.  The difficult legal issue now will be that an appeal of any board order denying license reinstatement for felony Drug Act conviction will be based upon an abuse of discretion standard and not an error of law standard.  The abuse of discretion standard is viewed in light of the general rule that all licensing boards are charged with the responsibility and authority to oversee the profession and to regulate and license professionals to protect the public health and safety. Barran v. State Board of Medicine, 670 A.2d 765, 767 (Pa .Cmwlth.1996), appeal denied 679 A.2d 230 (Pa.1996).

An abuse of discretion is generally defined as a misapplication of the law, a manifestly unreasonable exercise in judgment, or a final result that evidences partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Allegheny County v. Golf Resort, Inc., 974 A.2d 1242 (Pa.Cmwlth.2009); Pastorius v. State Real Estate Commission, 466 A.2d 780 (Pa.Cmwlth.1983). When reviewing the exercise of discretion by an administrative agency, the Court may not, in the absence of bad faith, fraud, capricious action or abuse of power, inquire into the wisdom of the agency’s action or into the details or manner of executing agency action. Slawek v. State Board of Medical Education and Licensure, 526 Pa. 316, 586 A.2d 362 (1990); Blumenschein v. Pittsburgh Housing Authority, 379 Pa. 566, 109 A .2d 331 (1954). Appellate courts may interfere in an agency decision only when there has been a manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion or a purely arbitrary execution of the agency’s duties or functions.  Although the Commonwealth Court is required to correct abuses of discretion involving penalties and sanctions imposed by a licensing board, the appeal court may not substitute its discretion for that of the board, which is an administrative body endowed with expertise in matters subject to its jurisdiction. Burnworth v. State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers, and Salespersons, 589 A.2d 294 (Pa . Cmwlth.1991).

Call me to discuss your case on appeal.




PHMP versus RAMP: A Big Difference

I write blogs about Pennsylvania professional licensing legal developments.  I am also licensed to practice law in New Jersey. I routinely counsel Pennsylvania professionals concerned about their NJ licenses.  There is a huge difference between Pennsylvania’s PHMP and New Jersey’s RAMP (“Recovery and Monitoring Program “).  RAMP was established in 2003 as an Alternative to Discipline program, managed by the Institute for Nursing for the New Jersey Board of Nursing.

Pennsylvania medical professionals who live in New Jersey or Pennsylvania residents also licensed in NJ, but only use their PA  licenses, are exposed to RAMP.  (Obviously also are NJ licensees working in NJ.)  Any Pennsylvania medical professional, who is also licensed in NJ – who receives Pennsylvania PHMP letter – must consider how RAMP will respond if Pennsylvania restricts their professional license.  Any Pennsylvania disciplinary action based upon an alleged impairment of alcohol and drugs will come to NJ’s RAMP attention. Also, NJ licensees must carefully respond to RAMP communications.

A recent NJ appellate case reveals just how different RAMP is from Pennsylvania’s PHMP.  On November 16, 2017 a New Jersey appellate court decided In The Matter of the license of Kevin Rafferty, RN.  He was a certified registered nurse anesthetist and an Advanced Practice Nurse.  Mr. McCafferty‘s licensing problems began in 2013 when three co-workers smelled alcohol on his breath during work.  They levied anonymous complaints to the Nursing Board, which contacted RAMP. This was the only evidence against him.

RAMP contacted  Rafferty via letter, setting forth the allegations that he may have problems related to mental health and or substance-abuse that could affect his ability to practice his profession.  RAMP offered him a private letter agreement and enrollment for a minimum of 90 days.  During this time RAMP requires random observed drug tests, monthly self evaluation reports, and regular attendance in peer support meetings.  Post-enrollment, RAMP then requires an initial intake evaluation.  In my experience this evaluation typically  finds the professional needs to be in RAMP for 12 months.  The 90-day initial RAMP invite is a fraud!

It is this context (which the McCaffrey case reveals)  that RAMP’s enrollment process is distinctly different from Pennsylvania’s PHMP.  RAMP’s initial letter of invite is not really an offer, but an order to each licensee.  PHMP’s initial “Letter of Concern” is a non-mandatory offer for help and does not constitute a demand to enroll.

RAMP’s initial 90-day evaluation period is not based upon a medical expert assessment or determination the licensee suffers from a drug or alcohol addiction that renders them an impaired professional. That assessment comes only after RAMP enrollment and signing of the RAMP 90-day contract.  The licensee is then stuck.

