February 17, 2017 Leave a comment
The confluence of administrative and criminal procedure is a significant issue I confront defending licensee disciplinary cases. Sometimes, during a hearing, or a pre-complaint investigatory meeting, a licensee is asked — almost expected — to give a statement. During a hearing, with a criminal case pending, a licensee sometimes must strategically choose or not to testify. This issue was recently addressed in the case of Blair Anthony Hawkins v. Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational Affairs, 2017 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 112 (Commw. Ct. Feb. 16, 2017).
In that matter, after the Department presented its evidence, Hawkins argued that the Board denied him a full and fair hearing when it failed to continue the hearing until after the resolution of the criminal case, thus resulting in Hawkins’ decision to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination before the Board. However, Hawkins was not forced to testify. Hawkins invoked his 5th Amendment Rights against self-incrimination.
A hearing was held on January 8, 2016, at which Petitioner renewed his request for a continuance until after the criminal charges were resolved. The Board denied the continuance request. Therefore, Hawkins asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and did not answer any questions. This looks horrible in a hearing.
Prior to the hearing, the parties exchanged pre-hearing statements, identified witnesses and exhibits, and participated in a pre-hearing conferences. On the day before the hearing, Petitioner requested a continuance via email, until Hawkins’ criminal charges were resolved. The Department opposed the continuance request. The Board denied the continuance, noting that Petitioner had previously been granted a continuance, had indicated that he was available for the hearing on January 8, 2016, had participated in a pre-hearing conference a few days prior, and had failed to identify an emergent reason for requiring a continuance.
Initially, the continuance request was handled improperly. Either at a pre-hearing conference, or in a separate motion to continue the hearing, counsel for Hawkins should have sought a continuance much sooner, with greater vigor. Counsel, not Hawkins, put his client in the trap the licensee board prosecutors set. The Board prosecutor set the trap, showed the trap to counsel, and counsel messed up the case. The matter should have been continued way before the hearing until after the criminal case had resolved.
In reviewing the choice to testify or not, the Board looked to prior case law. In Herberg v. Commonwealth, State Board of Medical Education & Licensure, 42 A.2d 411, 412 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982), a physician’s medical license was revoked and the physician argued that during the hearing before the board, his rights pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution were violated. The physician invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination so that his testimony before the board could not be used in a later criminal proceeding. Commonwealth Court determined that:
‘[T]here [is nothing] inherently repugnant to due process in requiring the doctor to choose between giving testimony at the disciplinary hearing, a course that may help the criminal prosecutors, and keeping silent, a course that may lead to the loss of his license.'[A]bsent a finding that a physician was forced to testify against himself, a medical disciplinary board was not constitutionally required to stay its proceedings until the criminal prosecutions against the doctor were over.
In Hawkins, the licensee was called as a witness, chose not to testify, and was not forced to testify. Thus, Hawkins’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not violated because the Board honored his choice not to testify. Further, due process rights are not violated simply because a decision on whether to testify is arduous. See PSI Upsilon v. University of Pennsylvania, 591 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. Super. 1991). Hawkins made what was assuredly a hard decision not to testify; however, making this decision did not result in a violation of his due process rights. See Herberg, 42 A.2d at 413. The Board did not err or abuse its discretion when it held Hawkins’ disciplinary hearing prior to his criminal proceeding, thus making Hawkins choose between testifying or asserting his privilege against self-incrimination.
Call me to talk about your case, investigators wanting you to give a pre-complaint statement, and how to handle your up coming hearing.