The RAMP evaluation takes place after enrollment, when the agreement sign requires compliance with the terms and condition of the program.  Licensee thinking they are just going to get the 90 days meet the expert, who determines more time in RAMP is required. Now they are stuck and can’t break the agreement.

PHMP’s letter of concern offers an assessment and voluntary disclosure to determine in an impairment exists.   PHMP requires either a finding of an impairment or a voluntary admission of such before enrollment in the program.  Pennsylvania Voluntary Recovery Program (“VRP”) questionnaire includes a provision that the licensee admit to suffering from an impairment.  This is the voluntary admission part of the VRP contract.  I counsel against signing this agreement.  NEVER ADMIT you are an impaired professional.Wait for the Board to file a formal petition to Compel and Mental and Physical Evaluation.  (See my other blogs.)

McCaffrey did not respond the the initial 90 day RAMP letter.  He was determined to be “non-compliant“ with RAMP.  RAMP notified the Nursing Board that “it could not insure the board or the public that McCaffrey was safe to practice.”  The Board subpoenaed McCaffrey to appear before a committee of the Board to answer questions about  appearing at work smelling of alcohol.  McCaffrey appeared, denied the allegations, and brought numerous letters of reference.  The Board still concluded he should enroll in RAMP and proposed a 2nd private letter agreement requiring McCaffery participate.  He refused.

The Board issued a provisional order of discipline compelling McCaffrey to submit to an evaluation and monitoring to determine whether his continued practice may jeopardize the safety and welfare of the public.  This is a distinct different legal standard and burden of proof compared to Pennsylvania’s impairment burden of proof.

NJ’s licensing boards and Courts have long recognized a “community care-taking responsibility” as legal justification that allows government license restriction.  The NJ Nursing Board thereafter issued a final order compelling McCaffrey to enroll in RAMP. The Board determined such was required to satisfy its “mandate to protect the public.” McCaffrey‘s failure to comply with this final order was reported to the national practitioner data Bank. Still no medical determination of any impairment!

McCaffery appealed claiming there was no medical or legal basis to compel RAMP and that absent such, a general order requiring such denied him due process of law.   The appellate court reviewed McCaffrey’s objections to the Board’s order. The appellate court determined the Board maintains oversight over professional licensing for nurses pursuant to the Nursing Law.  Because the New Jersey professional nursing law requires an applicant not be a “habitual user of drugs and alcohol”, McCaffrey‘s potential for alcohol and drug abuse rendered him suspect of meeting the legal requirements of both the Nursing Licensing and Nurse Anesthetist laws.  The court found the Board had the authority even absent a medical conclusion of any impairment.

McCaffrey complained that absent an expert determination that he was impaired or suffered from a chemical dependency, he met the requirements for licensure.  The Board rejected this argument. The court determined the Nursing Board was within its statutory authority based upon the factual allegations, even without even an expert evaluation, that the Board was within its authority to compel McCaffrey to participate in the 90 day private letter RAMP program.  The decision was handed down in 2017.  McCaffrey’s work place situation occurred in 2013.

For the many licenses that practice in Pennsylvania, these procedural differences between the PHMP and RAMP are significant and should be respected. Pennsylvania’s regulatory and statutory framework allow for licensee participation in and evaluation by a board chosen medical expert before mandatory enrollment in the PHMP.  NJ does not allow for this pre-enrollment evaluation, compels participation, and then subjects the licensee to a bait and switch disciplinary monitoring program.

Please call me to discuss either of these programs and any letters you receive from your licensing board.


Medical Marijuana and the Pitfalls for the Professional

The pitfalls of medical marijuana for the professional are more evident every day. Several weeks ago I wrote a blog on the challenges facing licensees who seek a medical marijuana card due to a medical condition. Prescription Drug History   In another blog I wrote about the complexities facing medical professionals who seek to become medical marijuana authorized prescribers.


In Pot Doc Article the Philadelphia Inquirer reveals Pennsylvania’s Medical Board, Health Department, FBI, and DEA investigatory practices in this field.  If you are a medical professional, please read this article.  I represented a peripheral, part time doctor moon lighting for Dr. Nikparavarfard.

Doctors working in a medical practice that includes a “Pot Doc“ – doctors that are authorized to write prescriptions for medical marijuana – are subjecting themselves to unnecessary oversight and inquiry.  When a  “Pot Doc” exposes himself to both criminal and licensing  investigations, they expose all nurses or doctors employed by that practice.  Drug Act violations are routinely found and criminal charges filed!.

The FBI and DEA’s investigation of Dr. Nikparvarfard’s Scranton office – the Pot Doc – necessarily also included  my client’s prescribing patterns.  An invasive, long running investigation turned to her simply because the police were investigating that practice and needed leverage against Dr. Nikparvarfard.  Experienced and accomplished undercover FBI, DEA, Health Department agents then ensnared my client.  Again, only because they were looking at Dr. Nik’s practice.

My client was not the prescribing “Pot Doc.”  However, the overarching Pot Doc investigation expanded to any potential criminal activity discovered within the medical practice.  But for my client working for the Pot doc and his medical practice, my client would not have been under surveillance. Unfortunately she was.

Once my client became known to FBI, her prescription and Medicaid/Medicare billing patterns were easily examined, patients contacted, and medical procedures evaluated.  Undercover patients were sent to the practice.  All because of the attention brought on the practice by Pot Doc Nikparvarfard.

One bad apple spoils the pie; two or three bad apples subject professionals to jail.  These types of investigations render medical professionals (nurses and doctors) unemployed and potentially unemployable.  Thereafter, professionals are the target of multiple investigations by medical boards, DEA,  Health Departments, and potentially the U.S. Department of justice.  But for my client’s employment with a Pot Doc, she would not have come under any surveillance.

This case is but one example of many to come.  Overarching public safety concerns, opiates in the news, and an aggressive enforcement environment of a new regulatory scheme create huge risks for both Pot Docs and those doctors and nurses who work with them.

Please call me to discuss

Birchfield, Rufusals, and PennDot’s DL – 26B Form

In many pending 2017 Pennsylvania DUI and civil license refusal cases stemming for arrests between April 2016 and July 2017 police officers administered incorrect chemical test warnings to Pennsylvania motorists.  Use of the DL 26B form, I think, is legally insufficient pursuant to the then effective 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(2).  Counsel should file suppression motions.  A corollary issue is whether these drivers are capable as a matter of law of refusing the blood test where the police officer testifies he read the illegal PennDOT DL-26B form.

In May/June 2016 PennDOT created the new DL 26B form in response to Birchfield.  Birchfield held that criminally coercing a blood draw — compelling a defendant to testify/provide blood evidence against themselves or face jail time — is unconstitutional.  After Birchfield, enhanced penalties and threats of jail to secure evidence in DUI cases require suppression of blood evidence.  In response PennDOT changed its DUI informed consent form, the DL 26B document that local and state police read to DUI suspects when the want the suspect to give blood.  The General Assembly did not give PennDOT authority to do this.  This is the topic of this blog.

The suppression argument is as follows:  The arresting officer’s warnings to the DUI suspect fail to comply with Section 1547(b)(2) in that the driver was not advised that refusing the chemical test would result in enhanced criminal penalties (i.e. the penalties provided in Section 3804(c)) as § 1547(b) (pre-July 2017) requires.  While there is no statutory or other requirement that any DL-26 Form contain appropriate warnings, or that the form be read verbatim, it is nonetheless the duty of the police officer to inform the petitioner of the statutorily required warnings.  (See Section 1547(b)(2)).  In other words, if the police officer recites the appropriate warnings from memory without the use of any form at all that is perfectly acceptable under the law.  If an officer confirms the only warnings provided were those contained on the DL-26B Form, those warnings are not consistent with the statutory law prior to July 2017.

This date is important because on July 20, 2017, the governor approved Act 30 of 2017 which provides for an amendment to Section 1547(b)(2), removing language requiring a police officer to provide the warnings relating to enhanced criminal penalties for refusal. While this amendment was not effective on the date of petitioner’s incident, the fact that the legislature  amended  it is indicative  of its acknowledgement that such an amendment was necessary to effectuate the change required of the warnings pursuant to Birchfield.

Importantly, the §1547 pre-July 2017 statute includes the word shall.   The legislature’s use of the term “shall” establishes that police officers must comply with the §1547 language mandate. In Comm v. Weaver, the 2006 Pennsylvania Supreme Court interprets §1547(b)(2) verbiage (the same was in effect on prior to July 2017) reaching the same conclusion.  Following the September 2003 amendments to the Implied Consent Law, PennDOT implemented the language of§ 1547(b)(2)(ii) into a new DL-26 form. This led to a significant amount of litigation over whether the warnings printed on the December 2003 version of the Department of Transportation’s DL-26 form were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of§ 1547(b)(2). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Weaver, held that the warnings printed on that version of the DL-26 form were legally sufficient to satisfy those requirements.  In reaching its decision, the Weaver Court stated:

The legislature’s use of the term “shall” clearly establishes that police officers must comply with  this mandate.   Subparagraph (ii) commands police officers to inform an arrestee that “(ii) upon conviction, plea or adjudication of delinquency for violating section 3802(a), the person will be subject to penalties provided in section 3804(c) (relating to penalties).” The words of this statute are clear and free from all ambiguity; thus, we will glean the legislative intent from those words. The plain language requires only that the officer inform the arrestee that if he is convicted of DUI, refusal will result in additional penalties.

Accordingly, under the plain language of the statute, the warnings set forth in the 2017 version of § 1547(b)(2) are mandatory and must be strictly complied with in order to suspend a motorist’s operating privilege pursuant to the Vehicle Code. Previously, in very certain terms, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court has held that, in requesting a chemical test, the police officer must inform the arrestee of the consequences of refusal and notify the arrestee that there is no right to consult with an attorney before making a decision. See O’Connell, 555 A.2d at 877-78.12 “An arrestee is entitled to this information so that his choice to take a [chemical] test can be knowing and conscious.” Id. at 878. The choice belongs to the arrestee, not the police officer.

In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation v Kennedy, 66 A.3d 818 (Pa. Comw. 2013), the Court says that:

“the warning delivered to [licensee] fully complies with the statutory requirements. The statute simply does not require any specific explanation as to the length of the civil suspension and does not require explanation of criminal penalties set forth in §3804(c). The statute requires only that the police provide notice that refusal will result in license suspension and, that if the licensee is driving under the influence, refusal will result in additional penalties. [The licensee] receives this information. Kennedy requires that the officer deliver only the statutory authorized 1547(b) authorized penalties of a refusal. While there is no specific language that the Courts have determined these police officers must read licensees, once the officer begins notifying potential motorists of license refusal consequences, only those consequences that are set forth in the statute must be read.”

Our Pennsylvania Supreme Court has confirmed police officers’ obligation to advise motorists of the exact warning contained in §1547(b)(2). In this 15 month period, police officers utilizing the DL-26B form did not comply with statutory law requiring the correct consequences be advised to these motorists. PennDOT’s utilization of the revised DL-26B was not sanctioned by the General Assembly and not legally effective on the date and time of these arrest render the information provided to them insufficient as a matter of law.

§1547 prior to July 2017 required reading all language contained therein, even those provisions deemed unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. This tension between the current statutory laws and judicial decisions create a situation fraught with potential that motorists will not receive sufficient information to make a voluntary, informed decision regarding consent to the requested chemical testing.

The complex criminal versus civil application of Birchfield, Weaver, Kennedy, supra, is born out in Boseman v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 157 A.3d 10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), and Gray v. Commonwealth , Dep’t of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, No. 1759 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 2536439, at *7–8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 9, 2017), reargument denied (Aug. 7, 2017).  These cases maintain  arresting officer’s statutory obligation to inform a motorist of the General Assembly’s defined § 1547(b)’s ramifications of a refusal – not PennDOT’s version.

In Boseman  and Gray, supra, Commonwealth Court states Birchfield does not apply to PennDOT license suspension refusal cases. As such, any court finding that Birchfield effectively compelled PennDOT to unilaterally re-write the 1547(b) mandatory warning, to a non-statutorily authorized version, is not supported by the Commonwealth Court’s application of Birchfield in the §1547(b) refusal context. Boseman, Gray, Weaver, Kennedy, supra.

In Gray and Boseman, supra, Judge McCullough dissents.  Judge McCullough convincingly points out the incongruity of the constitutional right of privacy and self-incrimination Birchfield establishes (adopted by Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323 (Pa. Super. 2016)) and Commonwealth Court’s dismissing such argument in the civil license suspension context when ONLY a state based property right (a motor vehicle operator’s license) is at issue.

In Price v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing,, No. 1873 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 4321625, at *6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept. 29, 2017), Judge McCullough concurs in the result (she is constrained to follow Boseman, supra) but reiterates her position set forth in Gray and Boseman.  However, Judge Cosgroves dissents:

While Birchfield is not directly applicable here, it does stand for a principle which the former DL–26 does not reflect. And while Birchfield allows implementation of civil penalties for refusal to submit to a blood test in cases such as this, it does not give states permission to misinform a licensee as to the consequences of a refusal.

As such, Courts may, on alternative grounds, conclude Birchfield applies in the civil, administrative license suspension realm as a driver’s licenses in this day and age constitutes a property right to which criminal threat of incarceration to surrender (the proper § 1547(b) language to be read but was not) violates her constitutional rights, voiding any refusal. This conclusion is sought even though the DL-26 Form with the enhanced penalties was not read to these motorists.  It was still required to be read, but was not.

Call me to discuss your case.


Social Media — Facebook, Instagram and State Licensing Board Prosecutions

Social media and the advent of voluntary public display of everything is starting to affect Pennsylvania’s professional licensing board investigations.  For the last ten years I have consistently represented client’s under investigation for drug diversion and theft.  These cases typically stem from hospital and nursing home based investigations.  A new twist in the investigatory practices of these cases has emerged.
It is important to realize how state board investigators are now utilizing social media as an investigatory tool.  Voluntary picture posts on Facebook, Instagram, or other websites will are now used as the professional’s own statements. Facial recognition software identifies and attaches names to various people in most photographs.  Aspiring and licensed professionals should pause when choosing which if any photographs to post or in which they are included that others are posting. This should give you the professional great concern.
Pennsylvania’s Department of Attorney General, Bureau of Narcotics Investigations (BNI) and licensing board investigators have begun to search social media for names, addresses, the identity of complaining witnesses, and/or information to aide their criminal and licensing prosecutions.  Investigators are learning —  through a target’s own social media self-promotion — the target’s social activities, accomplices, associates, friends, and favorites hang outs.  Many witnesses that would otherwise never be found are located, interviewed, and intimidated.
As well, during a client’s recent Nursing Board Mental and Physical Evaluation, the western Pennsylvania based psychiatrist asked my nurse client of her social media participation. This psychiatrist revealed he had searched Facebook, Instagram, and other social media outlets in preparation for the psychiatric drug impairment evaluation. The doctor sought evidence to confirm and corroborate my client’s statements during her evaluation about her social activities and drinking tendencies. The psychiatrist sought photographic and statement evidence which could reveal my professional client’s evaluation statements may have been inconsistent with social media and/or statements is medical records to her doctors.

Credibility is the most important piece of evidence in an independent medical examination and at a licensing application or disciplinary hearing.  The witnesses I  present at a licensing hearing (live, via telephone, or in a letter) corroborate and strengthen my professional client’s reputation, character, and credibility.
Photographs of social celebration in the context of disciplinary hearings based upon accusations of drunk driving or drug and alcohol impairments constitute important cross-examination evidence.  When a professional voluntarily hands to a psychiatrists, criminal or licensing board investigators evidence against them (or life style pictures that may poorly depict that licensee) it makes my defense harder and the prosecutor or psychiatrists impairment investigation easier.  DO NOT DO THIS  TO YOURSELF.

Serious Medical Conditions according to Pennsylvania’s Medical Marijuana Law and How They Relate to Medical Professionals


Pennsylvania began the legalization of medical marijuana with specific limitations on the medical conditions for which a practitioner can issue a prescription for medical marijuana (“MM”).   Act 16 of 2016, Section 403 (a) – Conditions for issuance – allows a physician to certify medical necessity only if all of the following requirements are met:

(1)  The practitioner has been approved by the department for inclusion in the registry and has a valid, unexpired, unrevoked, unsuspended Pennsylvania license to practice medicine at the time of the issuance of the certification.

(2)  The practitioner has determined that the patient has a serious medical condition and has included the condition in the patient’s health care record.

(3)  The patient is under the practitioner’s continuing care for the serious medical condition.

(4)  In the practitioner’s professional opinion and review of past treatments, the practitioner determines the patient is likely to receive therapeutic or palliative benefit from the use of medical marijuana.

The regulations define Serious medical condition as:

 (i) Cancer.
 (ii) Positive status for Human Immunodeficiency Virus or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.
 (iii) Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis.
 (iv) Parkinson’s disease.
 (v) Multiple sclerosis.
 (vi) Damage to the nervous tissue of the spinal cord with objective neurological indication of intractable spasticity.
 (vii) Epilepsy.
 (viii) Inflammatory bowel disease.
 (ix) Neuropathies.
 (x) Huntington’s disease.
 (xi) Crohn’s disease.
 (xii) Post-traumatic stress disorder.
 (xiii) Intractable seizures.
 (xiv) Glaucoma.
 (xv) Sickle cell anemia.
 (xvi) Severe chronic or intractable pain of neuropathic origin or severe chronic or intractable pain in which conventional therapeutic intervention and opiate therapy is contraindicated or ineffective.
 (xvii) Autism.

For the medical licensee seeking a medical marijuana card, the significance of these medical conditions cannot be understated.  A Pennsylvania medical licensee (nurse, doctor, dentist, and all others)  will have to suffer from a serious medical condition.  A referring medical marijuana practitioner  will have to certify the professional licensee’s serious medical condition necessitates marijuana for therapeutic or treatment reasons.  The practitioner will have to perform a completed and full assessment of the patient’s medical history and current medical condition, including an in-person consultation with the patient.  Reviewing the prescription drug monitoring history of that patient/licensee will also be necessary.

A MM practitioner will have to credibly determine that imminent disability is present, warranting therapeutic medical marijuana as all other drugs have or are failing.   Well, if the medical professional is disabled, they can not do their job.  If they are high on medical pot, the Boards think these licensees probably should not be permitted to practice their profession.

The burden of proof in disciplinary cases involving drugs or alcohol is whether the licensee suffers “from a drug or alcohol addiction or impairment or a medical condition that renders them incapable safely practicing.”  If a medical licensee’s MM practitioner suggests to the Department of Health the licensee is medically disabled to a degree that requires the therapeutic use of medical marijuana, a medical record has been generated stating the licensee is almost medical disability from practicing their profession. The medical impairment burden, it could be argued, has been met.

Conversely, if the medical licensee is prescribed medical marijuana (but not disabled), the use of medical grade marijuana renders the licensee under the influence of drugs or alcohol to such an extent that renders them in capable of safely practicing.  This logical reasoning jump  — using marijuana automatically renders one unsafe the practice — is found in other provisions of Pennsylvania law.  Those include the Drug act and Pennsylvania’s DUI statute.


Pennsylvania’s DUI statute, 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3802(d) provides for legal intoxication if the mere presence of marijuana is in one’s bloodstream.  (Pennsylvania is not a drug recognition state where the prosecutor has to put into evidence testimony from a drug recognition expert, a “DRE”, that the level of marijuana in somebody’s blood renders them under the influence and incapable of safely driving.)  Pennsylvania is a per se violation state.  This means that the legislature has determined as a matter of policy, that any marijuana or other schedule II prescription medication in a person’s blood, renders that person automatically incapable of safely driving.

It is not a hard legal argument to suggest that if you can not safely drive because you are high on pot (any amount), the medical professional can not perform their medical  duties because they are high on pot.  Here is where the confidentiality provisions of the Act are important.   Section 301(A)(4) of the Act establishes an electronic database to include activities and information relating to medical marijuana organizations, certifications and identification cards issued, practitioner registration and electronic tracking of all medical marijuana as required under the Act.

Section 301(B)(a) allows for confidentiality of Patient information.–The department shall maintain a confidential list of patients and caregivers to whom it has issued identification cards. All information obtained by the department relating to patients, caregivers and other applicants shall be confidential and not subject to public disclosure, including disclosure under the act of February 14, 2008 (P.L.6, No.3), known as the Right-to-Know Law, including:

(1)  Individual identifying information about patients and caregivers.
(2)  Certifications issued by practitioners.
(3)  Information on identification cards.
(4)  Information provided by the Pennsylvania State Police under section 502(b).
(5)  Information relating to the patient’s serious medical condition.

My concern is that these provisions in conjunction with other Pennsylvania rules and regulations will be employed against the medical professional who seeks and secures a medical marijuana card.  Your doctor must provide this information to the Department of Health.  If pot is found in a medical licensee’s blood, getting the medical records from their doctor (who will be discovered through the data base) is very easy.  Or, the licensee will be compelled to identify and provide their MM practitioner and his records at a Board ordered evaluation.

My experience in Pennsylvania’s heightened enforcement environment strengthens my conviction on this point. Currently every single DUI, workplace positive drug test, or other minor legal infraction is generating Board ordered mental and physical evaluations. The Boards are getting ready for a waive of intoxicated professionals.  They are gravely concerned for the well being of the Commonwealth’s citizens.  The Boards figure, get any current licensee help, stripped of their license, or at least in the Board’s radar so that when that licensee starts legally or illegally getting high and they learn of it they will be ready.   Any issue that brings the medical professional – high on legal Pennsylvania medical pot – to their respective Board’s attention will become the subject of a targeted enforcement scheme to strip their license.


Call me to discuss your medical condition, medical needs, and how to proceed.




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